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Since the emergence of the internet, the growth and development of communication tech-
nologies have presented new opportunities for collaboration. Practitioners in almost every 
industry can now collaborate with the skilled personnel across a range of fields, regardless 
of their geographic location. This contemporary working arrangement is referred to 
as Distributed Collaboration, which I define as the pursuit of a shared objective by 
groups that include non-proximate members, whose participation is facilitated by ICT. 
However, Distributed Collaboration is not without drawbacks. The dispersed and volatile 
nature of numerous participants makes these groups vulnerable to many challenges, pri-
marily, free-riding, production blocking, evaluation apprehension, and perceptions of 
fairness.  
Meanwhile, Blockchain technology has emerged over the last decade, initially to facilitate 
the cryptocurrency market. However, research interest has recently focused on its poten-
tial to support non-financial use-cases such as the ability to track assets, both digital and 
physical, in a secure, transparent, and immutable manner. These technological capabili-
ties of Blockchain would suggest it has the potential to support Distributed Collaboration 
by tracking individual contributions across a distributed ledger. Therefore, the objective 
of this thesis is to explore Distributed Collaboration and the potential of Blockchain as 
an enabling technology. 
This research was initiated by examining the potential of Blockchain to enable Distributed 
Collaboration from a macro-level perspective through the lens of the cryptocurrency mar-
ket. The market can be considered a network of distributed participants, communicating 
XI 
 
to evaluate Blockchain as a technology. The findings show that in the absence of estab-
lished factors and methods to evaluate cryptocurrencies, market participants rely on social 
cues to evaluate the assets.  
Next, I conducted a first iteration of Design Science Research (DSR) by exploring the 
potential for Blockchain to address the issue of free-riding in cross-functional groups. 
This endeavour found that there was potential. However, a more comprehensive under-
standing of the components of this research was required in order to extract theoretical 
and practical contributions. 
Therefore, a systematic literature review was performed to synthesise a comprehensive 
definition of Distributed Collaboration, as well as developing an understanding of the 
factors which lead to the success of these groups.  
Following this, qualitative interview data were gathered and analysed from practitioners 
operating in Distributed Collaboration to develop an understanding of the challenges 
faced when operating in this environment and the necessary components for a potential 
system to alleviate these issues.  
Finally, I completed a second iteration of DSR to rigorously investigate the potential of 
Blockchain to support Distributed Collaboration. A Blockchain-enabled system was de-
veloped, implementing the design construct of Creative Ancestry to improve perceptions 
of fairness in Distributed Collaboration. Findings show that Blockchain increases percep-
tions of fairness and thus improves overall collaboration.  
My research has implications for theory, practice, and future research. I provide a core 
model for successful Distributed Collaboration and detail how to implement a Block-
chain-enabled system that addresses key issues. I also illustrate the presence of herding 
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behaviour in the cryptocurrency market and how market participants are prone to ampli-
fied reactions to changes in the price of assets. These findings and their implications are 




Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Introduction to this study 
The objective of this research is to explore Distributed Collaboration and the potential 
of Blockchain as an enabling technology. This study provides contributions to both our 
understanding of Distributed Collaboration as well as the application of Blockchain as an 
emerging technology with vast potential across a host of industries. This is a thesis by 
publication and is structured as the following introduction chapter, a collection of five 
completed research papers, and a discussion and conclusion chapter. In this chapter, I will 
begin by contextualising my research through an overview of Distributed Collaboration, 
Blockchain, and the relationship I see between the two. Then, I will discuss what moti-
vated me to undertake this research. Following this, I will give an overview of my re-
search philosophy, research approach, and a summary of each of the five completed re-
search papers. Finally, I will provide an insight into the major contributions of my study. 
1.2 Research Context 
To achieve my research objective an understanding of Distributed Collaboration, Block-
chain, and the relationship between them is required to set the context for the Chapters to 
follow. 
1.2.1 What is Distributed Collaboration 
Distributed Collaboration is a term which has been developed over the course of this 
research to encapsulate collaborative arrangements whereby large numbers of partici-
pants work with one another in order to achieve a shared objective or collectively decide 
on a particular course of action. Distributed Collaboration is, therefore, defined as the 
pursuit of a shared objective by groups that include non-proximate members, whose par-
ticipation is facilitated by ICT. The methodology for developing this definition is detailed 
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in Chapter 3. Distributed Collaboration has been adopted by a plethora of industries, in-
cluding Open Source Software development, the sharing of information through sites 
such as Wikipedia, the design of clothing, and even developing new flavour combinations 
for food (Forbes & Schaefer, 2017). A full discussion of the different forms of Distributed 
Collaboration is detailed in Appendix 9.2. However, these examples are instance-specific. 
Although the size of these groups can be large in numbers, and members can be dispersed 
across the globe, their ‘shared objective’ is specific to their particular group. Distributed 
Collaboration can also occur between dispersed participants across an entire market (e.g. 
the cryptocurrency market) whereby participants collectively reach consensus regarding 
the value of the market’s assets. 
1.2.2 What is Blockchain 
Blockchain, at a fundamental level, is a chronological database of transactions recorded 
by a network of computers, the term ‘Blockchain’ refers to these transactions being 
grouped in blocks, and the chain of these blocks forms the accepted history of transactions 
(Peters & Panayi, 2016). This research examines Blockchain both as the technology 
which supports cryptocurrencies and also as a platform for decentralised applications. 
Upon undertaking this research, the Blockchain industry was still very much in its in-
fancy. It had been 8 years since Satoshi had released the Bitcoin whitepaper (Nakamoto, 
2008), and the cryptocurrency was perhaps best known for its infamous role in contro-
versies relating to Mt. Gox and Silk Road in the previous years. Simultaneously, the first 
cryptocurrency network to support smart contract development, Ethereum, had been 
launched a mere 11 months previous and Blockchain-enabled applications were few and 
far between.  
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Blockchain owes its popularity to its role as the underlying technology of major crypto-
currencies. The largest Blockchain-based cryptocurrency at the time of writing and the 
technological foundation on which other cryptocurrencies are built is Bitcoin. Bitcoin was 
designed to allow individuals from anywhere in the world to send funds to one another in 
a truly peer-to-peer nature without needing a central intermediary (Nakamoto, 2008). The 
Bitcoin protocol was released during the global financial crisis when trust in the tradi-
tional, centralised banking system was low (Earle, 2009; Weber, 2014).  
Other assets then emerged on the market. Litecoin was released in October 2011 by 
Charles Lee to improve on perceived shortcomings of Bitcoin (Sapuric, Kokkinaki, & 
Georgiou, 2017). Specifically, Litecoin sought to address slow transaction times, the pre-
determined coin supply cap, and the reliance on powerful and specialised equipment to 
participate in the network (Sapuric et al., 2017; Sovbetov, 2018). Ethereum was intro-
duced to transcend purely financial uses and instead facilitate smart contracts and distrib-
uted applications (Ethereum, 2018). Ethereum does this by building an abstract founda-
tional layer: a Blockchain with a built-in Turing-complete programming language, allow-
ing anyone to write smart contracts and decentralised applications (Sapuric et al., 2017). 
As a platform for the development of decentralised applications, Blockchain is a way of 
recording interactions in a structured and secure manner, offering increased fault toler-
ance and availability (Peters & Panayi, 2016; Swan, 2015; Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016).  
Several companies including Microsoft, IBM and Maersk have conducted their own re-
search to develop a proof-of-concept Blockchain solutions to fit their respective needs 
(Beck & Müller-Bloch, 2017; Hyvärinen, Risius, & Friis, 2017; Nærland, Müller-Bloch, 
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Beck, & Palmund, 2017). I, therefore, saw the potential for how the same security, scala-
bility, and scrutiny which Blockchain has brought to these industries could also benefit 
Distributed Collaboration 
1.2.3 The potential impact of Blockchain for Distributed Collaboration 
As with any technology, Blockchain becomes redundant without an appropriate use-case. 
I became increasingly interested in the potential of Blockchain to secure intellectual prop-
erty. Early-stage applications demonstrated the power of Blockchain; for example, 
proofofexistence.com showcased how any file could be immutably, securely and trans-
parently stored on the Blockchain. Similarly, Ujomusic provided an interesting example 
of how Blockchain could be used to disintermediate the production of music, creating a 
platform which paid musicians directly for the sale of their IP. Distributed Collaboration 
is another use-case where intellectual property disputes are a common issue. 
Distributed Collaboration evolved from what was traditionally co-located teams 
(Eppinger & Chitkara, 2006; Gupta, Mattarelli, Seshasai, & Broschak, 2009). The emer-
gence and development of communication technologies afforded these groups the oppor-
tunity to broaden their scope beyond their immediate geographic proximity and harness 
resources from dispersed locations. This presented an opportunity for traditional organi-
sations to expand but also for individual participants to join different organisations or 
even collaborate independent of formal organisations to achieve their shared goal.  
In this increasingly disintermediated or ‘flat’ world, Blockchain has emerged as a seem-
ingly ideal solution. Tracking individual contributions in Distributed Collaboration is es-
sentially supply chain management for intellectual property. Thus, I examined Block-
chain applications which had implemented supply chain management tools to capture the 
origins of component products, for example, Provenance in product assembly 
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(Provenance, 2015) and Everledger in the diamonds industry (Everledger, 2017). Block-
chain boasts the ability to remove the need to intermediaries and central authorities and 
eliminate the reliance of trust between collaborating parties.  
Blockchain also supports Distributed Collaboration on a macro-level in the form of the 
cryptocurrency market. Over the course of this research lifecycle, the cryptocurrency 
market experienced extraordinary growth, from less than 600 cryptocurrencies in July 
2016 to over 2300 cryptocurrencies available in June 2019 (Graphics, 2019). As well as 
this, the leading cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, underwent a price increase from approximately 
$600 to approximately $12,000 in this same time frame, reaching a peak of almost 
$20,000 (coinmarketcap.com, 2019). I analyse the cryptocurrency market as a Distributed 
Collaboration network whereby movements in the price of different cryptocurrencies is a 
reflection of the consensus public perception of each of the assets available in the market. 
The public, permissionless nature of leading cryptocurrencies including Bitcoin, Litecoin, 
and Ethereum makes this particularly interesting to analyse because of the low barrier to 
entry for new market participants.  
1.3 Research Motivation 
My motivation for undertaking this research can be categorised as theoretical and prag-
matic. Theoretically, the focus of this research was motivated by the nascent stage of 
Blockchain literature. In particular, this research was motivated by the lack of research 
investigating Blockchain as a technology for non-financial applications. Given the obvi-
ous association between Blockchain and cryptocurrencies, research in this domain has 
primarily focused on finance and related fields (Holub & Johnson, 2018). Blockchain had 
been suggested as an appropriate technology to secure intellectual property (Swan, 2015; 
Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016) and Distributed Collaboration certainly requires an efficient 
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IP management solution given the volume of contributions in these groups (Ren & Kraut, 
2011; Tsai & Bagozzi, 2014). The potential for individuals to collaborate in organised 
groups has evolved from exclusively co-located, face-to-face environments, to distrib-
uted, digitally-enabled groups with the growth and development of ICT (Gallupe et al., 
1992). Blockchain, as an emerging, disruptive technology, could be the catalyst for the 
next evolution in this domain. As such, the potential for Blockchain to enable Distributed 
Collaboration presented itself as an intriguing theoretical proposition. 
Pragmatically, I was motivated to conduct this research as it was an opportunity to work 
with and educate practitioners who were looking to learn what Blockchain as a disruptive 
technology could do for their business. I consider this to be an essential element of my 
research as it is important for practitioners to not only be aware of Blockchain, but also 
to understand how it operates, how it differs from traditional technologies, and the bene-
fits it can offer.   
Therefore, in addition to the academic outputs which will be presented in the following 
Chapters, I was conscious of pursuing an active approach to developing a comprehensive 
understanding of Blockchain and cryptocurrencies, which I could then share with practi-
tioners. I saw this research as a unique opportunity to gain expertise in an emerging, dis-
ruptive domain. Therefore, I participated in a number of extra-curricular activities to en-
hance my research. 
First, considering the incredible growth of cryptocurrencies over the course of the last 
three years, especially in 2017, I was keen not to miss the opportunity. I bought a small 
amount of cryptocurrency in February 2017 and revelled in the excitement of speculating 
what I was going to spend my fortunes on, only to stubbornly follow the ‘HODL’ (Hold 
on for Dear Life) strategy and watch my profits dwindled in 2018.  
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Second, in an effort to expose myself to every element of Blockchain, I purchased a Rasp-
berry Pi computer, joined a mining group, and began to mine smaller cryptocurrencies. 
Needless to say, given the highly competitive nature of cryptocurrency mining over the 
last three years and my extremely limited computing resources I did not yield any profits 
worth mentioning, but again I saw this as a valuable learning experience. 
Third, I quickly came to understand that Blockchain was developing at a much faster pace 
than I could ever keep up with. Therefore, the best way to remain up to date with the latest 
advancements was, in the spirit of Distributed Collaboration, sharing what I had learned 
and collaborating with others who were interested in the technology. I wrote speculative, 
industry-focused articles detailing my opinions on the development, growth and adoption 
of cryptocurrencies and Blockchain, two of which were published in Cutter and the Sun-
day Business Post (Appendix 9.5). I also discussed my thoughts at length during a local 
podcast in February 2018 and presented at a number of Meetup events for Blockchain in 
Cork City. These settings were an excellent opportunity to discuss developments with 
other interested parties without the pressure of adhering to academic rigour. I was also 
asked to present an Introduction to Blockchain guest lecture on a number of occasions in 
UCC, the Irish Management Institute (IMI), and National University of Ireland, Galway 
(NUIG), as well as giving the opening presentation for Blockchain Ireland Week in UCC 
in May 2019, where I presented on Blockchain 101 and Threats to Future Growth. In 
addition, I attended countless lectures and presentations on Blockchain, most notably at 
the World Blockchain Summit in Shanghai, 2016. Again, these were priceless learning 
experiences to expose myself to the latest developments in the industry. 
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1.4 Research Philosophy 
The research presented in this thesis assumes a critical realist ontology. A critical realist 
understands that our knowledge of reality is a result of social conditioning and, therefore, 
is dependent on the social actors involved in deriving this knowledge (Krauss, 2005). 
Critical realism makes a distinction between the real, the actual, and the empirical. The 
definition of the real notes two things; first, the real domain consists of structures of 
objects, both physical and social, with capacities for behaviour called mechanisms. 
Mechanisms are simply defined as a causal structure that explains a phenomenon 
(Bygstad & Munkvold, 2011). These mechanisms may (or may not) trigger events in the 
domain of the actual. Second, the real is the realm of objects, their structures and powers 
(Sayer, 1999). To build our knowledge of a stratum – that is, to find out what explains it 
– we need to examine the mechanisms of underlying strata. In the natural sciences, mech-
anisms are more tangible and easier to measure, for example, gravity or air pressure. 
However, in social settings it may not be possible to see or physically touch the mecha-
nisms represented, norms and roles, personality and attitude, and culture are all examples 
of mechanisms in social settings (McAvoy & Butler, 2018). 
The methodological approach of a critical realist, contrary to positivist research, is to 
uncover and describe the mechanisms that produced these events. This is achieved 
through retroduction; the process of taking an empirical observation and hypothesize a 
mechanism that might explain that particular outcome (Danermark, Ekstrom, & Jakobsen, 
2002). For example, while we may observe buyers and sellers agree on prices and vol-
umes, the underlying market mechanism is unobservable. Mechanisms are proposed to 
constitute the “nuts and bolts” of middle range theory, however, if a mechanism is too 
general it loses explanatory power, if it is too specific it becomes relevant only in the 
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single context where it was identified (Bygstad & Munkvold, 2011). Critical realists em-
phasize that the outcome of a mechanism is contextual, i.e. dependent on other mecha-
nisms. Thus, a mechanism may produce an outcome in one context, and another in a 
different context. 
In the context of my research a number of mechanisms were identified, for example, in 
Chapter 2, while we observe that the cryptocurrency market is extremely volatile, the 
unobservable mechanism has been the presence of herding in the market and the social 
amplification of risk being caused by insufficient information. Also, in Chapter 6 we ob-
serve that the application of Blockchain had a positive influence on Distributed Collabo-
ration, the application of a mid-range causal theory highlighted social justice as the un-
derlying mechanism which is facilitated through Creative Ancestry.  
The actual is the realm of practices/processes and events, i.e., the result of what happens 
when those powers are activated (Sayer, 1999). Finally, the empirical refers to the realm 
where social actors experience the real and the actual which may be observable or not 
(Sayer, 1999). Crucially, critical realism recognises the possibility that what has happened 
or been known to have happened does not exhaust what could happen or have happened 
(Sayer, 1999). 
Critical realism is particularly applicable in the IS field as Information Systems is a prac-
tice-based research domain, which encourages the use of both natural and social science 
(Zachariadis, Scott, & Barrett, 2013). Critical realism is compatible with a wide range of 
research methods and rejects prescribed methods which allow a researcher to apply them 
without scholarly knowledge of the study in question (Sayer, 1999). While critical realism 
endorses a variety of research methods, it implies that the particular choices should de-
pend on the nature of the object of study and what one wants to learn about it (Sayer, 
10 
 
1999).This was particularly empowering for the purpose of my research. Blockchain and 
Distributed Collaboration are developing, multi-faceted domains and, therefore, require 
a mixed methods research approach, the specifics of the approaches adopted are detailed 
in section 1.5.  
The purpose of this section is to introduce the main research paradigms applied in IS 
research and to justify the selection made for this thesis. A research paradigm is the “basic 
belief system or worldview that guides the investigator not only in choices of a method 
but in ontologically and epistemologically fundamental ways” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
Inquiry paradigms are dictated by the response given by proponents of any given para-
digm to three fundamental questions. The three questions are: 
1. The ontological question, which concerns the forms and nature of reality and, 
therefore, what can be known about it? 
2. The epistemological question, which concerns the nature of the relationship be-
tween the researcher and what can be known. 
3. The methodological question, which concerns how the researcher can go about 
finding out whatever they believe can be known. 
Table 1.1 below illustrates the responses to these questions, adapted from Guba and 
Lincoln (1994), these three fundamental questions are interconnected so that the answer 
to any one question constrain how the others must be answered. 
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Under the positivist research paradigm, the object of study is independent of research-
ers; knowledge is discovered and verified through direct observations or measurements 
of phenomena; facts are established by taking apart a phenomenon to examine its com-
ponent parts (Krauss, 2005). In other words, the data and its analysis are value-free, and 
data does not change because they are being observed (Healy & Perry, 2000). That is, 
researchers view the world through a “one-way mirror” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994).  The 
ontological assumptions can be characterised as naïve realism. Knowledge of “the way 
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things are” is presented independent of time and context. The epistemological assump-
tions can be characterised as dualist and objectivist. However, this can be a criticism of 
this research paradigm as researchers distance themselves from the world they study, ra-
ther than acknowledging the role of the real world in order to better understand their re-
search, as is the case in the other paradigms (Healy & Perry, 2000). 
The post-positivist research paradigm emerged in response to the criticism directed at the 
positivist paradigm. The positivist view stresses the importance of “theory verification” 
where post-positivist focuses on “theory falsification” (Ponterotto, 2005). Post-positivists 
are said to adopt a “critical realist” ontology, in that they assume that there is an objective 
reality, but maintain that due to flawed human intellectual mechanism, this is only imper-
fectly and probabilistically apprehendable (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). The epistemological 
assumptions can be characterised as modified dualist and objectivist; researchers assume 
that it is only ever possible to approximate reality as it is imperfectly apprehensible (Healy 
& Perry, 2000). This paradigm accepts that researchers’ perceptions and feelings influ-
ence observations and findings, meaning that reality is seen through the eyes of the re-
searcher and is, therefore, not necessarily the precise view of reality (Teddlie & 
Tashakkori, 2009). In conclusion, the complex, subjective nature of researching the utility 
of emerging technology such as Blockchain to support a dynamic use-case like Distrib-
uted Collaboration influenced the adoption of a critical realist approach. 
Under the critical theory research paradigm, the researcher focuses on the social realities, 
aiming to critique and transform social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender 
values (Healy & Perry, 2000). The ontological assumptions can be characterised as his-
torical realism, meaning that knowledge is grounded in social and historical routines. In 
contrast to the positivist research paradigm, knowledge is value-dependent (Guba & 
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Lincoln, 1994). The epistemological assumptions of critical theory can be characterised 
as transactional and subjectivist, meaning that researchers rely on conversations and re-
flections to develop their view of reality, often making subjective assumptions. Therefore, 
knowledge is value-dependent (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Ponterotto, 2005). 
Under the constructivist research paradigm, knowledge is established through the mean-
ings attached to the phenomena studied; researchers interact with the subjects of study to 
obtain data; inquiry changes both researcher and subject; and knowledge is context and 
time-dependent (Krauss, 2005). The ontological assumptions can be characterised as rel-
ativism, which assumes that there are multiple, apprehendable realities which may even 
conflict one another. Reality is the product of the observer and can change as people 
become more informed (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Ponterotto, 2005).The epistemological 
assumptions can be characterised as transactional and subjectivist; therefore, knowledge 
creation occurs from the interactions between the investigator and respondents (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994). 
1.5 Research Approach 
Blockchain and cryptocurrencies naturally have a symbiotic relationship. The cryptocur-
rency market is constituted of a network of distributed participants, all with the shared 
objective of collaborating to reach consensus as to the price of the available assets. This 
led me to view the cryptocurrency market itself as a form of Distributed Collaboration. 
Therefore, I pursued an initial study to analyse perceptions of Blockchain technology 
through the lens of the cryptocurrency market. This study is presented in Chapter 2 as a 
macro-level view of Blockchain and Distributed Collaboration (Figure 1.1). I then looked 
to examine how Distributed Collaboration could be enabled at a micro-level by adopting 
a Design Science Research approach.  
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I completed the first iteration Design Science Research (DSR) study in order to explore 
Distributed Collaboration and assess the potential for Blockchain as an enabling technol-
ogy. The product of this research effort was published in the OpenSym Conference, 2017. 
My paper, ‘Exploring the Application of Blockchain Technology to Combat the Effects 
of Social Loafing in Cross-Functional Group Projects’, presented in Chapter 3, detailed 
both my understanding of Distributed Collaboration, the challenges faced by their mem-
bers, as well as showcasing the first proof-of-concept, Blockchain-enabled system I had 
developed to capture users contributions to a group project.  
As shown in Figure 1.1, upon completing this first iteration of DSR, the following three 
papers explore, in far greater detail, particular elements which had been introduced. First, 
I needed to develop a more comprehensive understanding of what I had initially referred 
to as ‘cross-functional groups’, this resulted in the execution of a systematic literature 
review focusing on ‘Distributed Collaboration’, this study is presented in Chapter 4.  
Second, the challenges of free-riding, evaluation apprehension and production blocking 
which had been outlined required further exploration, in order to do so I held a series of 
exploratory interviews with industry participants operating in Distributed Collaboration, 
this study is presented in Chapter 5. While Blockchain has potential to combat these 
challenges, I determined that this was not an ideal application of the technology. I cate-
gorised this intra-organisational Distributed Collaboration as ‘Low Participation / Low 
Competition’ (Appendix 9.2). I then identified that Blockchain would better facilitate 
‘High Participation / High Competition’, which became the focus of the following chap-
ter. 
Third, given the comprehensive understanding of Distributed Collaboration and the chal-
lenges faced in this type of work, I assessed how Blockchain could be implemented as an 
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enabling technology. I further developed the Blockchain system, which is introduced in 
Chapter 2. I then rigorously evaluated its potential to capture individual contributions to 
a group. This process of designing, building, testing and, evaluating this system is pre-
sented in Chapter 6.  
 
Figure 1.1 Overview of research objectives in each Chapter  
•Quantitative study using the 
cryptocurrency market as a 
lens to assess how Distributed 
Collaborators evaluate 
Blockchain as a technology.
Chapter 2
•First iteration of Design Science 
Research looking at collaborative 
groups, the challenges they face, and 
how Blockchain could potentially 
provide a solution.
Chapter 3
•Literature Review – Comprehensive 
overview of Distributed Collaboration and 
the factors that contribute to its success.Chapter 4
•Exploratory study of first-hand accounts of the 
challenges with working in Distributed 
Collaboration and the potential of technology to 
overcome these.
Chapter 5
•Second iteration of DRS to Design, Build, Test, and Evaluate 
a Blockchain-enabled system to overcome the challenges 




1.6 Research Overview and Main Contributions 
An overview of my research is illustrated in Figure 1.2 below. 
 
Figure 1.2 Research Contributions Overview 
As detailed in Figure 1.2, due to the multidisciplinary nature of my research, and in keep-
ing with the critical realism ontology adopted for this research, I chose to apply a selection 
of research approaches in order to produce a comprehensive body of work to explore 
Distributed Collaboration and the potential of Blockchain as an enabling technology. My 
research started by exploring the potential of Blockchain to enable Distributed Collabo-
ration through the lens of the cryptocurrency market. I then focused on a Design Science 
Research approach to explore Distributed Collaboration and the potential of Blockchain 
as an enabling technology. DSR is an iterative process which I started in Chapter 3 and 
refined over the following three chapters. Each paper builds on the previous study and 
makes additional contributions to our understanding of Distributed Collaboration and the 
potential of Blockchain as an enabling technology as follows: 
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1. In Chapter 2, I analyse Distributed Collaboration on a macro-scale, through the 
lens of the cryptocurrency market. I view the market as a whole as a network of 
distributed participants, collaborating with the objective of evaluating cryptocur-
rencies and their underlying technology, Blockchain. 
2. The paper presented in Chapter 3 details the development of the first iteration of 
a proof-of-concept, Blockchain-enabled application which could capture individ-
ual contributions. This chapter represents an exploratory study into Blockchain 
for non-financial applications. This Chapter targets the problem of free-riding in, 
what I then referred to as cross-functional group projects. This study is now pub-
lished in the OpenSym conference (O'Leary et al., 2017). 
3. In my Literature Review presented in Chapter 4, I systematically explore the area 
of cross-functional groups. From this point, my research refers to this working 
arrangement as Distributed Collaboration, and a comprehensive definition is de-
veloped based on a number of popular synonyms found in the extant literature. 
Using a concept-centric approach as suggested by Webster and Watson (2002) I 
also illustrate a model for successful Distributed Collaboration. 
4. In Chapter 5, I investigate the challenges which can disrupt Distributed Collab-
oration by conducting exploratory interviews with industry participants and ana-
lysing these interviews using Open, Axial, and Selective Coding methods. This 
chapter builds on the challenge of free-riding which was presented in Chapter 2 
by discussing the other major difficulties of this type of work as well as gaining 




5.  The potential of Blockchain as an enabling technology for Distributed Collabo-
ration, is thoroughly investigated in Chapter 6, whereby the proof-of-concept 
system, which was initially developed for Chapter 3 is redesigned, redeveloped, 
and rigorously evaluated. The Design Science Research approach adopted for this 
chapter necessitates the development of two artefacts, first, the system instantia-
tion, and second, the design construct of Creative Ancestry.  
As a collection of research papers, this thesis contributes to the research domain by first, 
analysing Distributed Collaboration as a social construct. Second, this thesis assesses the 
role of technology in collaborative groups. Third, my research conducts a feasibility study 
of the application of Blockchain as a technology beyond financial use-cases, detailing not 
only that it can be implemented but also how to do so. Fourth, this research highlights the 
need to differentiate Blockchain technology from cryptocurrencies. Fifth, I have illus-
trated the unique user experience with a Blockchain-enabled application. A detailed dis-
cussion of these thesis-level contributions is presented in the conclusion Chapter of this 
thesis. 
A summary of each of my research papers is shown in Table 1.2 below: 
19 
 
Table 1.2 Summary of Methods, Data and Findings of each Chapter 
Chapter Peer Review Analysis 
Method 
Key Data Key Findings 
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1.7 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
The process of conducting the research I present in this thesis has afforded me the oppor-
tunity to develop a deep understanding of Distributed Collaboration as an approach to 
work which is continuously implemented across all industries and disciplines, as well as 
Blockchain as an emerging and disruptive technology. Through pursuing a thesis by pub-
lication, I had the opportunity to tackle my research with a multidisciplinary approach. 
This allowed me to experience every element of my domain, analysing existing literature 
to build a foundational understanding, interviewing participants with first-hand experi-
ence of operating in this domain, designing and building a system instantiation, and rig-
orously analysing the cryptocurrency market.  
The multiple iterations of peer review that each research paper has undergone has ulti-
mately strengthened both the content and delivery of my work. One of the papers has 
been published, another has undergone two rounds of review for a special issue and is 
now under review with another top academic journal, while the remaining three papers 
are all under review in peer-reviewed journals. 
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I am confident that the content of this thesis is rigorous and comprehensive in its methods, 
definitive and accurate in its findings, and is presented in a manner which makes signifi-




Chapter 2. “Information is the resolution of uncertainty”: The 
reliance on social perceptions to evaluate the price of 
cryptocurrencies 
2.1 Abstract 
The last number of years have seen the emergence and rapid growth of Blockchain tech-
nologies. Bitcoin has been widely credited for driving public confidence in Blockchain 
as a revolutionary operational technology, due to the financial investment Bitcoin has 
attracted as a cryptocurrency. Yet this relationship remains untested. Do changes in the 
price of Bitcoin actually predict changes in the prices of other cryptocurrencies? What do 
cryptocurrency prices tell us about public perceptions of Blockchain as a technology for 
further development? The objective of this study is to examine how increased reliance on 
social cues impacts changes to the price of cryptocurrencies. This research looks to show 
that in the absence of complete information and established methods for evaluating cryp-
tocurrencies, investors rely on social perceptions to determine the price, this ultimately 
leads to uncertainty and large fluctuations in the market. Applying the dual lenses of 
herding and social amplification of risk we hypothesize how public perceptions cascade 
across Blockchain platforms/cryptocurrencies. Specifically, we investigate changing 
daily price data for Bitcoin (BTC), Litecoin (LTC), and Ether (ETH). Surprisingly, results 
show Ether is the best predictor of changing prices, not Bitcoin. This suggests perceptions 
of Blockchain as a platform may be driving prices of cryptocurrencies. We further show 
these effects are stronger when prices are more extreme, consistent with existing research 
on the social amplification of risk.  






The last number of years has seen extraordinary growth in the cryptocurrency market, 
peaking in late 2017 before stabilizing in 2018. Bitcoin, the largest cryptocurrency, re-
ported a rise in price of over 1300% in 2017, having reached a record high in December 
of $17,899.70 (coinmarketcap.com, 2019). Ether, the underlying cryptocurrency of the 
Ethereum network, outperformed Bitcoin in terms of percentage price increase in the 
same year, rising in price by more than 9,000% the same year, from a closing price of 
$8.17 on New Year’s Day 2017 to $756.73 on New Year’s Eve (coinmarketcap.com, 
2019). Recent prices are more modest, with BTC trading at $10,210 and ETH at $281 at 
the time of writing (coinmarketcap.com, 2019). However, cryptocurrencies continue to 
attract significant attention, most recently with the announcement that Facebook is to 
launch its own cryptocurrency, Libra (Andriotis, Rudegeair, & Hoffman, 2019). 
Naturally, there is a symbiotic relationship between perceptions of the potential of cryp-
tocurrencies and public confidence in Blockchain, the underlying technology (Li & 
Wang, 2017). Research has shown that increased interest, measured through Google 
search trend, in cryptocurrencies and Blockchain are positively correlated (Sovbetov, 
2018). This trend has been reflected in academic research, which has looked to establish 
the determinants of cryptocurrency price formation (Cheah & Fry, 2015; Georgoula, 
Pournarakis, Bilanakos, Sotiropoulos, & Giaglis, 2015; Kristoufek, 2013; Li & Wang, 
2017), while also focusing on the potential of Blockchain technology (Beck, Czepluch, 
Lollike, & Malone, 2016; Beck, Müller-Bloch, & King, 2018; Hyvärinen et al., 2017). 
These wild growth spurts raise questions regarding how these cryptocurrencies are val-
ued. Certain studies suggest they are naturally prone to bubble behaviour (Cheah & Fry, 
2015; Cheung, Roca, & Su, 2015; Fry & Cheah, 2016), comparable to Internet stocks of 
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the 1990s rather than a true currency (Yermack, 2015). Other streams of research suggest 
a sustainable value, due to the practical benefits of Blockchain such as addressing the 
double-spend problem, lowering transaction costs, and improving fraud detection (Van 
Alstyne, 2014). Others recognise the dual nature of cryptocurrencies and includes the 
joint determination of technology and economic factors (Li & Wang, 2017). These di-
verse perceptions show that evaluating a cryptocurrency is undoubtedly different from 
evaluating traditional financial assets. Fiat currencies can be evaluated by examining the 
economic state of the issuing nation, the corresponding exchange rates, or the trade bal-
ance (Hopper, 1997). Similarly, a company’s stock price can be evaluated by measuring 
factors such as customer satisfaction (Fornell, Mithas, Morgeson III, & Krishnan, 2006) 
and ownership structure (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). Cryptocurrencies do not allow 
investors the same capacity to ground and triangulate their perceptions with perceptions 
of established economic indicators which would be typically used to evaluate traditional 
organisations or economies. Thus, the value of a cryptocurrency is almost entirely deter-
mined by how investors perceive and pre-empt the evaluations of other investors.  
The objective of this study is to examine how increased reliance on social cues impacts 
changes to the price of cryptocurrencies. This research looks to show that in the absence 
of complete information and established methods for evaluating cryptocurrencies, inves-
tors rely on social perceptions to determine the price, this ultimately leads to uncertainty 
and large fluctuations in the market. 
In order to achieve this objective, we build on an emerging body of extant literature which 
has found volatility connectedness and herding behaviour in the cryptocurrency market, 
especially in periods of uncertainty (Bouri, Gupta, & Roubaud, 2018; da Gama Silva, 
Klotzle, Pinto, & Gomes, 2019; Stavroyiannis & Babalos, 2019; Vidal-Tomás, Ibáñez, & 
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Farinós, 2018; Yi, Xu, & Wang, 2018). This study contributes to this existing research 
which has identified herding in the market through the additional application of the Social 
Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF). SARF is a mechanism which explains how 
individuals rely on social observation in situations where the stakes are high and infor-
mation is limited (Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996; Renn, Burns, Kasperson, Kasperson, 
& Slovic, 1992).  
In the next section we will discuss the emergence of cryptocurrencies. This section de-
scribes how Bitcoin, Ether, and Litecoin were developed and the similarities and differ-
ences between each. Following this, we discuss how investors perceive and pre-empt the 
evaluations of other investors, culminating in the two hypotheses for this study. These 
hypotheses predict that movements in Bitcoin precede movements in the other cryptocur-
rencies and that this pattern increases when these movements are more extreme. Next, the 
methods and results for the study are presented, which suggest movements in the price of 
Ether (ETH) are actually more likely to precede movements in Bitcoin (BTC) and Lite-
coin (LTC). These findings are then discussed with regard to different investor popula-
tions and the role of investor perceptions of underlying Blockchain technologies. 
2.3 The Emergence of Cryptocurrencies 
Cryptocurrencies are built on Blockchain technology. The Blockchain records transac-
tions in blocks of data which are verified by a network of peers in an immutable, crypto-
graphically secure manner (Beck et al., 2018). The largest Blockchain-based cryptocur-
rency at the time of writing, and the technological foundation on which other cryptocur-
rencies are built is Bitcoin. Bitcoin was designed to allow individuals from anywhere in 
the world to send funds to one another in a truly peer-to-peer nature without needing a 
central intermediary (Nakamoto, 2008). The Bitcoin protocol was released during the 
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global financial crisis when trust in the traditional, centralised banking system was low 
(Earle, 2009; Weber, 2014). Since its release Bitcoin has captured the attention of re-
searchers from several different backgrounds, Holub and Johnson (2018) detailed a com-
prehensive literature review of 1206 research papers on Bitcoin, categorizing the research 
across Technology, Accounting, Economics, Finance, Tax, and Regulation. 
Other cryptocurrencies were soon introduced. Litecoin was released in October 2011 by 
Charles Lee to improve on the technical details of Bitcoin (Sapuric et al., 2017). Several 
early competitors to Bitcoin in the cryptocurrency market were developed to address per-
ceived shortcomings in the Bitcoin protocol, Litecoin was one of these early competitors. 
Specifically, Litecoin sought to address slow transaction times, the predetermined coin 
supply cap, and the reliance on powerful and specialised equipment to participate in the 
network (Sapuric et al., 2017; Sovbetov, 2018).  
Ethereum was introduced to transcend purely financial uses and allow the currency to be 
spent for the storage of smart contracts and distributed applications (Ethereum, 2018). 
Ethereum does this by building an abstract foundational layer: a Blockchain with a built-
in Turing-complete programming language, allowing anyone to write smart contracts and 
decentralised applications (Buterin, 2014). Ethereum utilises a cryptocurrency called 
Ether, which acts as the ‘fuel' to run the programming platform. Ether can be traded with 
other currencies, however, it is used for paying for things on the Ethereum network, such 
as creating smart contracts (Casino, Dasaklis, & Patsakis, 2018; Lindman, Tuunainen, & 
Rossi, 2017). This ability to support smart contracts has sparked significant interest 
among researchers and developers, who identify a number of use-cases that extend be-
yond basic financial transactions (Beck et al., 2018; Casino et al., 2018; Hyvärinen et al., 
2017). This interest is not limited to start-ups and academics, many industry consortia 
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have been established to examine the long-term potential, for example, IBM and Samsung 
recently collaborated to explore how Ethereum could support the growing Internet of 
Things networks (Beck et al., 2016). Other suggested applications are intellectual prop-
erty, domain registration, crowdfunding, and prediction markets (Peters & Panayi, 2016; 
Swan, 2015; Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016). 
Despite the obvious interest, the use of cryptocurrencies as a currency has been limited, 
with the majority of market participants seeming to treat cryptocurrencies as a longer-
term investment opportunity. This was reinforced by research by Glaser, Zimmermann, 
Haferkorn, Weber, and Siering (2014), who found that new Bitcoin users increased the 
volume of transactions at the exchange but did not increase the volume of Bitcoin traded 
within the network. This suggests many people buying Bitcoin are not routinely using it 
to pay for goods and services. 
2.4 Herding Behaviour in the Cryptocurrency Market 
Cascading investor behaviour is common in financial markets, a phenomenon often re-
ferred to as herding, i.e. when some agents imitate the prior actions (buying or selling) of 
others (Avery & Zemsky, 1998). Herding behaviour has been researched extensively in 
existing literature, especially in the context of institutional investment (Cakan, Demirer, 
Gupta, & Marfatia, 2019; Deng, Hung, & Qiao, 2018; Rompotis, 2018). More recently, 
herding behaviour has been found to exist in the cryptocurrency market, especially in 
times of heightened uncertainty (Bouri et al., 2018; da Gama Silva et al., 2019; 
Stavroyiannis & Babalos, 2019; Vidal-Tomás et al., 2018; Yi et al., 2018). 
Literature suggests multiple reasons why herding occurs in investment markets. First, 
many individuals have a tendency to disregard their own private information and trade as 
the crowd does for fear of reputational damage that could result from being the outlier 
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(Deng et al., 2018; Scharfstein & Stein, 1990). Even if a trader believes the consensus to 
be wrong, the dangers in acting against the crowd are often disproportionately larger than 
those from following them. Herding behaviour is common in stock markets, where money 
managers operate in an environment of intense competition. For example, in the lead up 
to the October 1987 bull market, professional money managers had largely reached a 
consensus that the prices were too high and were more likely to go down than up. How-
ever, they were slow to sell their holdings, fearing that the prices would continue to rise, 
highlighting them as the lone fools that missed out on the extended profits. They were 
also comforted by the fact that should the prices fall, they would not be the only ones to 
lose money, so everyone would suffer the same fate (Rompotis, 2018; Scharfstein & 
Stein, 1990). This reluctance to sell has been mirrored with the viral cryptocurrency trad-
ing strategy of ‘HODL’, a term which originated as a typo for ‘hold’ but has also been 
suggested as an acronym for ‘hold on for dear life’ (Dierksmeier, 2018; Quest, 2018). 
Second, investors may trade together simply because they may be analysing the same 
indicators and as a result, they are trading off the same private information (Deng et al., 
2018; Froot, Scharfstein, & Stein, 1992). Investors may also infer that others are better 
informed than themselves and thus assume they should trade in the same direction even 
if it is not clear why those trades are desirable (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992; 
Deng et al., 2018; Rompotis, 2018). This is also observable in the cryptocurrency market, 
not least because the sharing of information is legal as cryptocurrencies are not considered 
securities. This has even led to ‘whale watching’ websites and apps which make it easy 
to observe and follow the trading actions of large cryptocurrency holders, commonly re-
ferred to as ‘whales’ (Bouri et al., 2018). 
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Herding has also been used to explain bandwagon effects in technology adoption. If the 
manager of one firm adopts a particular technology this can often lead to other firms 
looking more favourably on this technology and adopting it themselves before conducting 
their own extensive research (Sun, 2013; Walden & Browne, 2009). Although Bitcoin 
remains the largest cryptocurrency in the market, the underlying Blockchain networks of 
each cryptocurrency are far from homogenous. Broadly speaking the market consists of 
(i) Bitcoin (arguably the first true cryptocurrency) (ii) newer alternatives to Bitcoin, or 
‘altcoins’, such as Litecoin (iii) cryptocurrencies to ‘fuel’ multi-purpose Blockchain de-
velopment platforms such as Ethereum which facilitate non-financial use-cases. Each of 
these currencies appears closely tied to the overarching success of the Blockchain para-
digm. Yet each represents an alternative perception of where that eventual success lies. 
Bitcoin suggests the cryptocurrency market will continue to develop along similar lines, 
altcoins suggest the initial technology required refining, while Ethereum suggests the 
value of Blockchain extends beyond cryptocurrencies. Existing research has little insight 
to offer to prioritise these perceptions among the public. Thus, we work from the prelim-
inary assumption that perceptions of value overlap equally in each direction, meaning 
herding will cascade from one currency to another indiscriminately. Thus, we present the 
first hypothesis: 
H1: Changes in the market price of one cryptocurrency will predict changes in the market 
price of other cryptocurrencies. 
2.5 Social Perceptions of Risk Around Cryptocurrencies 
The source of value for Bitcoin is somewhat unorthodox, given it has no formal ties to 
any particular material asset or issuing body.  
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Viewed as a currency, Bitcoin’s lack of affiliation with any particular national economy 
means it is difficult to triangulate its worth with large-scale economic trends. Traditional 
currencies are not simply evaluated in isolation; rather they are compared with specific 
factors such as monetary and fiscal policy, the balance of payments, and other macroeco-
nomic factors which contribute to determining exchange rates of fiat currencies (Hopper, 
1997; Mussa, 1976).  
Viewed as company stock, Bitcoin's lack of affiliation with a particular issuing body 
means it is difficult to triangulate its worth with specific consumer behaviours. Company 
stocks are typically judged on factors such as customer satisfaction (Fornell et al., 2006), 
ownership structure (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000), and customer based brand-equity 
(Lassar, Mittal, & Sharma, 1995; Stocchi & Fuller, 2017). Even this idea of brand-equity 
is comparatively tangible in terms of market returns, e.g. 90% of the total price of $220 
million paid by Cadbury-Schweppes for the ‘Hires’ and ‘Crush’ product lines they ac-
quired from Procter and Gamble were credited to brand assets (Lassar et al., 1995).   
This inability to triangulate the value of cryptocurrencies is compounded by the fact that 
Bitcoin does not yet operate as a widely accepted payment system across multiple mar-
kets, nor is there any underlying value to be derived from its consumption or production 
as is the case with commodities such as gold (Ciaian, Rajcaniova, & Kancs, 2016). Also, 
Bitcoin is not affected by an ownership structure as the creator of the cryptocurrency 
operated under the pseudonym ‘Satoshi Nakamoto’ (Nakamoto, 2008). Additionally, cur-
rency-related attributes such as monetary policy and money supply are predetermined by 
the network protocol of a cryptocurrency and the balance of payments is not relevant 
either as it is not representative of any particular economy (Kristoufek, 2013). This has 
led many to suggest cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin should be considered as speculative 
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assets, with no opportunity of repayment in the future, and whose value is determined 
only by ephemeral market sentiment (Corbet, Meegan, Larkin, Lucey, & Yarovaya, 2018; 
Yermack, 2015).  
This naturally lends itself to wide fluctuations in price for cryptocurrencies; a tendency 
exacerbated by perceived vulnerabilities to hacking attempts and/or criminal misuse 
(Bouoiyour, Selmi, Tiwari, & Olayeni, 2016; Yermack, 2015). Thus, individuals are left 
to judge the value of cryptocurrencies based on social observations. Such circumstances 
are prone to a concept known as social amplification of risk (SARF), i.e. the idea that 
events associated with risks interact with psychological, social, institutional, and cultural 
processes in ways that heighten or attenuate perceptions of risks and shape risk behaviour 
(Renn et al., 1992). In other words, people tend to over or under-react to risk when it must 
be evaluated based on social observations (Kasperson et al., 1988). This means apparently 
minor risk events often result in massive public reactions, while larger risk events often 
seem largely ignored despite a seemingly obvious need for individuals to react. Kasperson 
et al. (1988) suggested amplification occurs in two stages: first in the transfer of infor-
mation about the risk, and second, in the subsequent response mechanisms of society. 
They argue the absence of reliable information often results because direct personal ex-
perience is lacking, meaning individuals learn from other persons and the media, all the 
while debates among experts heighten public uncertainty, and erroneous information 
sources find ready access to the mass media. 
This reliance on public perceptions to determine the price of cryptocurrencies has been 
supported by a number of studies which have found a correlation between increased 
search volume and social media activity and rising prices in cryptocurrencies. It, there-
fore, makes sense the relationship between the price of Bitcoin and search volume related 
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to the cryptocurrency is bi-directional, meaning not only do search queries influence 
price, but the price also influences search queries (Kristoufek, 2013). Garcia, Tessone, 
Mavrodiev, and Perony (2014) looked at Bitcoin bubbles using digital behavioural traces 
of investors in their social media use, search queries, and user base. Their results showed 
positive feedback loops for social media use and the user base. Kristoufek (2015) found 
that interest in Bitcoin has an asymmetric effect during bubble formation and bubble 
bursting whereby, when a bubble is forming, public interest boosts prices higher, but dur-
ing a burst, negative public perceptions pushes prices lower. Indeed, this is typical of 
many financial markets, where social discussion and peer-based propagation of good 
news stories are often key triggers for the entry of new investors (Kaustia & Knüpfer, 
2012). Cryptocurrencies, as an emerging market, are naturally more vulnerable to infor-
mation shocks (Girard & Biswas, 2007). This, combined with cryptocurrencies’ inability 
to triangulate evaluations against those of nations or organisations, leads to our second 
hypothesis:  
H2: The relationship between the market price of one cryptocurrency and the price of 
another will be stronger when that market price is particularly high or low. 
2.6 Method 
Daily price data for Bitcoin, Ether, and Litecoin were collected from Yahoo Finance rang-
ing from January 1st, 2016 to December 31st, 2017, giving a total of 731 observations for 
each time series. The price data for all three cryptocurrencies is represented in terms of 
USD for the purpose of consistency.  
We further gathered price data for three major fiat currencies to examine the extent to 
which changes in cryptocurrencies were a reflection of general market trends; Euro 
(EUR), Sterling (GBP), and Japanese Yen (JPY). As fiat currencies trade on a five-day 
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market and cryptocurrencies trade on a seven-day market, we first analysed weekly price 
data for all six currencies over the same two-year time period to determine the presence 
of any relationships. Table 2.1 details a correlation matrix for each of the currencies. 
These results illustrate a strong positive correlation of greater than 0.9 between all three 
of the cryptocurrencies at the 0.01 level. No correlations were observed between any 
cryptocurrency and Sterling. However, a minor negative correlation is observed between 
JPY and BTC/ETH, and a strong positive correlation is observed between EUR and all 
three cryptocurrencies. In order to analyse these relationships further, it was necessary to 
coordinate the daily price data by inserting values for weekend dates. We did this by using 
the median of Friday and Monday scores as weekend approximates for fiat currencies. 
A detailed overview of the data analysis process employed for this chapter is provided in 
Appendix 9.10, however, in brief, for our first hypothesis, we initially tested each time 
series for stationarity and cointegration (Table 2.2). If each series is stationary, we can 
use the Vector Autoregressive framework and Granger Causality to test the relationship 
between each time series pairing (Table 2.3). Additionally, we tested these relationships 
over time through Impulse-Response analysis, which shows the reaction of one variable 
to a unit shock in the other (Figure 2.1-2.6). The combination of these tests would illus-
trate if changes in the market price of one cryptocurrency will predict changes in the 
market price of other cryptocurrencies.  
Polynomial regression analysis was then employed to test the validity of the second hy-
pothesis which examines the relationship between the market price of one cryptocurrency 
and the price of another and if that relationship will be stronger when that market price is 
particularly high or low (Table 2.4 - 2.6 and Figure 2.6 - 2.9). 
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Table 2.1 Correlation Matrix representing the relationship between fiat and crypto 
currencies 
 Mean price High Low 
Stnd. 
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Table 2.2 Stationarity and Unit-Root Tests 
 KPSS p-value ADF p-value 
Bitcoin Price (daily) 0.01000000 0.9698128 
Bitcoin log price 0.01000000 0.9139713 
Bitcoin Difference 0.03761068 0.0100000 
Bitcoin Log Difference * 0.10000000 0.0100000 
Ether Price (daily) 0.01000000 0.9900000 
Ether log price 0.01000000 0.7150292 
Ether Difference 0.02335312 0.0100000 
Ether Log Difference* 0.10000000 0.0100000 
Litecoin Price (daily) 0.01000000 0.4088454 
Litecoin log price 0.01000000 0.9112676 
Litecoin Difference * 0.10000000 0.0100000 
Litecoin Log Difference * 0.10000000 0.0100000 
Euro Price (daily) 0.01000000 0.8516900 
Euro log price 0.01000000 0.8406418 
Euro Difference * 0.10000000 0.0100000 
Euro Log Difference * 0.10000000 0.0100000 
Japanese Yen Price (daily) 0.01000000 0.3702186 
Japanese Yen log price * 0.10000000 0.0100000 
Japanese Yen Difference * 0.10000000 0.0100000 
Japanese Yen Log Difference * 0.10000000 0.0100000 
“*” = Stationary 
2.7 Findings  
The results below will be presented as they relate to each hypothesis, therefore, we will 
first detail the results of the Granger Causality tests and impulse response functions and 
whether or not these support our first hypothesis. Following this, the results of the poly-
nomial regression analysis will be presented and how these relate to the second hypothe-
sis.  
Table 2.3 illustrates the results of Granger Causality tests based on the VAR model. We 
employ Granger Causality to test the extent to which changes in the market price of each 
cryptocurrency predicts changes in price of the others. We also include EUR and JPY in 
the analysis to examine whether any observed effects may be secondary to changes in 
these currencies. We further calculated an impulse response functions (IRFs) for each 
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combination where Granger Causality was observed to examine the impact of exogenous 
shocks across variables, in the presence of correlated noise (Lütkepohl, 2005). The results 
of these IRFs are plotted in Figures 6.1 - 6.6. This combination of Granger Causality and 
impulse response functions was utilised to account for the finite sample size of the data 
and the multidimensional nature of our analysis (Lütkepohl, 2005). 
The results of the Granger Causality tests and impulse response functions show the price 
of Bitcoin does not predict changes in the market price of Ether, as the p-value fails to 
reject the null hypothesis of no causality. However, when we tested the converse of this 
relationship, the changes in the market price of ETH are found to be a significant predictor 
of the changes in the market price of BTC. IRFs in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate this trend 
further, showing that BTC has little or no impact on ETH as the impulse variable (Figure 
2.1). In contrast, ETH shows a significant impact as an impulse variable on the price of 
BTC, lasting up to four days after the shock (Figure 2.2). When testing the relationship 
between Bitcoin and Litecoin, although the Granger tests suggest causality between the 
pairing, the IRF plot illustrated in Figure 2.3 shows this causality does not persist over 
time. We, therefore, partially accept Hypotheses 1, as it appears it is changes in the price 
of ETH that predict changes in other cryptocurrencies, BTC is not found to be a predictor 
for changes in the price of other cryptocurrencies.  
Looking closer at the overall set of Granger Causality and IRF results, changes in the 
market price of both Bitcoin and Litecoin appear to have no statistically significant impact 
on the market price of Ether. However, changes in the price of ETH do show a significant 
change in the price of both BTC and LTC. Interestingly, this suggests movements in the 
price of Ether are actually more likely to precede movements in Bitcoin and Litecoin. 
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Table 2.3 Granger Causality Test Results for logarithmic difference series 
Log Difference of Original Series 
Lag = 1 BTC ETH LTC EUR JPY 
BTC - 0.1022 0.00007057 *** 0.7181 0.9222 
ETH 0.0000005679 *** - 0.003966 *** 0.8658 0.6947 
LTC 0.0003362 *** 0.9454 - 0.7495 0.817 
EUR 0.5386 0.8914 0.3986 - 0.04938 
JPY 0.8392 0.8772 0.9834 0.4711 - 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
 





Figure 2.2 BTC Response to ETH Impulse 
 
 





Figure 2.4 BTC Response to LTC Impulse 
 
 





Figure 2.6 LTC Response to ETH Impulse 
 
Next, we move to test Hypothesis 2, which predicts the relationship between the market 
price of one cryptocurrency and the price of another will be stronger when that market 
price is particularly high or low. Tables 6.4 – 6.6 provide the results of polynomial re-
gression analysis of the relationship between cryptocurrencies. These polynomials allow 
us to identify whether the relationship between cryptocurrency prices is linear (the rela-
tionship is similar, regardless of whether prices are high or low), curvilinear (the relation-
ship changes when prices are high or low), or s-shaped (the relationship changes when 
prices are high or low, when compared to when they are medium).  
The results in Tables 6.4 – 6.6 suggest the predicted s-shaped relationships provide the 
most explanatory power between ETH and BTC, ETH and LTC, and between BTC and 
LTC (all of the relationships showing Granger Causality). For each of these relationships, 
the cubic model shows the highest R2 and all terms are significant. Interestingly, while 
the shape of the relationship between ETH and BTC is as anticipated, the shape of other 
relationships differs. Notably, it appears that increases in the price of both ETH and BTC 
are most predictive of large, positive changes in LTC price when the prices of ETH and 
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BTC are medium. Increases in prices of ETH and BTC, when those prices are low or 
high, seem to predict either decreases or only marginal increases in LTC price.   
Table 2.4 Polynomial Regression for logarithmic Ether as a predictor of Bitcoin 
Ether as a predictor of Bitcoin 
ETH  0.553714 *** -0.10284 ** 0.35975 *** 
ETH2  0.087686 *** - 0.097022*** 
ETH3   0.019465*** 
ADJ R2 0.862  0.9114  0.9197  
Significance codes:   ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Scatter plot of ETH Logarithmic series (Y-axis) and BTC Logarithmic se-
ries (X-axis) 
 
Table 2.5 Polynomial Regression for logarithmic Ether as a predictor of Litecoin 
Ether as a predictor of Litecoin 
ETH  0.73037 *** -0.32584 *** -0.198210 *** 
ETH2  0.14106*** 0.090101*** 
ETH3   0.005371** 
ADJ R2 0.8942  0.9705  0.9708  





Figure 2.8 Scatter plot of ETH Logarithmic series (Y-axis) and LTC Logarithmic se-
ries (X-axis) 
 
Table 2.6 Polynomial Regression for logarithmic Bitcoin as a predictor of Litecoin 
Bitcoin as a predictor of Litecoin 
BTC  1.24033 *** 0.70024 *** -26.88521 *** 
BTC2  0.03573 ** 3.65764 *** 
BTC3   -0.15647 *** 
ADJ R2 0.917  0.9177  0.9353  
Significance codes:   ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 
 
 





The emergence and rapid growth of the cryptocurrency market has quickly sparked the 
attention of many researchers. Extant research can be broadly categorised as either exam-
ining cryptocurrencies as an alternative to traditional currency and the determinants of its 
price (Cheah & Fry, 2015; Georgoula et al., 2015; Kristoufek, 2013; Li & Wang, 2017), 
or research focused on the potential of the underlying Blockchain technology (Beck et 
al., 2016; Beck et al., 2018; Hyvärinen et al., 2017). Bitcoin is the market leader and often 
considered synonymous with Blockchain and other altcoins (Sovbetov, 2018). Hence, we 
applied the theory of herding behaviour and hypothesized that changes in the market price 
of any one cryptocurrency would predict changes in the market price of other cryptocur-
rencies (Bitcoin, Ether and Litecoin, in this case). Consistent with extant research (Bouri 
et al., 2018), we found herding behaviour to be a powerful mechanism in the cryptocur-
rency market. Specifically, our results found that it is Ether prices that seem to precede 
changes in the price of other cryptocurrencies. Equally interestingly, while changes in 
Ether are more predictive of changes in Bitcoin when prices are especially high or low, 
the relationship with Litecoin is different. Litecoin prices appear less likely to increase 
with Ether and Bitcoin prices when prices are especially high or low. These findings pro-
vide an interesting insight into how the cryptocurrency market facilitates a network of 
distributed participants to collaborate and determine the price of the assets being traded. 
The concept of Blockchain as an enabling technology for Distributed Collaboration will 
be explored in detail in the chapters to follow.  
The first contribution of this research concerns the approach to evaluating cryptocurren-
cies. First, this research has shown that changes in cryptocurrency prices are not obviously 
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preceded by changes in other fiat currencies. This observation is consistent with the find-
ings of Corbet et al. (2018) who concluded that cryptocurrencies are isolated from market 
shocks and are decoupled from popular financial assets. This supports the basic underly-
ing assumptions of this research that the value of cryptocurrencies is difficult to ground 
in specific economies and institutions. This is valuable as existing literature is somewhat 
divided on this matter. Some conclude the market is a speculative bubble similar to inter-
net stocks in the 1990s (Bouoiyour & Selmi, 2015; Yermack, 2015), others focus on the 
practical side and believe Bitcoin has demonstrated that cryptocurrencies offer value as a 
currency (Van Alstyne, 2014). Other research has attributed the value of Bitcoin to its 
technical components, such as the difficulty of mining coins, the rate of unit production, 
and the cryptographic algorithm employed (Hayes, 2017). This is in stark contrast to tra-
ditional stocks which are determined by recognised factors such as customer satisfaction 
(Fornell et al., 2006), ownership structure (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000), brand-equity 
(Lassar et al., 1995) or, macroeconomic factors in the case of fiat currencies (Hopper, 
1997; Mussa, 1976).  
Second, this research has highlighted that changes in the prices of cryptocurrencies have 
a non-linear effect on the prices of other cryptocurrencies. We predicted that social per-
ceptions would lend themselves to over or under reactions. Therefore, the relationship 
between the market price of Bitcoin and the market price of other cryptocurrencies would 
be stronger if that market price was particularly high or low. This shows a tendency in 
the social valuation process for these cryptocurrencies to vary according to price-levels. 
This is consistent with existing literature, which demonstrates that people who rely on 
social cues to evaluate a situation often produce a disproportional reaction (Kasperson & 
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Kasperson, 1996; Kasperson et al., 1988), as well as literature which has found the cryp-
tocurrency to be especially volatile in times of uncertainty (Bouri et al., 2018; Kristoufek, 
2015; Yi et al., 2018).  
Therefore, we conclude that in order to effectively evaluate the price of cryptocurrencies 
we need to reach a consensus as to what factors determines their price. This research 
clearly highlights that cryptocurrencies are fundamentally different from fiat currencies. 
However, with nothing but social perception as a guide to evaluate them, cryptocurrencies 
have been subject to severe price changes. As we have discussed, there are many forms 
of cryptocurrencies, including those which offer an alternative payment mechanism to 
fiat currencies, but also those which represent Blockchain development platforms. We 
believe that each cryptocurrency should be evaluated in isolation as their value proposi-
tions differ greatly. 
The third contribution is the illustration that changes in the price of Ether are more likely 
to predict changes in the price of both Bitcoin and Litecoin. Two intuitive explanations 
are possible. The first is that prices of all cryptocurrencies are driven more by perceptions 
of Blockchain technology than the specific financial manifestation. Bitcoin and Litecoin 
both serve as a peer-to-peer version of electronic cash (Litecoin.org, 2018; Nakamoto, 
2008), whereas Ether offers a ‘fuel’ to run the Ethereum smart contract development plat-
form (Casino et al., 2018; Lindman et al., 2017). This means perceptions of Ether may be 
more meaningful, as they reveal more about the general perceived utility of Blockchain 
across a range of domains. This observation builds on our first contribution which sug-
gests that there needs to be an established approach to evaluating cryptocurrencies, and 
each should be evaluated with respect to the objective of the underlying network. An-
swering this question requires further research to explore the perceptions of investors for 
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different cryptocurrencies to determine how they are evaluating value and risk. The sec-
ond explanation is that investors in Ether are perceived as better informed than Bitcoin 
and Litecoin investors, meaning Bitcoin and Litecoin investors are more likely to be in-
fluenced by Ether investors. This is consistent with much of the economic literature on 
herding, where knowledgeable investors are often considered disproportionally influen-
tial (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Deng et al., 2018; Rompotis, 2018). 
The fourth contribution is the peculiar patterns of changing prices in Litecoin. Our as-
sumption was that Litecoin, as a less mature emerging currency, would largely follow the 
path of Bitcoin and Ether. Yet it appears the opposite is the case, as the more socially 
amplified the positive price of Bitcoin and Ether, the less interest there appears to be in 
Litecoin. However, this makes sense when Litecoin is considered a competing currency, 
rather than one that is complimentary. Litecoin was, after all, introduced to replace 
Bitcoin by addressing some of its technical flaws (Sapuric et al., 2017). Therefore, it is 
logical that investment in Bitcoin and investment in Litecoin should be adversarial, 
whereby falling prices in Bitcoin are more likely than rising prices to drive investors to-
wards Litecoin. This leads to a more nuanced view of the market, where investors are 
moving between alternative cryptocurrencies, rather than simply hedging investment 
across parallel relatively homogenous options.   
As for the limitations of this study, we accept that an analysis of the relationship between 
three cryptocurrencies may not be considered to be representative of the cryptocurrency 
market as a whole. We justify our selection for two primary reasons. First, the open pro-
tocol of leading cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin has allowed ‘altcoins' to be developed 
with ease by simply adapting the source code to their own criteria (Sapuric et al., 2017). 
This, combined with widespread knowledge of increased profits in the cryptocurrency 
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has, in turn, led to increased participation in the market (Kristoufek, 2013), which means 
the sheer number of cryptocurrencies is prohibitively large to analyse in detail. As of 
November 2018, the market consisted of a total of 2081 coins, compared to the 1335 coins 
which were listed as of December 31st, 2017 (coinmarketcap.com, 2019), the growth of 
new cryptocurrencies was also noted by da Gama Silva et al. (2019), they, therefore, fo-
cused on established cryptocurrencies with larger historical time series to analyse.  
The second justification is that Bitcoin, Litecoin and Ether are nonetheless appropriate 
coins to analyse as they represent three different types of cryptocurrencies. First, Bitcoin 
is the leading cryptocurrency in the market and has been subject to significant research 
attention since its release (Holub & Johnson, 2018; Kristoufek, 2013). Second, Litecoin 
represents those so-called ‘altcoins' which were established by adopting the Bitcoin pro-
tocol to improve upon apparent weaknesses of the Bitcoin network by altering certain 
elements such as block generation time and coin supply (Sapuric et al., 2017). Third, 
Ether typifies a contrasting style of cryptocurrency whereby the coin itself is not devel-
oped as a means of financial exchange but rather a fuel to run smart contracts and facilitate 
the development of decentralised applications to serve use-cases within and beyond the 
financial domain (Beck et al., 2016; Beck et al., 2018). The same is true for the fiat cur-
rencies analysed. We used a limited set as an indicator and make no claims of exhaus-
tivity. We also could not use USD in the analysis, as each of the costs was calculated 
relative to USD, meaning its inclusion in the analysis would have been impossible to 
interpret. We thus call for future research to examine other cryptocurrencies and fiat cur-
rencies. We believe this is necessary to create an accurate understanding of the relation-




Chapter 3. Exploring the Application of Blockchain Technology 
to Combat the Effects of Free-Riding in Cross-Functional 
Group Projects 
3.1 Abstract 
Today, many multinational organisations operate in a dispersed geographical environ-
ment. Teams consisting of members from around the globe can be assembled on an as-
needed basis. However, this can prove to be a complex managerial task. Individuals, who 
believe that their efforts are not being effectively monitored by upper management, lose 
their motivation to fully contribute to the best of their abilities as they do not believe there 
is any correlation between the effort they exert and the reward they receive. With low 
levels of intrinsic motivation among employees, a lack of task visibility from upper man-
agement and limited social interaction among group members, many organisations strug-
gle to combat the issue of free-riding in cross functional working groups. Blockchain 
technology, widely acknowledged as enabling openness, can facilitate the development 
of an immutable, transparent, secure, and verifiable application for capturing individuals 
Intellectual Property as they work. This would motivate employees to more openly con-
tribute to group work, safe in the knowledge that their contribution will be recognised, 
enabling management to maintain a high level of task visibility over their employees work 
without requiring their physical presence.  
3.2 Introduction 
The objective of this research is to explore if Blockchain technology can be utilised to 
more effectively track employee’s contributions and efficiently record an individual’s 
contribution to group endeavours, potentially facilitating increased transparency, leading 
to improved productivity and rewards. 
49 
 
This research focuses on the issue of free-riding in cross functional dispersed teams and 
explores the potential of a Blockchain-based system to address this problem and garner 
an understanding as to the effectiveness of such a system to potentially increase individ-
uals IP contributions, which are defined as ‘creations of the mind: inventions; literary and 
artistic works; and symbols, names and images used in commerce’ (World Intellectual 
Property Organization). Blockchain technology is potentially applicable in this setting as 
it acts as a distributed mechanism to capture data in an immutable, verifiable and inde-
pendently auditable fashion (Swan, 2015). 
The potential application of Blockchain technology for capturing IP contributions has 
been discussed in the literature in an inter-organisational setting. A report published by 
the UK Government’s Chief Scientific Advisor in 2016 advocated the potential that dis-
tributed ledger technology could have in the IP domain; “Enabling companies to register 
their Intellectual Property (IP) within a distributed ledger, rather than through traditional 
patent applications, may reduce the overall number of contract disputes” (UK 
Government Office for Science, 2016).  
An analysis of the literature on organisational behaviour and forms of motivation reveals 
that many organisations experience the issue of being unable to effectively manage their 
employees to work productively, the problem being magnified when it comes to group 
projects due to ‘The Free-Rider Problem’ or ‘Social Loafing’ phenomenon. Low levels 
of task visibility and low levels of intrinsic motivation result in employees feeling that 
their work was undervalued and unimportant to the organisation (George, 1992). In the 
global environment in which we operate today, many organisations consist of teams con-
taining group members from dispersed geographic locations. Although dispersed teams 
offer many advantages to an organisation, they lack the level of social comparison found 
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in co-located groups which can contribute to increased levels of free-riding (Suleiman & 
Watson, 2008). Social comparison is defined as ‘comparing our behaviours and opinions 
with those of others in order to establish the correct or socially approved way of thinking’ 
(Vaughan & Hogg, 2014). 
In order to complete this research we adopted a design science approach which is outlined 
in detail later in the paper. In brief, first we identified the problem of free-riding in 
distributed teams which will be outlined in the literature review. The literature review 
also details our analysis of Blockchain technology as a potential tool for combatting this 
problem. We then designed and developed a Blockchain-enabled proof-of-concept 
application to track individual contributions to a group project and demonstarted this to a 
number of organisations in order to evaulate it’s potential and take suggestions for future 
applications of the system. Details of the application will also be outlined later in the 
paper. 
3.3 Literature Review 
Ryan and Deci (2000) paper on Intrinsic and Extrinsic motivation and ‘Self-Determina-
tion Theory’ described the ability to motivate somebody to perform tasks which are not 
inherently interesting or enjoyable as an essential strategy for successful teaching. Intrin-
sic motivation refers to when people perform an activity because they are interested in 
the activity itself and performing the activity gives them a sense of satisfaction. On the 
other hand, extrinsic motivation does not involve satisfaction coming from the activity 
itself but rather satisfaction from separable outcomes that come because of performing an 
activity such as rewards (Gagné & Deci, 2005).  One form of extrinsic motivation under 
the umbrella of ‘Organismic Integration Theory’ is ‘identification’, this occurs where an 
individual partakes in an activity out of choice because they can see the benefit in doing 
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so. Although they perform an activity to achieve ‘separable outcomes’ as described 
above, their behaviour is self-determined, for instance athletes who are involved in sport 
as they believe it contributes to their personal development (Pelletier et al., 1995). Organ-
isations should focus their efforts on creating an environment which would enhance an 
individual's level of identification in a task by rewarding everyone on their contribution 
to achieving the organisational objectives. This would help counteract what is known as 
the dilution effect whereby members of groups feel their contribution is marginal towards 
the overall goal (Gagné & Deci, 2005). 
Rational individuals have a desire to progress in their own careers. Behavioural econo-
mist, Dan Ariely, spoke to this point in his book entitled ‘Predictably Irrational’. Rather 
than focusing on market norms where money is the primary motivator to work, Ariely 
suggests that social norms, i.e. showing recognition for the effort made by an individual 
can produce better output. He found that a lack of recognition for work completed is 
almost as bad as destroying one’s work, however, the slightest amount of recognition, 
was enough to motivate people to work harder as they felt their work was worthwhile 
(Ariely, 2008). If there was a system in place in an organisation which would guarantee 
recognition for individual effort, each person would be able to identify with the im-
portance of improving their productivity.  
Regardless of an individual’s level of identification, they may still be reluctant to partic-
ipate in group activities as a result of the ‘Free-Rider Problem’. The term ‘free-rider’ 
refers to a member of a group who obtains benefits from a group membership but does 
not bear a proportional share of the costs of providing the benefits (Albanese & Van Fleet, 
1985). This issue is particularly relevant in the case of group activities because regardless 
of how motivated an individual may be to perform well, often they will not trust that other 
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members of the group are making the same effort. This can result in individuals losing 
that level of identification in the task they are working, which undermines any strategy 
for motivating employees that may be in place within an organisation. Latané, Williams, 
and Harkins (1979) found that in group activities ‘lack of trust and the propensity to at-
tribute laziness or ineptitude to others could have led people to work less hard them-
selves’. Furthermore, members of a group feel that the responsibility for the success of 
the group does not rest on their shoulders to the same extent as the success of an individual 
task would (Latané et al., 1979), a problem referred to as ‘diffusion of responsibility’ 
which is defined by Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, and Pastorelli (1996) as ‘when eve-
ryone is responsible, no one really feels responsible’.  
George (1992) explored the area of the ‘Free-Rider Problem’, or as she refers to it, ‘social 
loafing’ which she defines as being ‘the fact that individual contributions to a group prod-
uct are often unidentifiable. When this is the case, motivation may be low since the per-
ceived relationship between individual effort and sanctions or rewards is weak’. George 
(1992) put forward the following hypotheses to explain the factors that influence social 
loafing; 
• Task visibility is negatively related to social loafing. 
• An individual’s intrinsic involvement in work is negatively associated with social 
loafing. 
• Task visibility will dominate intrinsic task involvement in terms of relative ability to 
predict social loafing in an ongoing organisation. 
• Intrinsic involvement moderates the relationship between task visibility and social 
loafing such that the relationship is stronger when intrinsic involvement is low than 
when intrinsic involvement is high. 
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It is apparent from these hypotheses that the two main variables contributing to the factors 
that influence social loafing are task visibility and intrinsic involvement. George (1992) 
describes task visibility as; ‘the belief that a supervisor is aware of individual effort on a 
job’, and intrinsic involvement as; ‘beliefs that the work being done is meaningful and 
significant and that one’s own efforts are an important contribution to the employing or-
ganisation’. Therefore, an organisation should focus on increasing task visibility and in-
dividual’s intrinsic involvement to reduce social loafing and in turn improve productivity. 
Indeed, George (1992) purports that the reason individual productivity is not maximised 
is because employees do not believe their work has a direct contribution to the entire 
organisation, nor do they trust their employers to record their contributions. 
Further research into this area has found that free-riding is particularly a problem in tech-
nology supported, dispersed and knowledge teams (Lin & Huang, 2009). One basic dif-
ference between global teams that work and those that don’t lies in the level of social 
distance—the degree of emotional connection among team members (Neeley, 2015). 
In the case of traditional, co-located groups, Chidambaram and Tung (2005) cite social 
standards as key deterrents of free-riding; they argue that in a co-located environment, 
social pressure results in individuals being more productive as they can see their peers 
working around them, this acts as a form of motivation to other team members which is 
not present in a dispersed group.  
Social pressure in groups is also highlighted by Suleiman and Watson (2008) as being 
integral to any effort to reduce free-riding tendencies. Their research found that self-feed-
back; feedback given on an individual basis, did not result in a reduction in the levels of 
free-riding in a group. However, when feedback was given to all members of the group 
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and member’s feedback was visible to all other members, this acted as a comparative tool 
and decreased level of free-riding.   
The terms ‘social loafing’ and ‘free-riding’ have been synonymous with each other in 
previous literature (Hall & Buzwell, 2013).  Social Loafing describes individuals who 
tend to perform at lower levels when part of a group than when they are expected to 
complete a task on their own (George, 1992). Free-Riding is a choice individuals some-
times make to avoid co-operating in the pursuit of rewards to be shared by the members 
of a group (Albanese & Van Fleet, 1985). The subtle difference between the two being 
that free-riding grows out of a rational calculation but social loafing can occur without 
conscious awareness (Wagner III, 1995). The terms have been considered analogous in 
this research as they both grow out of the choice to withhold co-operative effort from 
group endeavours (Wagner III, 1995). For consistency purposes throughout the remainder 
of this thesis, ‘Free-Riding’ will therefore be used to refer to instances where individuals 
withhold effort from a group endeavour. 
To summarise, free-riding is a significant issue in distributed teams, with a myriad of 
factors impacting upon group dynamics, project success and the ability to manage and 
motivate individuals to contribute and innovate. Can Blockchain technology, with its fo-
cus on openness and transparency, potentially play a part in reducing free-riding and in-
creasing individual’s contribution?  
We suggest, and are keen to investigate, if Blockchain technology can combat an em-
ployee’s feeling that they are merely an anonymous tool in a large organisation through 
tracking individual contribution and recreating social presences in dispersed group set-
tings. A Blockchain application which captures individual contribution to a group and 
ensures that individual intellectual property receives appropriate recognition may also 
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potentially reduce perceptions of diffusion of responsibility, dehumanisation and attribu-
tion of blame as illustrated by Alnuaimi, Robert, and Maruping (2010). 
As stated in the introduction, the objective of this research is to apply this concept to 
group projects and assess the potential the technology may have for recording individual 
contributions to a distributed team’s towards improved performance.  
3.4 Utilizing Blockchain for Capturing IP and Reducing Free Riding in 
Distributed Group Projects 
This section reviews the state of the art in Blockchain technology and abstracts that; 1. 
the ability to store information on the Blockchain 2. The technologies record of being 
applied to capture IP and appropriate recognition 3. Blockchain’s security and immuta-
bility characteristics and 4. The ability to leverage the technology to record verifiable 
contributions mean that it is a suitable technology to be applied for potentially improving 
the performance of geographically distributed teams.  
3.4.1 Information Storage 
Recording employees work can be facilitated by storing data on the Blockchain. This has 
already been successfully implemented by a few applications, most notably ProofOfEx-
istence.com, a service which anonymously and securely stores an online distributed proof 
of existence for any document (Araoz, 2017). The service works in the following way: A 
user presents a document or file to the website. The file is never uploaded to the site but 
instead they create the cryptographic digest of the file and the user maintains the original 
copy ‘off-chain’ (Araoz, 2017). This adds security and privacy to the service because the 
original contents cannot be stolen from the service. The digest is then inserted into a 
transaction which is in turn mined into a block and is then registered forever on the Block-
chain, regardless of whether the service is shut down. Should any conflict occur in the 
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future over the ownership of the file, the user need only run the hash function over their 
off-chain copy of the file and the file will be verified if the digest produced is the same 
(Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016). 
In fact, storing data and documents on the Blockchain is becoming an increasingly pop-
ular application for the technology. In October 2016 Dubai announced their objective to 
store all government documents on Blockchain by the year 2020, this is as part of Dubai’s 
strategy to become a leader in the Blockchain industry. Estimates from the Dubai gov-
ernment suggest that this initiative has the potential to save 25.1 million hours of eco-
nomic productivity as well as being environmentally friendly (Castillo, 2016). 
3.4.2 Capturing IP and Recognition 
An interesting example of where Blockchain technology has already been implemented 
to secure IP rights and ensure that appropriate recognition is given to the creators of IP is 
in the music industry. Tapscott and Tapscott (2016) credit Napster, the peer-to-peer music 
sharing platform, for casting a light on the music industry’s distribution inefficiencies 
when the service was launched in 1999. This revolutionary innovation in the music in-
dustry caused musicians to rethink the role of record labels and opened their eyes to the 
unbalanced distribution of wealth. Today, musicians such as Imogen Heap are distrib-
uting their music via Blockchain based services such as ‘Ujomusic’, this platform uses 
smart contracts to ensure that artists get to decide who can interact with their work and 
how much each interaction is worth. All contributors to the purchased product are auto-
matically paid directly into their wallets after each transaction (Heap & Tapscott, 2016). 
This research hopes to apply this logic to group work and ensure that each member of a 
group receives appropriate recognition for their work.  
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3.4.3 Security and Immutability 
Blockchain uses Hashing and Secure Timestamping to conduct attestation services. Hash-
ing is the process of compressing any document or file of any type into a string of alpha-
numeric characters which cannot be reverse computed into the original file (Tapscott & 
Tapscott, 2016). The hash function is ‘second pre-image resistant’, meaning that it is im-
possible for a transaction to be recorded on the Blockchain before it is executed. Also 
because of pre-image resistance of hash functions, it is impossible to recreate an identical 
hash in the future with a different file (Araoz, 2017). This directly relates to the issue of 
recognition discussed earlier in this paper as put forward by Ariely (2008); when employ-
ees believe that their work is not being recognised their production levels begin to decline. 
The hashing of transactions on the Blockchain can provide employees with a sense of 
security that all work they record on a Blockchain-enabled system will be securely rec-
orded. In the event that any other party tried to claim ownership of their work, Blockchain 
has the ability to verify the true ownership of the record. 
Blockchain timestamps all transactions as outlined in Nakamoto (2008), ‘a timestamp 
server works by taking a hash of a block of items to be timestamped and widely publishing 
the hash. The timestamp proves that the data must have existed at the time, obviously, to 
get into the hash’. Combining this with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), the Blockchain 
not only prevents a double spend but also confirms ownership of each transaction, and 
each transaction is immutable and irrevocable. Bitfury define immutability by saying ‘the 
Blockchain could not be retroactively changed by the collusion of notaries’ (Group, 
2016). In summary, this means that Blockchain prevents us from claiming ownership of 
a transaction that is not our own, committing a transaction on behalf of another party or 
even preventing somebody’s freedom to commit a transaction to the Blockchain. The 
58 
 
Blockchain provides a means of proving ownership and preserving records without cen-
sorship (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016).  
3.4.4 Recording Verifiable Contributions 
Organisations today are constantly striving to keep their employees motivated, particu-
larly when individuals can identify with the benefits of working hard on a task (Ryan & 
Deci, 2000). If they feel intrinsically involved in the task, or if they feel that management 
maintains a high level of visibility over their work (George, 1992) they will be more likely 
to be productive. However, this can be undermined if individuals feel that their efforts are 
not being effectively recorded, especially in the context of group endeavours (Latané et 
al., 1979).  
This research hopes to illustrate that Blockchain technology can facilitate an application 
that would resolve these issues by creating a trustless, secure mechanism for recording 
any content produced by any individual. The technology is immutable meaning that no 
third party could prevent an individual from having their efforts recorded. Transactions 
are irrevocable so nobody could claim ownership of work they did not perform. Transac-
tions are timestamped, allowing everyone to see when the work was completed. Finally, 
transactions are verifiable through hashing so that should conflict of ownership ever arise, 
it can be easily resolved.  
3.5 Statement of the Research Problem 
The focus of this research study is to explore the possible utility of a Blockchain-enabled 
application to combat the problems of free-riding and increase individual contributions in 
cross functional, geographically dispersed group projects. In order to conduct this re-
search, the following research questions will be answered; 
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• Does utilizing Blockchain technology in cross functional geographically dispersed 
group projects both increase individual contributions and reduce the potential for free-
riding? 
• What are the factors which determine the success of utilizing Blockchain technology 
to reduce free-riding and increase IP capture in cross functional geographically dis-
persed group projects? 
3.6 Research Methodology: A Design Science Approach 
Given the nature of the research, and the necessity to design an artefact to answer the 
research questions outlined, design science is a suitable methodology to investigate this 
problem. ‘The design science paradigm seeks to extend the boundaries of human and 
organisational capabilities by creating new and innovative artefacts’ (Hevner, March, 
Park, & Ram, 2004). Design Science Research (DSR) generates prescriptive design 
knowledge in the act of creating and evaluating some new IT artefact(s) (Gregor & 
Hevner, 2013; Hevner et al., 2004; March & Smith, 1995). This research builds on, and 
informs, the types of descriptive/explanatory knowledge generated by traditional (non-
design) approaches (Gregor & Jones, 2007; Hevner, 2007).  
The purpose of conducting IS Research is to create and evaluate IT artefacts which will 
solve problems faced by an organisation. The specific types of contributions vary, though 
the most fundamental types of theorising tend to take the form of design constructs, de-
sign methods, design models, and design instantiations (Hevner & Chatterjee, 2010; 
Hevner et al., 2004). Other types of contributions may include design principles/rules 
(Gregor & Hevner, 2013; Gregor & Jones, 2007) and embedded explanatory/predictive 
theory (Conboy, Gleasure, & Cullina, 2015; Kuechler & Vaishnavi, 2012). Design is both 
a process and a product. The products of design are the constructs, models, methods, and 
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instantiations as outlined above whereas the processes of design are building and evalu-
ating (Hevner et al., 2004).  
Table 3.1 below employs the Six Activities outlined in Peffers et al. (2007) Design Sci-
ence Methodology and a brief overview of each as they pertain to the stated research 
problem. This model was chosen because his study involved analysing all prior research 
into Design Science Frameworks and building on this groundwork to create a generaliza-
ble methodology. 





Due to low levels of task visibility and intrinsic task 
involvement, many organisations experience high levels of 
‘free-riding’ among their employees which reduces levels of 
productivity in individual and group work (George, 1992).  This 
problem becomes more pronounced in cross functional groups 
because of low levels of social interaction between group 
members (Chidambaram & Tung, 2005). Also, work that 
individuals do complete is under threat of being stolen, 
international IP theft adds up to over $7 trillion globally (UK 
Government Office for Science, 2016). 
Define the 
objectives for a 
solution 
To assess the ability of a Blockchain-enabled system in 
improving overall group productivity by capturing individual 
productivity during cross functional group projects. Blockchain 
will create a secure and frictionless solution, aiming to improve 
productivity by increasing management’s visibility over 
everyone’s efforts, improve individual’s level of identification 
with their work and create a degree of social interaction 
between members of dispersed groups. 
Design and 
Development 
Development of a prototype instantiation:  
If the initial exploratory investigatory research reveals the 
utility of a solution a prototype will be built. This solution will 
be developed using Blockchain technology and will aim to 
demonstrate how the immutability, transparency, verifiability 
and timestamping features of Blockchain can be utilised to 
create a successful product. 
Demonstration Once an artefact of an acceptable standard (preferably a 
prototype system) has been produced it will be demonstrated 
during workshop sessions in organisations operating in a variety 
of industries. The workshops will be conducted for managers 
and project team members to gain an insight into the 
requirements of each type of user. In an ideal scenario, the 
61 
 
prototype would be implemented for a trial period in each 
organisation to fully assess its potential, however, a simulated 
situation will suffice if necessary. 
Evaluation Evaluation of the System Prototype: 
Before any workshops, a full unit test will be carried out on the 
system to ensure that every method works correctly. During the 
workshops, the system will be evaluated in terms of general 
feedback as well as metrics gathered.  
User feedback will be important to gain insight into the user’s 
general interaction with the system, and any suggested 
improvements they may have, this will then be used to direct 
future iterations of the system. The workshops will look to 
suggest improvements to the aesthetics of the system but also 
whether a Blockchain-enabled system produced any significant 
benefits or drawbacks compared to a traditional system. Also, 
the system’s reporting capabilities will be assessed by the 
managers taking part in the workshops. 
The metrics gathered during workshops will include, time taken 
to record each task, time required for each transaction to be 
subsequently mined to the Blockchain, the level of user 
engagement will be recorded by the quantity of tasks submitted 
to the system.  
Communication The results of this piece of IS Research will be documented and 
communicated in the form of an Empirical Research Paper 





3.7 Blockchain Innovation Tool: proof-of-concept  
Table 3.2 Blockchain Innovation Tool 
Figure 3.1 User adds and idea 
 
Figure 3.2 Users browse and vote on ideas 
 
Figure 3.3 Managers get a report of passsed ideas 
 





This proof-of-concept application has been developed considering the suggestions and 
recommendations of managers and distributed group members in State Street corporation. 
After conducting exploratory interviews with these parties, we decided the develop the 
application to tackle a specific use-case, namely intra-organisational groups and the in-
novation process.  
The system was built on the Ethereum Blockchain network which allowed us to utilise 
smart contracts to implement a voting mechanism and an internal cryptocurrency.  
The different activities and the associated Blockchain Innovation Tool GUI are outlined 
in Table 3.2. First, members of a group can login to the system to post an idea they may 
have (Figure 3.1); this idea will be immutably stored on the Blockchain for all group 
members to see, towards increasing task visibility and intrinsic involvement of group 
members.  
Next (Figure 3.2), individuals will have the ability to browse through all ideas which have 
been posted to the system and vote for ideas which they consider having potential. This 
feature combats the issues which contribute to free-riding, for example, social comparison 
is increased in groups as each member can see the ideas being put forward by their peers. 
Although Blockchain will not be able to create the level of social interaction found in a 
face-to-face setting, the technology will be able to increase levels of individual task mon-
itoring so that each member will observe a similar level of social comparison that would 
be found in a co-located group. Feedback is provided to all members, by all members, 
thus harnessing the wisdom of the crowd, and this is broadcasted to everyone as the cur-
rent vote count will be captured by the smart contract and displayed to all users.   
The smart contract is designed and programmed so that each idea requires a certain num-
ber of votes before it is deemed valid. Once this quota is reached the idea will be flagged 
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as ‘passed’ and presented to management (Figure 3.3), giving them a high-level report of 
popular ideas amongst their group. This increases transparency for management and by 
giving each member a say, the system can reduce the ‘dilution effect’ in group-based 
innovation.  
Finally, the system also utilises smart contract technology to improve recognition and 
reward (Figure 3.4), once an idea is passed by the voting system, the smart contract will 
automatically reward the individual who contributed the idea with a predefined amount 
of internal coins. Potentially, these coins may have intra-organisational value, for exam-
ple being redeemable for lunch in the cafeteria etc. 
3.8 Conclusions  
This research contributes to both theory and practice. From a theoretical stand point, this 
research illustrates that Blockchain technology has significant value beyond a transac-
tional setting, revealing that it can be applied as part of an organisation’s (1) innovation 
and (2) recognition and reward process. Furthermore, it illustrates that Blockchain tech-
nology, through the transparency which it enables can address the problem of free-riding 
in dispersed, cross functional group terms.  
Furthermore, from a practitioner perspective, the Blockchain-enabled POC (Proof-of-
Concept) would, if operationalised, allow individuals to record their contributions in a 
frictionless manner as they operate. An immutable, verifiable and transparent application 
for capturing individuals IP could potentially improve individual’s contributions, partic-
ularly in group environments by combatting free-riding. 
Finally, Design Science Research is inherently iterative, progress is made through re-
peated iterations whereby the scope of the design problem is refined and with each itera-
tion, the artefact becomes more relevant and valuable (Hevner et al., 2004). The purpose 
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of this Chapter has been to complete a first iteration of design science research to combat 
challenges faced by cross functional groups through the application of Blockchain tech-
nology. This chapter has been successful in suggesting that Blockchain does indeed have 
potential to facilitate cross functional groups. Over the course of the subsequent chapters 
in this thesis the scope and utility of the system instantiation presented in here will be 
refined and iterated. First, in Chapter 4, we will present a systematic Literature Review 
to develop our understanding of this use-case. Following this, in Chapter 5, we will em-
pirically explore the challenges faced by these groups in greater detail. Finally, having 
refined our understanding of the design problem we are looking to tackle, Chapter 6 will 
present a second iteration of the design and development of this system instantiation ar-




Chapter 4. Reviewing the Contributing Factors and Benefits of 
Distributed Collaboration 
4.1 Abstract  
Distributed Collaboration has become increasingly common across many domains, rang-
ing from software development, to information processing, to the creative arts, to enter-
tainment. However, researchers have applied a myriad of terms to define these operations. 
We first addressed this issue by developing a definition of Distributed Collaboration 
which is representative of all its forms. Existing research has identified a number of fac-
tors that contribute to the success of Distributed Collaborations. Yet these factors are typ-
ically discussed in modular theoretical terms, meaning researchers and practitioners often 
struggle to identify and synthesise literature spanning multiple domains and perspectives. 
This research performs a systematic literature review to bring together core findings into 
one amalgamated model. This model categorises the contributing factors for Distributed 
Collaboration along two axes (i) whether they are social or material (ii) whether they are 
endemic or relational. The relationships between factors is also explicitly discussed. The 
model further links these contributing factors to different collaborative outcomes, specif-
ically mutual learning, relationship building, communication, task completion speed, ac-
cess to skilled personnel, and cost savings.  






The growth of digital technologies has facilitated an uptake in Distributed Collaborations 
(Asatiani & Penttinen, 2019; Cheng, Fu, & Druckenmiller, 2016; Liu, Hull, & Hung, 
2017; Tapscott & Williams, 2008). Examples of Distributed Collaboration are discussed 
under several synonyms and can be found in a variety of industries, for example, virtual 
teams (Kanawattanachai & Yoo, 2007; Nordbäck & Espinosa, 2019), online communities 
(Hauser, Hautz, Hutter, & Füller, 2017; Park, Im, Storey, & Baskerville, 2019), and dis-
persed teams (Magni, Ahuja, & Maruping, 2018). These forms of online social production 
have become an increasingly viable and popular way of creating high quality knowledge 
goods (Faraj, Jarvenpaa, & Majchrzak, 2011; Grigore, Rosenkranz, & Sutanto, 2015).  
However, not all historic attempts at adopting Distributed Collaboration have proven suc-
cessful, despite significant capital investment (Worthen, 2008), motivating researchers to 
find the root cause of this failure to gain mass adoption (Butler, Bateman, Gray, & 
Diamant, 2014; Zhang, Hahn, & De, 2013), even operational research on Distributed Col-
laboration means it is unlikely these failures can be attributed only to unforeseen factors. 
Instead, it appears that research is inadequately supporting practice because the range of 
theoretical models are either too complex or too individually disconnected and incom-
plete.  
The objective of this review paper is, therefore, to address these issues by developing a 
more comprehensive understanding of the contributing factors and benefits of this type 
of working arrangement. First, consolidating different definitions of Distributed Collab-
oration into one synthesised definition. Second, by building an amalgamated model of the 
factors that predict success in Distributed Collaboration. Third, by detailing how these 
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factors compliment and moderate one another. The following section details how we pro-
duced our definition of Distributed Collaboration. We then perform a systematic literature 
review that uses the concept-centric matrix approach of Webster and Watson (2002) to 
find recurring success outcomes and contributing factors for Distributed Collaboration. 
We then examine the interactions between these factors. Finally, we discuss the implica-
tions for theory and practice. 
4.3 Defining Distributed Collaboration 
Traditionally collaborative groups operated in a co-located environment, as this offered 
better communication and coordination between team members (Gupta et al., 2009). 
However, advancements in ICT led to the emergence and growth of distributed groups, 
which sacrificed face-to-face communication in favour of access to global expertise 
(Gupta et al., 2009; Vlaar, van Fenema, & Tiwari, 2008; Watson‐Manheim, Chudoba, & 
Crowston, 2012). This attracted a lot of attention from researchers, who framed these new 
dynamics in a variety of ways (see Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1 Definitions of Distributed Collaboration synonyms  
Virtual teams Groups of geographically and/or 
organisationally distributed participants who 
collaborate towards a shared goal using a 
combination of information and 
communication technologies (ICT) to 





A collection of people who communicate 
and interact openly with each other in a 
computer-supported virtual space to seek 




Ren et al., 2012) 
Dispersed 
teams 
Collective of individuals who are distributed 
across different geographic locations and 
rely primarily on ICTs to communicate and 
collaborate with each other to achieve joint 
outcomes for which they are responsible. 




Groups of people with shared interests who 
communicate over the internet through a 
common platform. 
(Butler et al., 2014) 
Distributed 
teams 
Groups of people who interact through 
interdependent tasks guided by a common 
purpose, and who work across space, time, 
and organisational boundaries primarily 
through electronic means. 
(Majchrzak, 




Online social networks that allow people 
with common interests, goals, or practices to 
interact and share information and 
knowledge. 
(Bock, Ahuja, Suh, 
& Yap, 2015; 
Porter, Devaraj, & 
Sun, 2013) 
We use ‘Distributed Collaboration’ as an umbrella term to encapsulate each of these 
forms of collaborative groups. We acknowledge there are differences among the above 
definitions. However, there are three common elements that are present in each: (1) the 
distribution of members (2) the use of ICT to communicate (3) a shared goal. Thus, we 
define Distributed Collaboration as the pursuit of a shared objective by groups that in-
clude non-proximate members, whose participation is facilitated by ICT.  
4.4 A Systematic Literature Review 
We began by conducting a keyword search of articles published in Senior Scholars Basket 
of 8 IS journals from January 2000 - June 2019, an approach commonly adopted to gather 
the discipline’s most respected research (Bernroider, Pilkington, & Córdoba, 2015; Dean, 
70 
 
Lowry, & Humpherys, 2011). The obvious issue with the keyword-centric approach is 
the ‘cold-start problem’ of identifying applicable keywords (Levy & Ellis, 2006). This 
was particularly challenging for this study, as there are multiple terms used to describe 
Distributed Collaboration. We thus created a keyword matrix that would help uncover 
and keep track of emerging terms. We began with searches for Distributed and Collabo-
ration. Based on initial results, we created a list of synonyms for each of these terms, and 
then searched all pairings between these alternative terms. The synonyms used for Dis-
tributed were Dispersed, Global, Virtual, and Online and the synonyms for Collaboration 
were Team, Work, Group, and Community (see Table 4.2).  
We searched for papers articles published in Senior Scholars Basket of 8 IS journals using 
the Web of Science, the AIS Electronic Library, and Google Scholar. This resulted in an 
initial set of 290 papers. The set of papers was subsequently limited to peer-reviewed 
articles, and all duplicates removed, resulting in a total set of 153 papers. Table 4.2 pro-
vides more details concerning the numbers retrieved for each keyword pair. Building on 
this, we performed ‘backward searching’, which refers to reviewing literature referenced 
in the articles yielded in the keyword search (Levy & Ellis, 2006; Webster & Watson, 
2002). This yielded a further 20 papers to be included in the review process.  
The next round of refinement discarded articles that did not fit with the definition of Dis-
tributed Collaboration adopted, e.g. because there was no obvious shared objective, or 
teams were operating in shared premises. This resulted in the removal of 3 articles, mean-
ing a final set of 170 papers were included for theory amalgamation. Initial analysis fo-
cused on the identification of contributing factors and outcomes, which were organised 
in an evolving concept matrix (Webster and Watson, 2002). The use of a concept matrix 
enhances the sense-making task of a successful literature review by bringing a logical 
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structure to how we discuss a topic’s central ideas (Webster & Watson, 2002). Continued 
iterations gradually found the contributing factors could be grouped according to whether 
they were endemic or relational, and whether they were social or material. This created 
an overarching theoretical framework in which to position individual constructs, de-
scribed in the following section.  
Table 4.2 Keyword Search Results 
Keyword Database Initial 
Results 
Distributed + Collaboration OR Team OR 
Work OR Group OR Community 
AIS Electronic Library 3 
Google Scholar 13 
Web of Science 19 
Global + Collaboration OR Team OR 
Work OR Group OR Community 
AIS Electronic Library 0 
Google Scholar 4 
Web of Science 11 
Dispersed + Collaboration OR Team OR 
Work OR Group OR Community 
AIS Electronic Library 3 
Google Scholar 1 
Web of Science 1 
Virtual + Collaboration OR Team OR 
Work OR Group OR Community 
AIS Electronic Library 21 
Google Scholar 37 
Web of Science 55 
Online + Collaboration OR Team OR 
Work OR Group OR Community 
AIS Electronic Library 18 
Google Scholar 53 
Web of Science 51 
Initial Results: 290 
Results (Minus Duplicates) 153 
Papers Removed for Irrelevance 3 
Additional Papers from Backward Searching 20 
Total 170 
4.5 A Model of Distributed Collaboration Attributes and Collaboration 
Benefits 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the final set of constructs, grouped according to the emerging theo-
retical framework. Social factors concern the attitudes, perceptions, and knowledge pos-
sessed by the team members, while material factors describe the perceived qualities of 
objects in the system. Endemic factors exist across a range of collaborative configura-
tions, while relational factors vary according to which people and tools are interacting.  
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The factors are presented in Figure 4.1 as being related to one another. The purpose of 
this is to illustrate that no factor, or group of factors, results in successful Distributed 
Collaboration, rather all factors should be managed in unison to ensure success. The man-
ner in which factors compliment and moderate one another will be discussed at length in 
section 4.6. 
 
Figure 4.1 A Model for Distributed Collaboration 
4.5.1 Collaboration Benefits 
The first benefit of Distributed Collaboration is communication. Online social technolo-
gies afford low-cost and easy to access communication media (Hauser et al., 2017). How-
ever, the benefits are not simply about the quantity of communication, the quality may 
also benefit. Communication in these environments is often predominately text-based, 
which carriers particular learning advantages as it allows the user to read, reflect, write 
and revise their thoughts before they post their contributions (Minas, Potter, Dennis, 
Bartelt, & Bae, 2014). Communication can be mediated either synchronously, for exam-
ple a chat room, or asynchronously such as a discussion board (Massey, Montoya-Weiss, 
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& Hung, 2003; Piccoli & Ives, 2003; Spagnoletti, Resca, & Lee, 2015). Nuanced benefits 
result from each type of distributed communication. Groups which use synchronous text-
based communication generally share more unique information as the text-based commu-
nication helps the contributors overcome the selective information search bias which is 
common in face-to-face groups (Minas et al., 2014). Benefits found from asynchronous 
communication include members being less subject to ‘pressure to closure’ which pre-
vents members from dedicating time to explore alternative solutions when problem solv-
ing (Colazo & Fang, 2010). Good communication can also enhance other benefits such 
as mutual learning and relationships (Hauser et al., 2017; Yang, Tong, & Teo, 2015) 
which will be discussed next. 
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Table 4.3 Collaboration Benefits 
Benefit Definition Sources 
Communication The synchronous and 
asynchronous transfer of 
information between 
collaborators.  
(Bartelt & Dennis, 2014; Sarker, 
Ahuja, Sarker, & Kirkeby, 2011) 
Mutual learning The transfer of useful 
knowledge and skills 
between collaborators. 
(Gupta et al., 2009; Oshri, Van 
Fenema, & Kotlarsky, 2008; 
Ridings, Gefen, & Arinze, 2006; 
Robert Jr, Dennis, & Ahuja, 2008) 
Relationship 
Building  
The development of reusable 
and reciprocal relationships 
between collaborators. 
(Bateman, Gray, & Butler, 2011; 
Kraut, Wang, Butler, Joyce, & 
Burke, 2010; Paul & McDaniel Jr, 




The speed with which a 
given task can be completed.  
(Colazo & Fang, 2010; Massey et 




The ability to include 
specialised or highly skilled 
collaborators as needed.  
(Fuller, Hardin, & Davison, 2006; 
Ransbotham & Kane, 2011; Wang 
& Haggerty, 2011) 
Cost Savings The reduction of costs when 
transferring or maintaining 
resources 
(Asatiani & Penttinen, 2019; Breu 
& Hemingway, 2004; Gómez, 
Salazar, & Vargas, 2017) 
The second benefit of Distributed Collaboration is mutual learning. Mutual learning is 
often considered the major attraction for members or organisations to participate in Dis-
tributed Collaboration (Kotlarsky & Oshri, 2005; Ridings et al., 2006; Wang, Noe, & 
Wang, 2014). Mutual learning differs from communication, as the focus is not merely on 
exchanging information; rather it is about changing group members’ perspectives through 
the sharing, transfer, recombination, and reuse of knowledge among parties (Jarvenpaa & 
Majchrzak, 2010). Distributed Collaborations are most successful when members not 
only share their unique knowledge and integrate that knowledge across the group as a 
whole; they also generate new ideas and understanding as they contrast and compare per-
spectives and interpretations (Robert Jr et al., 2008). The value of mutual learning has 
been reflected by the adoption of open innovation models by many large multinational 
firms, such as Procter and Gamble, Fiat and IBM (Gómez et al., 2017). This is largely 
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due to the prevailing perception that adopting strategies such as open innovation and vir-
tual teams provides knowledge transfer opportunities at low marginal costs (Griffith, 
Sawyer, & Neale, 2003). 
The third benefit of Distributed Collaboration is relationship building. Those who partic-
ipate in Distributed Collaboration may often benefit by finding people for emotional sup-
port, instrumental aid, companionship, a sense of belonging and encouragement, (Huang, 
Chengalur-Smith, & Pinsonneault, 2019; Ridings et al., 2006). They may also enjoy a 
new platform for entertainment or to discuss social and political issues (Bateman et al., 
2011; Kraut et al., 2010). These relationships are particularly apparent in online health 
communities, where relationship-building provides strong emotional support for individ-
uals who may be struggling with the personal and social demands of illness (Mein Goh, 
Gao, & Agarwal, 2016). There is further evidence that the stronger the relationship, the 
more likely members are to trust the information being shared as they work towards some 
common purpose (Barrett, Oborn, & Orlikowski, 2016). 
The fourth benefit of Distributed Collaboration is task completion speed. Mutual learning 
and relationship building are primarily social benefits. However, Distributed Collabora-
tion also produces tangible, easily measurable outputs. Distributed Collaboration means 
groups can collaborate on a task at any time, either working simultaneously or separately 
– this is particularly attractive when the group is geographically dispersed, spanning mul-
tiple time zones (Kanawattanachai & Yoo, 2002; O'Leary & Cummings, 2007; Yang et 
al., 2015). Not only is this a beneficial arrangement for group members, it also provides 
increased flexibility, which is desirable for customers. Groups can now offer round-the-
clock service to customers and rapid response to global market demands as members in 
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different time zones allow themselves to easily adapt to changing environmental condi-
tions (Kankanhalli, Tan, & Wei, 2006; Massey et al., 2003; Yang et al., 2015). 
The fifth benefit of Distributed Collaboration is access to skilled personnel. These bene-
fits are typically associated with the expanded geographic scope of distributed groups, 
providing access to skilled contributors 24 hours a day (Gupta et al., 2009). Compared 
with co-located groups, which are geographically limited in the group members to choose 
from, distributed groups have greater capacity to choose members with the ideal skill sets 
for the specific task at hand (Beranek, Broder, Reinig, Romano Jr, & Sump, 2005). Dis-
tributed Collaboration can, therefore, deliver significant strategic flexibility by efficiently 
forming groups of the best available talent for the duration of a specific task and then 
disbanding upon completion (Piccoli & Ives, 2003). This is particularly advantageous 
from an R&D perspective as partnerships can be developed to access specialised know-
how on demand (Gómez et al., 2017). Despite these obvious benefits, it can also be a 
difficult task to manage a large dynamic group (Goh & Wasko, 2012). However, 
Ransbotham and Kane (2011) suggested that even the membership turnover experienced 
in Distributed Collaboration can prove to be favourable as it allows new information and 
abilities to enter the group, without losing the content generated by those who depart. 
The sixth benefit of Distributed Collaboration is cost savings. The opportunities described 
already explain that Distributed Collaboration can achieve more with similar commitment 
of resources. This also means Distributed Collaboration creates opportunities to achieve 
similar results with fewer resources. Operating in Distributed Collaborations is associated 
with significant cost savings, as it is seen as a user-friendly, low-tech, and low-cost means 
of managing dynamic requirements – one which can expand and contract in size and scale 
(Bauer, Franke, & Tuertscher, 2016; Ferguson & Soekijad, 2016; Hauser et al., 2017). 
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Breu and Hemingway (2004) advise that by moving work to the worker rather than vice 
versa, organisations can achieve significant cost savings. Others have pointed out that 
Distributed Collaboration allows people and organisations to share information more sys-
tematically, meaning a reduction in R&D expenditure through duplication and rework 
(Gómez et al., 2017). 
4.5.2 Endemic-Social Contributing factors 
We use the term endemic-social to describe attributes of collaborating members that are 
not limited to specific relationships; rather they are recurring traits of those collaborators 
(Table 4.4). The first endemic-social contributing factor is members’ leadership skills. In 
the case of Distributed Collaboration, leadership is vital for defining the goal or vision 
for the group project, attracting and retaining members to the group, communicating ef-
fectively, and promoting active participation in the group (Oh, Moon, Hahn, & Kim, 
2016; Pauleen, 2003). Traditional collaborations and Distributed Collaborations differ in 
that the role of leadership is considered a collective effort in a distributed environment 
(Johnson, Safadi, & Faraj, 2015; Nordbäck & Espinosa, 2019). Leadership in Distributed 
Collaboration may be formal or informal, as long as some team collaborators are recog-
nised by their peers as being influential in the actions the group takes to achieve their 
shared objective(s) (Johnson et al., 2015; Nicholson, Sarker, Sarker, & Valacich, 2007; 
Nordbäck & Espinosa, 2019; Pauleen, 2003). Many scholars have argued leadership is 
more challenging in Distributed Collaborations, due to the continuous dynamic reconfig-
urations taking place (Faraj, Kudaravalli, & Wasko, 2015; Nicholson et al., 2007).  
The second endemic-social contributing factor is members’ tendency to empathise. Em-
pathy plays an important role in the success of Distributed Collaboration. Empathy is 
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displayed through social sensitivity in co-located groups and is related to group perfor-
mance, the lack of visual cues in Distributed Collaboration makes this difficult to replicate 
(Barlow & Dennis, 2016).  
The third endemic-social contributing factor is the members’ personalities. Personalities 
are important when determining the ability of individuals to establish individual roles and 
resolve conflict (Potter & Balthazard, 2002). Certain combinations of personalities are 
more likely to be effective collaborators (Brown, Poole, & Rodgers, 2004).  
The fourth endemic-social contributing factor is the motivation of collaborating members. 
Distributed Collaboration is dependent on members handing over knowledge to benefit 
the group as a whole and this requires they see sufficient value to do so (Wasko & Faraj, 
2005). Extrinsic factors which motivate members include reputation, career advancement, 
while intrinsic factors may include ideology and a sense of collective reciprocation 
(Roberts, Hann, & Slaughter, 2006; Von Krogh, Haefliger, Spaeth, & Wallin, 2012; 
Zhang et al., 2013).  
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The recognition of specific 
collaborators as positive 
influencers in the pursuit of 
some shared objective(s). 
(Faraj et al., 2015; Johnson et al., 
2015; Kayworth & Leidner, 
2002; Nicholson et al., 2007; Oh 




The sensitivity with which 
collaborators interact with one 
another. 
(Bateman et al., 2011; Fan & 
Lederman, 2018; Grigore et al., 




The values and interaction 
styles of collaborators.  
(Brown et al., 2004; Cummings 
& Dennis, 2018; Nicholson et al., 
2007; Potter & Balthazard, 2002) 
Members’ 
Motivation 
The intrinsic and extrinsic 
reasons why individuals are 
engaging with the 
collaboration. 
(Ridings et al., 2006; Roberts et 
al., 2006; Von Krogh et al., 2012; 
Wasko & Faraj, 2005; Zhao, 




The knowledge and skill 
possessed by individual 
collaborators. 
(Barlow & Dennis, 2016; Fuller 
et al., 2006; Kayworth & Leidner, 




The different national and 
local cultures of individual 
collaborators. 
(Porter et al., 2013; Posey, 
Lowry, Roberts, & Ellis, 2010; 
Sarker & Sarker, 2009; Shin, 
Ishman, & Sanders, 2007; Vlaar 
et al., 2008) 
The fifth endemic-social contributing factor is members’ individual capabilities. Consid-
ering that Distributed Collaboration is facilitated by ICT, technical proficiency can act as 
a significant barrier to collaboration (Barlow & Dennis, 2016; Fuller et al., 2006). The 
capabilities of group members influence perceptions of competency among group mem-
bers (Paul & McDaniel Jr, 2004). Digital collaboration-specific competences can refer to 
(1) virtual self-efficacy, i.e. an individual’s belief in their abilities, (2) virtual media skill, 
i.e. an individual’s skill levels in using communicative technologies, and (3) virtual social 
skill, i.e. an individual’s ability to build social relationships in a virtual setting (Wang & 
Haggerty, 2011). Many groups assist members by providing some degree of training or 
support depending on the group structure (Pauleen & Yoong, 2001). This is important, as 
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the varying skill-sets and knowledge of ‘technophobes’ may be lost due to the technical 
demands of Distributed Collaboration (Paul, Samarah, Seetharaman, & Mykytyn Jr, 
2004). Instead, collaborations may be dominated by an over-representation of members 
with a positive predisposition to technology (Asatiani & Penttinen, 2019; Wang & 
Haggerty, 2011). 
The sixth and final endemic-social contributing factor is the members’ cultural back-
grounds. Intercultural differences present a continuous challenge in Distributed Collabo-
ration (Sarker & Sarker, 2009).  
4.5.3 Endemic-Material Contributing factors 
We use the term endemic-material to describe tangible attributes (Table 4.5) of the spe-
cific infrastructure that support the collaboration. The first endemic-material contributing 
factor is the consensus on the choice of mediating technologies. The choice of technology 
provides the consistent link between the group members (Gómez et al., 2017; Pauleen & 
Yoong, 2001). Thus, the choice of technology plays a crucial role in capturing assertions, 
thoughts, and experiences between members (Altschuller & Benbunan-Fich, 2013). The 
choice of mediating technology may have to factor in cost-benefit comparisons between 
various options, e.g. typing is simple to implement but takes more time and effort than 
speaking, phone calls reduce travel need but are not as natural as face-to-face meetings 
(Bos, Olson, & Nan, 2009).  
The second endemic-material contributing factor is the usability of mediating technolo-
gies. Increasing usability is considered a critical design goal when forming Distributed 
Collaborations (Butler et al., 2014; Kankanhalli et al., 2006; Sarker & Sarker, 2009). 
Technologies must provide virtual spaces that do not get in the way of interactions if they 
are to produce the types of sociable environments needed for meaningful collaboration 
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(Phang et al., 2009), these capabilities include thread-posting, real-time chat, private mes-
saging, polling tools, communal calendars/scheduling, and social network applications 
(Bock et al., 2015).  
Table 4.5 Endemic-material contributing factors for successful Distributed Collabo-
ration 
Contributing factor Definition Sources 
Consensus on the 
choice of mediating 
technologies 
The extent to which 
mediating technologies are 
accepted by collaborators.  
(Gómez et al., 2017; Gupta et 
al., 2009; Ma & Agarwal, 




The extent to which 
mediating technologies are 
effortless to use by 
collaborators. 
(Lindberg, Berente, Gaskin, & 
Lyytinen, 2016; Phang et al., 




The extent to which 
mediating technologies 
afford parallel 
communication and rapid 
feedback. 
(Cummings & Dennis, 2018; 
Daft & Lengel, 1986; Dennis, 
Fuller, & Valacich, 2008; 





The extent to which 
mediating technologies allow 
collaborators to track 
knowledge activities. 
(Altschuller & Benbunan-Fich, 
2013; Phang et al., 2009) 
The third endemic-material contributing factor is the richness of mediating technologies. 
Media richness describes the ability of a communication channel to capture different 
types of information and feedback rapidly and in parallel, so reducing ambiguity and un-
certainty between parties (Daft & Lengel, 1986). Media richness is socially constructed, 
meaning that different individuals will have different perceptions of richness, ultimately 
media richness and how group members communicate is dependent on how the individ-
uals interact with the technology (Dennis et al., 2008).  
The fourth and final endemic-material contributing factor is knowledge tracking fulfil-
ment. This describes the extent to which members believe their need to track knowledge 
activities can be fulfilled by the technology used by the group (Phang et al., 2009).  
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4.5.4 Relational-Social Contributing factors 
Relational-social contributing factors describe qualities that exist within the relationships 
between collaborators. The description of these factors in existing literature was more 
complicated than other contributing factors. Hence, they are modelled in this study as 
hierarchical constructs, each comprised of multiple constituent factors (see Table 4.6). 
The first relational-social contributing factor is interpersonal ties. This contributing fac-
tor is comprised of four sub-concepts, namely trust among specific group members, in-
terpersonal relationships among specific group members, communication among specific 
group members, and prior work history between collaborating members.  
Interpersonal relationships among specific group members are essential to allow ‘syner-
gistic knowledge’ to be developed through group interactions (Griffith et al., 2003). These 
relationships may existing within and across different organisations (Liu et al., 2017).  
Trust among specific group members may be divided into cognitive and affective trust 
(Fan & Lederman, 2018; Kanawattanachai & Yoo, 2002) whereby cognitive trust in-
volves a cognitive assessment of other members competence, reliability and dependabil-
ity, while affective trust deals with emotional bounds, caring and reciprocity (Altschuller 
& Benbunan-Fich, 2013; Fan & Lederman, 2018). Both of these dimensions are im-
portant. However, Distributed Collaboration means members are dispersed and projects 
may be short term, hence cognitive trust often takes precedence (Altschuller & Benbunan-
Fich, 2013; Liu et al., 2017).  Communication among specific group members is important 
as those who communicate more will be seen more positively within the group (Bock et 
al., 2015; Pauleen, 2003; Sarker & Sahay, 2004). Existing literature has cited prior work 
history as a consideration for distributed collaborative groups (Piccoli & Ives, 2003; 
Robert Jr et al., 2008). Distributed Collaborations often face a logistical hurdle which 
would be less common in co-located groups in that members are likely to have no history 
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of working with one another (Gu, Konana, Rajagopalan, & Chen, 2007; Kanawattanachai 
& Yoo, 2002).  











(Goh & Wasko, 2012; Kraut et al., 2010; Liu et 
al., 2017; Paul & McDaniel Jr, 2004; Pauleen, 




(Altschuller & Benbunan-Fich, 2013; Cheng et 
al., 2016; Fan & Lederman, 2018; 
Kanawattanachai & Yoo, 2002; Ridings, Gefen, 





(Dennis et al., 2008; Kotlarsky & Oshri, 2005; 





(Altschuller & Benbunan-Fich, 2013; Cummings 
& Dennis, 2018; Espinosa, Slaughter, Kraut, & 
Herbsleb, 2007; Robert et al., 2009; Wu, Gerlach, 








(Gu et al., 2007; Jarvenpaa, Shaw, & Staples, 
2004; Moser, Ganley, & Groenewegen, 2013; 




(Cummings & Dennis, 2018; Garg, Smith, & 
Telang, 2011; Kane & Ransbotham, 2016; Robert 





(Bauer et al., 2016; Crowston, Li, Wei, Eseryel, 
& Howison, 2007; Faraj et al., 2011; Grigore et 
al., 2015; Hauser et al., 2017) 
Social Norms (Bjørn & Ngwenyama, 2009; Butler & Wang, 
2012; Park et al., 2019; Ridings & Wasko, 2010; 
Sarker & Sahay, 2004; Watson‐Manheim et al., 
2012) 
Subgroups (Bock et al., 2015; Bos et al., 2009; Gu, Konana, 
Raghunathan, & Chen, 2014; O'Leary & 







(Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-
Bowers, 2000; Ray, Kim, & Morris, 2014; Robert 
Jr et al., 2008; Sarker et al., 2011; Wasko & 









(Beranek et al., 2005; Kanawattanachai & Yoo, 
2007; Lindberg et al., 2016; Moser et al., 2013; 





(Faraj et al., 2011; Kane & Ransbotham, 2016; 
Kotlarsky & Oshri, 2005; Ma & Agarwal, 2007; 
Oh et al., 2016; Posey et al., 2010; Ransbotham & 
Kane, 2011; Ridings et al., 2006; Staples & 
Webster, 2008; Wasko & Faraj, 2005) 
The second relational-social contributing factor is the social structures of the group, this 
is comprised of five sub-concepts, communication standards adopted in group, the social 
network within the group, the governance structure, social norms, and subgroups.  
Communication standards, sometimes referred to as genre rules, are defined as the in-
stantiation of the social structures for how a communication tool is used by a set of users 
(Bartelt & Dennis, 2014; Watson-Manheim & Bélanger, 2007). Communicative genres 
are distinctive types of communicative action, characterised by socially recognised com-
municative purpose and common aspects of form (Moser et al., 2013). They are typically 
adopted intuitively by users as they communicate with one another, further emphasising 
the self-structured nature of Distributed Collaboration (Bartelt & Dennis, 2014).  
Establishing a social network within the group increases social presence, which is the 
perception that social counterparts in virtual exchanges are real (Altschuller & Benbunan-
Fich, 2013; Srivastava & Chandra, 2018). This in turn creates social comparison, which 
should be managed to promote positive actions from group members (Bhagwatwar, 
Massey, & Dennis, 2017). Social capital theory, specifically structural capital can be ap-
plied to Distributed Collaboration when discussing the power of social networks on the 
group (Robert Jr et al., 2008). Structural capital reflects the overall pattern of interactions 
among group members (Cummings & Dennis, 2018; Wasko & Faraj, 2005).  
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One of the distinguishing factors of Distributed Collaboration over a traditional, hierar-
chical group within an organisation is its governance structure. The application of com-
munication technology means these groups are typically governed by self-organisation, 
keeping a detailed trace of the interactions between members in real time (Bauer et al., 
2016; Crowston et al., 2007; Grigore et al., 2015). These Distributed Collaborations are 
established and maintained by its members as a platform to share common interests and 
information relating to that topic without any organisational input (Hauser et al., 2017; 
Porter et al., 2013). Distributed collaborative groups implement their own content bound-
aries, which are an individual perceptions of what materials and discussions are part of 
the community and what are not (Butler & Wang, 2012). The lack of formal structure in 
Distributed Collaboration has been shown to free collaborators from the pressure of social 
convention and hierarchy, fostering levels of innovation which are not found in traditional 
organisational structures (Faraj et al., 2011).  
Social Norms are the informal rules and standards of a group that emerge out of social 
interactions and influence group members’ social behaviour without the force of laws 
(Huang et al., 2019). Social norms develop over time within a group with repeated inter-
actions, contributions and exchanges (Bjørn & Ngwenyama, 2009).  
Subgroups or cliques are a subset of a network in which actors are more closely and in-
tensely tied to one another than they are to the other members of the entire network (Bock 
et al., 2015). 
The third relational-social contributing factor is task-specific alignment. This social con-
tributing factor is also achieved through the combination of elements which are discussed 
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in a number of prior studies, specifically shared goals/understanding among group mem-
bers, a coordination among specific group members, and mutual learning between mem-
bers.  
Distributed Collaborations require a shared understanding of what they are trying to 
achieve in order to operate towards a common goal. The importance of shared goals and 
understanding in Distributed Collaboration draws on cognitive capital, i.e. the extent to 
which members share a common understanding about their teamwork and/or task 
(Mathieu et al., 2000). Park et al. (2019) showed that shared understanding leads to ‘af-
fective contagion’ i.e. a process in which a person or group influences the affect or be-
haviour of another person or group through the conscious or unconscious induction of 
affect states and behavioural attitudes.  In an effort to develop a shared understanding 
there are also obstacles which should be avoided, first, it is important to avoid confirma-
tion bias, which is the tendency to search for or interpret information in a way that con-
firms one’s preconceptions (Minas et al., 2014). Second, developing a shared understand-
ing within the group is not always achieved, many groups experience conflict among team 
members which must be resolved (Oshri et al., 2008; Windeler et al., 2015).  
Coordination among group members occurs when members develop an understanding of 
the activities of others, coordination is defined as the management of dependencies among 
task activities, when the task activities of multiple individuals need to interrelate in a 
synchronised fashion, the corresponding interdependencies need to be well managed 
(Espinosa et al., 2007). This role of coordination of group members in a Distributed Col-
laboration is well regarded in the extant literature (Lindberg et al., 2016; Moser et al., 
2013; Yang et al., 2015) and an understanding of ‘who knows what’ can improve the 
performance of the group (Oshri et al., 2008).  
87 
 
Mutual learning, i.e. the sharing, transfer, recombination, and reuse of knowledge among 
parties (Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2010) is a central activity of Distributed Collaboration. 
However, it can be extremely difficult to encourage users to participate (Ren et al., 2012). 
Distributed Collaboration follows a power law distribution whereby a few top contribu-
tors provide most of the resources, for example, over 65% of Gnutella network users 
downloaded free music without ever contributing themselves (Gu et al., 2007). Equality 
of participation is considered an important factor of group performance as there in a need 
to integrate knowledge from as many group members as possible, if some members do 
not contribute, the group loses this potential knowledge (Barlow & Dennis, 2016). 
4.5.5 Relational-Material Contributing factors 
We use the term relational-material to describe tangible factors which determine how 
group members interact with one another (Table 4.7). The first relational-material requi-
site is task-technology fit. Task-technology fit refers to the fit between the task require-
ments and the capabilities of the IT to facilitate communication (Asatiani & Penttinen, 
2019). IT coordinates the features of the communication medium with the situation and 
social context of the group (Barlow & Dennis, 2016; Jarvenpaa et al., 2004) and has been 
discussed as a contributor to collaborative success in the extant literature (Barlow & 
Dennis, 2016; Beranek et al., 2005; Figl & Saunders, 2011).  
The second relational-material contributing factor is distance between group members. 
When operating in Distributed Collaboration, groups must overcome geographical dis-
tance which is traditionally considered antithetical to successful coordination (Lindberg 
et al., 2016). Of course distance can also be harnessed to the groups advantage as the 
virtual space is not subject to geographical limitations so members can access the plat-
form anywhere, anyhow, and anytime (Spagnoletti et al., 2015). 
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The third relational-material contributing factor is the time zones occupied by group 
members. Extant research has highlighted time as ‘one of the most elusive concepts re-
lated to work’ (Sarker & Sahay, 2004). For distributed collaborative groups, as distance 
and group size increases, groups are likely to experience difficulties with members work-
ing in different time zones (Kayworth & Leidner, 2002; Massey et al., 2003). This is 
referred to as temporal dispersion (Colazo & Fang, 2010; O'Leary & Cummings, 2007) 
and is considered an ‘internal boundary’ for distributed groups (Espinosa, Cummings, 
Wilson, & Pearce, 2003).  







The appropriateness of 
the mediating technology 
adopted given the context 
of the group’s operations. 
(Asatiani & Penttinen, 2019; Bartelt 
& Dennis, 2014; Faraj et al., 2011; 




dispersion of group 
members. 
(Colazo & Fang, 2010; Espinosa et 
al., 2003; O'Leary & Cummings, 
2007; Sarker & Sahay, 2004) 
Time Zones of 
Group Members 
The time zones occupied 
by collaborating 
participants of the group. 
(Colazo & Fang, 2010; Espinosa et 
al., 2003; Massey et al., 2003; 
O'Leary & Cummings, 2007; 
Sarker, Ahuja, & Sarker, 2018; 
Sarker & Sahay, 2004) 
4.6 Complimentary and Moderating Factors 
To this point this literature review has detailed the benefits which organisations or groups 
can reap from effective Distributed Collaboration as well as modelling the factors which 
must be managed in order to produce such rewards. However, through the process of 
reviewing existing literature, it became obvious that many factors did not operate in iso-
lation and instead were complimented by others. Through retrospectively reviewing these 
complimentary factors after producing our model illustrated in Figure 4.1, it was no sur-
prise that social factors, both endemic and relational were found to be complimented or 
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moderated by a number of other listed factors. The following sections will detail how the 
factors listed in our research model have a complimentary or moderating influence on the 
endemic-social or relational-social factors. 
4.6.1 Endemic-Social 
Leadership is particularly challenging due to the multidisciplinary and geographically 
distance between members in Distributed Collaboration (Eseryel & Eseryel, 2013). 
Choosing a leader is influenced by mutual learning, personality and members tendency 
to empathise as factors that are often associated with a good leader include level of par-
ticipation (Faraj et al., 2015), strong leadership personality traits (Nicholson et al., 2007), 
or simply being considerate of others’ feelings (Eseryel & Eseryel, 2013). 
Empathy has a positive effect on the level of participation, thus improving mutual learn-
ing (Huang et al., 2019; Johnson et al., 2014; Leimeister, Ebner, & Krcmar, 2005). Show-
ing empathy also motivates other members and encourages unselfish behaviours (Grigore 
et al., 2015). As already mentioned, empathy can also compensate for an absence of for-
mal leadership, whereby members assume the role of a mentor, developing their peers by 
listening and showing support (Wakefield, Leidner, & Garrison, 2008).  
The role of individual personalities can be moderated by social networks within a group 
as Distributed Collaborations arguably make it more difficult to express one’s personal-
ity, due to the decrease in continuous exposure. This means certain personality traits, such 
as charisma, can become less effective in Distributed Collaboration if the member is not 
also proficient in the necessary technical skills to allow them to express it (Windeler et 
al., 2015). Although much of the extant research focuses on the effect of an individual’s 
personality on their role in Distributed Collaboration, the converse of this relationship has 
also been shown to be true, mutual learning and participation in Distributed Collaboration 
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can negatively influence individuals’ personalities, e.g. if the pressures of working in a 
distributed group interfere with an individual’s work-life balance (Sarker, Sarker, & Jana, 
2010). 
Increased motivation has been shown to compliment mutual learning as having a sense 
of belonging in a group increases information exchange and cooperation in the group 
(Cummings & Dennis, 2018). Members with greater commitment to the group will stay 
with it longer and contribute more (Kraut et al., 2010; Yan, Leidner, & Benbya, 2018). 
Levels of commitment play a key role in regulating members behaviour such as reading 
posts, posting replies and moderating discussions (Bateman et al., 2011). A large portion 
of group members in open environments typically start as ‘lurkers’ who must be moti-
vated to become more actively involved by showing them the potential value from active 
participation (Ridings et al., 2006). 
The mix of national and local cultures often has a strong influence on communication, 
shared understanding, and leadership in the group as members require greater commu-
nication skills to avoid misunderstandings or cultural biases (David, Chand, Newell, & 
Resende-Santos, 2008; Kayworth & Leidner, 2002; Pauleen & Yoong, 2001; Vlaar et al., 
2008). Group members from different cultures may interact with their peers in contrasting 
ways. For example, Nordbäck & Espinosa (2019) showed that members from high power-
distance cultures are more likely to accept unequal distribution of power, making them 
less equipped and less likely to assume leadership roles. On the other hand, team members 
from low power-distance cultures are more likely to favour less centralised leadership 
approaches. Similarly, the mix of cultures in a group can influence the development of 
interpersonal relationships and knowledge sharing necessary for mutual learning as dif-
ferent cultures may have different attitudes to self-disclosure (Posey et al., 2010) and 
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members from a culture of individualism will tend to have loose interpersonal ties vs. 
collectivists which will tend to be cohesive and well-integrated (Paul et al., 2004; Posey 
et al., 2010; Shin et al., 2007). 
4.6.2 Endemic-Material 
The decision on the choice of mediating technologies will directly influence the level of 
communication between members, for example there could be secondary compatibility 
issues, e.g. some communication tools, such as Google+ and Facebook, are not available 
in China, but U.S. members may not be accustomed to using WeChat (Cheng et al., 2016). 
Second, the usability of mediating technologies will impact mutual learning as it is im-
portant for the technology to support the sharing of digital content in multiple formats in 
order for participants to collaborate properly (Spagnoletti et al., 2015). For example, plat-
forms such as GitHub provide a comprehensive suite of communication and collaboration 
features which support users in effectively coordinating their work (Lindberg et al., 2016). 
The third endemic-material contributing factor is the richness of mediating technologies, 
which again, can either compliment or negatively impact communication between mem-
bers and play a significant role in the ultimate success or failure of Distributed Collabo-
ration, as less rich media slows and inhibits complex communication between collaborat-
ing members (Kayworth & Leidner, 2002). 
The fourth and final endemic-material contributing factor is knowledge tracking fulfil-
ment. Distributed Collaboration systems can enable knowledge tracking fulfilment by 
maintaining a digital record of member contributions and contributors, so improving re-
lationships within the group as increased public awareness encourages members to build 
relationships (Altschuller & Benbunan-Fich, 2013). Knowledge tracking fulfilment can 
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also act as a motivation  tool as it plays an important role in reputation-building and group 
acknowledgement (Wasko & Faraj, 2005; Wasko, Faraj, & Teigland, 2004). 
4.6.3 Relational-Social 
Following our model presented in Figure 4.1, the first relational-social contributing fac-
tor is interpersonal ties. This contributing factor is comprised of four sub-concepts, 
namely trust among specific group members, interpersonal relationships among specific 
group members, communication among specific group members, and prior work history 
between collaborating members. 
First, interpersonal relationships among specific group members, form the basis for the 
development of trust and communication (Cummings & Dennis, 2018; Paul & McDaniel 
Jr, 2004; Pauleen, 2003; Windeler et al., 2015).  
Second, trust between members can be difficult to develop, given the lack of established 
relationships or prior work history between members in Distributed Collaboration, they 
must often rely on ‘swift trust’, a presumptive form of trust that allows individuals to 
begin collaborating as quickly as possible (Robert et al., 2009). Once trust is established, 
mutual learning follows as individuals are more likely to share information and make 
contributions, it also means they are more likely to accept the information and contribu-
tion of others (Robert Jr et al., 2008; Zhang & Watts, 2008). 
Communication among specific group members is predicated on the condition the group 
trusts the communicator, as otherwise high levels of communication are simply seen as 
wasteful ‘babbling’ (Sarker et al., 2011). Communication between members can be im-
proved based on the usability of technology as individual communications can be differ-
entiated according to their ‘rehearsability’, i.e. the extent to which users can reread and 
93 
 
edit communications before sending them (Dennis et al., 2008). This not only allows in-
dividuals to avoid making mistakes or offending people, it also alleviates some of the 
social pressures of synchronous or face-to-face communication (Ray et al., 2014). 
Having no prior history working together does not mean trust cannot be developed but, 
as discussed already, it does necessitate the development of swift trust (Robert et al., 
2009). Having a satisfactory prior collaborative experience has been shown to encourage 
continued participation and, therefore, improve mutual learning (Wu et al., 2007). This 
can influence members impressions of one another, not only do members rarely have a 
history of working together, they also rarely meet in person during the course of a collab-
oration which would assist in establishing a relationship (Cummings & Dennis, 2018). 
The lack of familiarity between group members means they struggle to develop relation-
ships and routine over time (Barlow & Dennis, 2016), making it difficult for group mem-
bers to develop a shared understanding (Windeler et al., 2015), decreasing communica-
tion between members and thus, increasing the likelihood of conflict in the group (Oshri 
et al., 2008). 
Communication standards naturally has a direct influence on the communication between 
group members, effective communication is essential in Distributed Collaboration, and 
by establishing genre rules, a group can increase the ease of use, reduce communication 
cost, and improve both efficiency and effectiveness of communication (Espinosa et al., 
2007). Previous studies have recommended that Distributed Collaborations even make 
explicit agreements for how quickly emails should be responded to in order to dramati-
cally improve overall communication (Bos et al., 2009). The explicit implementation of 
communication standards such as this would help overcome trust issues between mem-
bers as research has shown that in the case of communication responsiveness, a group 
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member with high trust in their peer will attribute slow responsiveness to an external 
factor. However, if trust is not established, they will interpret the delay in response as 
noncooperative behaviour (Jarvenpaa et al., 2004). Establishing communication stand-
ards can also overcome cultural differences, as previous research has highlighted the dif-
ference in communication culture between different nationalities (Sarker & Sahay, 2004). 
Social networks in the group rely on the richness of the mediating technology, as well as 
distance between members as distance has an effect on communication, and the social 
influence of the exchange is subject to the richness of the communication media (media 
richness theory) (Dennis et al., 2008). Rich media are better suited to ambiguous tasks, 
whereas lean media are better for information processing (Asatiani & Penttinen, 2019). 
An interesting outcome from a strong social presence in a group is social proof, which is 
an effect motivation tool whereby members engage in an activity as they believe that other 
in the group are also participating in that activity (Posey et al., 2010). Groups with decen-
tralised networks do not have a history of a small number of members dominating dis-
cussions, therefore, higher structural capital increases the likelihood that more members 
will contribute, share, and use information from all members (mutual learning) (Robert 
Jr et al., 2008). Although members of Distributed Collaboration may not have prior work 
experience, it is interesting to note the prevalence of homophily. Homophily refers to the 
propensity to seek interactions with those who have similar beliefs (Gu et al., 2014) and 
how members of Distributed Collaboration have a tendency to discover the same infor-
mation because of their shared interests (Garg et al., 2011). 
Governance structure has a unique impact on leadership,  unlike traditional organisa-
tions, in keeping with the free structure or Distributed Collaboration, leaders emerge in-
formally either by natural selection or those who are actually doing the work in the group 
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determine who should take certain responsibilities (Eseryel & Eseryel, 2013). By estab-
lishing some degree of control within the group, feedback is provided to members which 
increases the probability of reaching the shared goals of the group (Dennis, Robert Jr, 
Curtis, Kowalczyk, & Hasty, 2012), and increases the perceptions of fairness among 
members (Magni et al., 2018). Governance structures are maintained by the presence of 
moderators who play a crucial role in sustaining the group (Phang et al., 2009), as well as 
having trust and good relationships between group members (Pauleen, 2003). 
Social norms emerge on a voluntary basis and moderate the interactions of contributors 
and ensure quality of contributions, thereby improving mutual learning (Butler & Wang, 
2012; Gu et al., 2007; Ridings & Wasko, 2010). When norms are established in a group 
it helps develop a shared understanding and motivate participation (Sarker & Sarker, 
2009; Zhao et al., 2018), this is considered a form of relational-social capital (Robert Jr 
et al., 2008). However, for a number a reasons, distributed collaborative groups find it 
difficult to establish social norms, for example, as has been discussed in detail already, 
cultural difference between members can cause conflict in a group which inhibits to de-
velopment of norms (Sarker & Sahay, 2004; Wakefield et al., 2008). Also, the lack of 
past work experience, established relationships or even the social cues present in face-to-
face interactions present a challenge (Barlow & Dennis, 2016; Robert et al., 2009). Fail-
ing to establish social norms can lead to a lack of cohesion in the group, or worse, the 
belief that they have established a shared understanding while remaining oblivious to the 
presence of misunderstandings (Watson‐Manheim et al., 2012). 
Distributed Collaboration facilitates the formation of subgroups, firstly, through the 
choice of mediating technology and its technical infrastructure as emails and communi-
cation tools can support both collective and subgroup communication (Magni et al., 2018; 
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Thomas & Bostrom, 2010). Second, Distributed Collaborations create homophily, as they 
are formed in order to collaborate on a shared topic or goal (Park, Konana, Gu, Kumar, 
& Raghunathan, 2013), therefore, members find that they identify with particular sub-
groups (Robert et al., 2009) which may increase their motivation and thus improve mutual 
learning through increased participation (Bos et al., 2009). The formation of subgroups 
should, however, be cautiously monitored as it has been cited as restricting the develop-
ment of trust (Windeler et al., 2015) and increasing the likelihood of conflict, i.e., a lack 
of shared understanding (O'Leary & Cummings, 2007). 
Shared understanding itself is particularly important for Distributed Collaborations to 
develop as they are geographically dispersed and may not have the same opportunities to 
communicate with one another (Sarker et al., 2011; Vlaar et al., 2008). Therefore, along 
with forming strong interpersonal ties, the group requires a shared understanding and 
sense of belonging, mutual responsibility and a sense of obligation toward one another 
(Ray et al., 2014; Vlaar et al., 2008). This cognitive capital facilitates efficient communi-
cation and coordination of members in a Distributed Collaboration (Robert Jr et al., 2008; 
Wasko & Faraj, 2005). As discussed above, Distributed Collaboration is a fluid object 
where members can come and go as they please, creating potential for confirmation bias 
in the group (Faraj et al., 2011; Yan et al., 2018). However, the strength of Distributed 
Collaboration lies in the variety of expertise and individual capabilities within a group 
(Lindberg et al., 2016; Zhao et al., 2018). We view conflict as the absence of shared un-
derstanding, Hauser et al. (2017) describe this as an interaction relationship between two 
or more parties that pursue mutually exclusive or incompatible goals. The likelihood of 




Creating and maintaining this awareness reduces the effort needed to coordinate tasks 
and resources, once developed through communication and working as a group, this fa-
miliarity helps group members anticipate the actions of others (Beranek et al., 2005; 
Nordbäck & Espinosa, 2019). When Distributed Collaborations have a shared under-
standing, they begin to develop shared mental models which are important for effective 
information exchange and integration (mutual learning) and enable high performing 
groups to coordinate themselves without the need for over communication (Beranek et 
al., 2005; Robert Jr et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2015). This requires particular attention in 
distributed rather than co-located collaborations, as the latter has the advantage of ‘bump-
ing into one another’ which would remind them of tasks that need to be delivered upon 
etc. (Bos et al., 2009). Instead, Distributed Collaborations rely on Transactive memory 
systems (TMS) which refer to the combination of individual memory systems and com-
munications between individuals (Oshri et al., 2008). In particular TMS discussed the 
awareness of knowledge specialisation among group members (Kanawattanachai & Yoo, 
2007). TMS is vital for Distributed Collaborations as members may not have close per-
sonal relationships but come together to facilitate mutual learning (Kotlarsky & Oshri, 
2005).  
Social exchange theory has also been applied in prior literature when studying mutual 
learning in distributed groups (Posey et al., 2010; Ridings et al., 2006). Social exchange 
theory is applied in this context as a subjective cost-benefit perspective, comparing intan-
gible costs such as contributing to the group, to intangible benefits such as the respect 
you will receive (Posey et al., 2010). Existing literature shows us that members require 
trust (Staples & Webster, 2008) and the belief that their reputation will be enhanced 
(Wasko & Faraj, 2005) to motivate them to contribute themselves (Posey et al., 2010). 
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Members of Distributed Collaboration operate on a somewhat voluntary basis, meaning 
that members, and as a result their contributions, are far more volatile (Oh et al., 2016). 
The literature has shown that Distributed Collaborations have high membership volatility 
(Faraj et al., 2011), member retention and motivation to participate proves to be a constant 
struggle and is crucial for the survival and success of the group (Ransbotham & Kane, 
2011). However, other studies suggest that the volatile nature of membership can be a 
positive factor as it increases group size and, therefore, information quality (Kane & 
Ransbotham, 2016). Distributed Collaborations naturally have more difficulty in encour-
aging mutual learning due to the lack of face to face communication (Griffith et al., 2003; 
Ma & Agarwal, 2007) Distributed Collaborations invest heavily in media-rich communi-
cation tools to support mutual learning across their sites, however, breakdowns and other 
challenges are still evident (Kotlarsky & Oshri, 2005). 
Of course, not all knowledge which should be shared between members is explicit, it is 
also important for tacit knowledge to be exchanged (Wang et al., 2014), although this can 
be difficult in a distributed setting with limited interpersonal communication (Gupta et 
al., 2009). Therefore, members rely on repeated interactions, contextualising their ques-
tions and validating answers (Johnson et al., 2015). Knowledge creation theory indicates 
that in order to encourage mutual learning, there must be high levels of social interaction 
between individuals, because knowledge is created by individuals, groups should look to 
create ‘communities of interaction’ to improve mutual learning (Yan et al., 2018).  
4.6.4 Relational-Material 
Task-technology fit also has a close relationship with the coordination of team members 
as it is important to align individual with tasks, technology and group structure to achieve 
optimal performance (Wang & Haggerty, 2011). Task-technology fit should be given as 
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much consideration as the technology itself to ensure the investment in collaborative tools 
is not wasted, increased availability of communicative technology means that communi-
cation can take place, but does not mean that it will take place (David et al., 2008). Tech-
nology can alleviate cultural, temporal and geographic issues, however, if the fit between 
task and technology is not optimal these issues could be amplified (Asatiani & Penttinen, 
2019). 
The challenge presented by having group members dispersed across a variety of sites is 
how best to distribute work, responsibilities and leadership across the sites and then re-
integrate them into the group as a whole (David et al., 2008). The result of greater distance 
between group members is that the intensity of communications is reduced, in particular 
when members face problems with media that cannot substitute face-to-face communica-
tion (Kotlarsky & Oshri, 2005). 
The additional factor of different time zones to coordinate increase the complexity of 
communication, especially synchronous communication becomes difficult to arrange 
(Cheng et al., 2016; Kankanhalli et al., 2006), individuals experience unproductive waits 
for responses which can lead to inefficiencies, rework and ultimately working outside 
regular hours (Sarker et al., 2018). For example, David et al. (2008) detail an observation 
of their study on GLOBALIS, meetings took place at 08:00 AM (EST), which meant it 
was 13:00 in Ireland, 19:00 in India, 07:00 in Texas and 06:00 in Utah. The result of this 
is that people on the east coast of America started their day with a meeting, Irish workers 
had their day interrupted with a meeting and members in Texas, Utah or India had to work 
outside their normal hours to participate in meetings. Schedules such as this have also 
been the cause of conflict in distributed collaborative groups, giving rise to complaints 
that meetings are scheduled during times that are more convenient for one group, or that 
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certain groups are given better assignments (Magni et al., 2018). The temporal benefits 
such as 24-hour service which are detailed in the benefits section of this paper, come at 
the cost of coordination issues such as this when an all-group meeting is required 
(Kankanhalli et al., 2006). 
4.7 Discussion and Conclusions  
The objective of this study was to conduct a comprehensive overview of the current lit-
erature on Distributed Collaboration, and in doing so, develop a more complete under-
standing of the contributing factors and benefits of this type of working arrangement. The 
first step in this process was to define Distributed Collaboration as the pursuit of a shared 
objective by groups that include non-proximate members, whose participation is facili-
tated by ICT. This definition was developed by synthesising several other synonyms in-
cluding virtual teams, online communities, dispersed teams, online discussion communi-
ties, virtual communities, and distributed teams, which are used in extant research. This 
development alone contributes both to researchers and practitioners. As we have dis-
cussed, Distributed Collaboration has been applied to a plethora of industries and appli-
cations, however, each instance seems to operate under a new title. Defining Distributed 
Collaboration provides clarity for both practitioners who are looking to adopt this ap-
proach to work as well as researchers who study how it operates. 
A systematic approach to searching academic databases was taken by first developing a 
keyword search matric to overcome the challenge of searching for comprehensive litera-
ture in a multidisciplinary field. Once the literature was gathered and duplicates removed 
we began our review of the material and developed a concept-centric matrix to capture 
the contributing factor factors to be managed for successful collaboration, as well as the 
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benefits which resulted from these groups (Webster & Watson, 2002). The contents of 
this concept-centric matrix are illustrated in our core research model (Figure 4.1).  
This study contributes to the existing body of research by providing a core model for 
Distributed Collaboration which can be adopted and built upon in future research. This 
model enhances knowledge on successful Distributed Collaboration and creates a lens to 
enable organisations to understand how to realise the benefits of Distributed Collabora-
tion. While existing research has focused on specific factors and the role they play in 
Distributed Collaboration, for example trust (Jarvenpaa et al., 2004; Ridings et al., 2002), 
leadership (Eseryel & Eseryel, 2013; Johnson et al., 2015; Kayworth & Leidner, 2002), 
and communication (Bartelt & Dennis, 2014; Sarker et al., 2011), our analysis of existing 
literature did not reveal a comprehensive model for successful Distributed Collaboration.  
This model makes a number of significant contributions, both to theory and practice. First, 
we distinguish both contributing factors and benefits as being either ‘social’ or ‘material’. 
This is an important distinction to make considering our definition of Distributed Collab-
oration highlights the reliance on ICT to facilitate this type of working arrangement. 
Therefore, our model stresses that both technology and structural factors (‘material’) as 
well as factors pertaining to the members within the group and how they interact with one 
another (‘social’) must be examined.  
The second axis of our model divides the contributing factors as being either endemic or 
relational. Again, referring back to our definition of Distributed Collaboration, groups 
consist of geographically dispersed members working towards a common goal or shared 
interest. Therefore, dispersed workers will carry their own personal attributes, which we 
label as being social-endemic. All factors relating to how members perform within the 
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group as a whole are then categorised as social-relational. Similarly, we found that mate-
rial factors can also subcategorised as either endemic or relational; endemic being those 
which relate to the specific technology implementation and relational being the structural 
factors in place which dictate the composition of the group.  
Second, in addition to illustrating a comprehensive model of the contributing factors for 
successful Distributed Collaboration and categorising each of these factors, we have also 
detailed the interactions between these factors and how they can complement or regulate 
one another. This is particularly important from a practitioner’s perspective as it provides 
valuable insights into how to efficiently integrate all the elements of the model.  
Third, this research has drawn attention to factors which have received varied levels of 
research. Factors such as trust (Jarvenpaa et al., 2004; Ridings et al., 2002), leadership 
(Eseryel & Eseryel, 2013; Johnson et al., 2015; Kayworth & Leidner, 2002) and commu-
nication (Bartelt & Dennis, 2014; Sarker et al., 2011) have been the focus of many re-
search papers. However, other factors such as empathy and knowledge tracking fulfilment 
have not been explored to the same extent. This research not only explicitly outlines the 
importance of these infrequent factors but also outlines the role they play in the overall 
success of Distributed Collaboration. Highlighting the importance of knowledge tracking 
fulfilment is especially important given the developments in communication technology. 
Future research should look to explore the role of knowledge tracking fulfilment in the 
context of emerging technologies which facilitate this ability, for example the ability of 
Blockchain technology to capture data in a secure, immutable, and publicly verifiable 
manner (Beck et al., 2018). 
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As regards directions for future research in this domain, we believe this study has high-
lighted a number of potential avenues for researchers to explore. First, this study has pre-
sented a synthesised definition of Distributed Collaboration which encapsulates a pleth-
ora of terms which have been applied to describe similar forms of collaborative groups in 
previous research. We believe it would be beneficial for future research to explore the 
dynamics of Distributed Collaboration further in an effort to categorise what distinguishes 
different flavours of this type of working arrangement. Second, the primary contribution 
of this study is the core research model presented in Figure 4.1 which illustrates the con-
tributing factors which must be managed to effectively produce the benefits of Distributed 
Collaboration. Future researchers could adopt this model and evaluate its accuracy against 
an established Distributed Collaboration use-case. Finally, as mentioned in the body of 
this paper, we decided to limit the scope of our literature search to papers published be-
tween 2000 and 2019 in order to maintain a degree of relevance to advancements in mod-
ern communicative technologies. Although we are satisfied that this study represents the 
current state of Distributed Collaboration, we also must acknowledge the pace of devel-
opment of communicative technologies. For instance with the growth of virtual and aug-
mented reality and its application in collaboration (Venkatesh & Windeler, 2012). Future 
research should, therefore, iterate this study to capture the contribution of these technol-




Chapter 5. Exploring the Challenges Associated with Distrib-
uted Collaboration 
5.1 Abstract 
Collaboration has evolved from co-located to distributed settings. A wealth of research 
has examined how Distributed Collaboration is affected by the challenges of free-riding, 
production blocking, and evaluation apprehension. Research also suggests that the appli-
cation of technology can help overcome these issues. This study applies this extant liter-
ature to inform a set of propositions to detail how the implementation of a system could 
overcome these challenges. A series of exploratory interviews with industry participants 
are conducted to gain insights into their experiences with these challenges while operating 
in Distributed Collaboration. This data is analysed using Open, Axial, and Selective cod-
ing techniques. Findings detail first-hand, rich accounts of the challenges faced when op-
erating in Distributed Collaboration. Results from data analysis contribute to the emer-
gence of new insights and hypotheses on how to overcome these challenges. The findings 
highlight how collaborations differ based on the team function, project objective or indi-
viduals’ approach to work. This study illustrates that a sufficient balance of people, pro-
cesses, and technology is necessary to overcome the challenges faced in Distributed Col-
laboration. Much of the existing research on the challenges of Distributed Collaboration 
derive their results from short simulations. This study contributes rich insights gathered 
from participants with first-hand experience operating in Distributed Collaboration, 
thereby contributing to both theory and practice.  





Traditional forms of collaboration were focused on teams in a co-located environment. 
However, the emergence and growth of digital technologies has given rise to the growth 
of Distributed Collaborations i.e. the pursuit of a shared objective by groups that include 
non-proximate members, whose participation is facilitated by ICT (Asatiani & Penttinen, 
2019; Cheng et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2017; Tapscott & Williams, 2008). Examples of Dis-
tributed Collaboration are discussed under several synonyms and appear in a variety of 
industries, for example, virtual teams (Kanawattanachai & Yoo, 2007; Nordbäck & 
Espinosa, 2019), online communities (Hauser et al., 2017; Park et al., 2019), and dis-
persed teams (Magni et al., 2018). Working under these conditions allows individuals 
with a range of backgrounds and expertise from various geographic locations to bring 
new perspectives to bear on complex problems in a variety of domains (Faraj et al., 2011; 
Grigore et al., 2015).  
Much of the extant literature dedicated to researching different forms of Distributed Col-
laboration has focused on the myriad of success factors which must be managed in this 
type of working arrangement such as trust (Jarvenpaa, Knoll, & Leidner, 1998; Porter et 
al., 2013; Ridings et al., 2002), leadership, (Carte, Chidambaram, & Becker, 2006; 
Kayworth & Leidner, 2002; Nordbäck & Espinosa, 2019) and communication (Garg et 
al., 2011; Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1999; Sarker et al., 2011). There is also a wealth of re-
search which examines the challenges facing collaborative teams. These include produc-
tion blocking, which is when individuals cannot express their ideas in a collaborative 
group because someone else is talking; evaluation apprehension, which is when individ-
uals withhold their ideas out of concern that others may not approve them; and free-riding, 
which refers to a member of a group who obtains benefits from a group membership but 
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does not bear a proportional share of the costs of providing the benefits (Albanese & Van 
Fleet, 1985; Briggs & Reinig, 2010; Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Gallupe et al., 1992; 
McGrath, 2015).   
The objective of this study is, therefore, to investigate the operational challenges of Dis-
tributed Collaboration, as well as gaining insights from industry participants on how a 
technology-enabled solution could overcome these challenges. In order to develop a bet-
ter understanding of how these issues affect members of Distributed Collaboration, we 
conducted semi-structured interviews with individuals working in a large multinational 
organisation, hereafter referred to by the pseudonym ‘DE Computers’. Findings make 
two primary contributions; first, the analysis of data gathered in interviews draws atten-
tion to the importance of harmonizing the combination of people, processes, and technol-
ogy to overcome the challenges faced in Distributed Collaboration. Second, this research 
adds new insights and depth regarding the day-to-day reality of operating in Distributed 
Collaboration. This perspective is not covered in detail in extant research.  
The remainder of this study will be structured as follows; first, a theoretical grounding 
will be established by examining the evolution of collaboration from traditional, co-lo-
cated settings to geographically distributed environments. The challenges mentioned 
above of production blocking, evaluation apprehension, and free-riding will also be dis-
cussed in detail as well as the potential of technology to provide a solution. Second, the 
methodological approach will be detailed, including the background of those interviewed 
and how the interview data was analysed. Third, the findings of the study will be pre-
sented as a synthesis of the research. Finally, we will discuss the implications of this 
research for theory and practice, as well as the limitations.  
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5.3 Theoretical Grounding 
5.3.1 The Evolution from traditional to Distributed Collaboration 
Traditionally collaborative working groups operated in a co-located environment as the 
physical distance was seen as detrimental to collaboration between people and organisa-
tions (Eppinger & Chitkara, 2006; Gupta et al., 2009). Geographic proximity was consid-
ered advantageous as it offered better communication and coordination between team 
members as they worked (Sapsed, Gann, Marshall, & Salter, 2005). Also, certain regions 
were established industrial districts or had an environment to foster innovation (Amara, 
Landry, & Ouimet, 2005). 
Knowledge itself is recognised as a corporate asset that can provide a company with a 
competitive advantage (Bordia, Irmer, & Abusah, 2006); therefore, promoting knowledge 
sharing is essential for success. Traditional, co-located teams used meetings as an oppor-
tunity for team members from different departments to collaborate and generate and share 
their ideas (Paulus & Yang, 2000). Knowledge management is a crucial activity for or-
ganisations to facilitate the sharing of explicit as well as tacit knowledge (Wang et al., 
2014). The real benefit of knowledge sharing between group members comes when mem-
bers from various backgrounds begin to share ideas, taking advantage of cognitive diver-
sity and sharing unique expertise (Paulus, 2000; Paulus & Yang, 2000), thus it is im-
portant to facilitate the generation and sharing of ideas to create synergies between indi-
viduals in a group.  
Bordia et al. (2006) applied social exchange theory to analyse knowledge sharing as an 
economic exchange whereby group members conduct a cost-benefit analysis before shar-
ing knowledge. Members consider the effort involved in sharing as a cost and the rewards 
received as a benefit. Wang et al. (2014) suggested that practices that induce accounta-
bility are necessary to promote knowledge sharing in a team.  
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The concept of brainstorming was initially developed by (Osborn, 1953) as a mechanism 
for increasing the amount of ideas shared between members of a group, and has since 
been cited by numerous studies as the origin of group idea generation and knowledge 
sharing exercises (Briggs & Reinig, 2010; Dennis & Valacich, 1993; Gallupe et al., 1992; 
McGrath, 2015; Paulus, 2000). Osborn (1953) detailed four rules to govern idea genera-
tion sessions: do not criticise, encourage quantity, combine and improve suggestions, and 
say all ideas no matter how wild.   
However, researchers found that the combined performance of individuals brainstorming 
and then aggregating their ideas afterwards was more productive than interactive brain-
storming groups. In fact, these nominal groups produced nearly twice as many different 
ideas than interactive groups (Camacho & Paulus, 1995; Gupta et al., 2009; Sutton & 
Hargadon, 1996). In particular, the marginal productivity of members of brainstorming 
groups declines with increasing group size (Gallupe et al., 1992). 
The reason for this underperformance in brainstorming groups is that the four rules out-
lined by Osborn (1953) are often ignored. Many studies find that brainstorming groups 
suffered from members feeling the weight of evaluation (evaluation apprehension), mem-
bers struggling to contribute ideas (production blocking) and reduced motivation to con-
tribute, leaving others to complete the task (free-riding) (Briggs & Reinig, 2010; Diehl & 
Stroebe, 1987; McGrath, 2015). 
Advancements in ICT lead to the emergence and growth of Distributed Collaborations 
(Asatiani & Penttinen, 2019; Cheng et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2017; Tapscott & Williams, 
2008). These teams are not restricted by geography and instead have access to global 
expertise (Chiu, Liang, & Turban, 2014; Eppinger & Chitkara, 2006; Ye & Kankanhalli, 
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2015). This has created a new ‘flat world' of participation, where old collaborative hier-
archies give way to more open and inclusive collaborations involving large numbers of 
distributed collaborators. Organisations must embrace these collaborations within evolv-
ing and boundary-spanning technological ecosystems (Friedman, 2005). These new Dis-
tributed Collaborations act as a form of ‘nominal group' whereby members work alone, 
and their contributions are aggregated. These groups are consistently found to be more 
productive than traditional brainstorming groups (Gupta et al., 2009; McMahon, Ruggeri, 
Kämmer, & Katsikopoulos, 2016; Sutton & Hargadon, 1996). 
Due to the dispersed nature of these groups and their reliance on technology to communi-
cate, Distributed Collaboration utilises electronic brainstorming. Electronic brainstorm-
ing is considered an enhanced form of brainstorming whereby members contribute ideas 
through a computer rather than in an open, face-to-face forum (Dennis & Valacich, 1993). 
Knowledge sharing exercises such as this are often considered the major attraction for 
individuals or organisations to participate in Distributed Collaboration (Griffith et al., 
2003; Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2010; Kotlarsky & Oshri, 2005; Ridings et al., 2006). 
Distributed Collaborations are most successful when participants not only share their 
unique knowledge and integrate that knowledge across the team as a whole; they also 
generate new ideas and understanding as they contrast and compare perspectives and in-
terpretations, developing synergies (Robert Jr et al., 2008). Electronic brainstorming de-
velops synergies as there are more participants, providing a diverse set of skills and ex-
pertise (Dennis & Valacich, 1993) and members can combine and build upon one an-
other’s ideas (Kohn, Paulus, & Choi, 2011). 
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Electronic brainstorming was seen as a solution to the inhibitors of traditional brainstorm-
ing. Production blocking was reduced as all ideas can be expressed simultaneously. In-
creased anonymity reduced evaluation apprehension. Improved accountability combats 
free-riding (Briggs & Reinig, 2010; Nijstad, Stroebe, & Lodewijkx, 2003; Paulus, 2000; 
Paulus & Yang, 2000). Groups that use electronic brainstorming were found to be more 
productive than co-located groups and nominal groups (Dennis & Valacich, 1993; 
Gallupe et al., 1992; Sutton & Hargadon, 1996). 
5.3.2 Production Blocking in Collaborative Groups 
Production blocking is defined as "group members who are prohibited from verbalizing 
their ideas may forget or suppress them because they seem less relevant or less original 
at a later time." (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987). Many studies have suggested that production 
blocking has reduced productivity in collaborative groups (Camacho & Paulus, 1995; 
Dennis & Valacich, 1993; Diehl & Stroebe, 1987). 
Diehl and Stroebe (1987) examined production blocking in detail, outlining that it occurs 
when only one speaker is allowed at a time. It has been suggested that production blocking 
results in reduced output because the delay caused by blocking prevents individuals from 
developing their original thought and other ideas as they are rehearsing one thought until 
they express it to the group. Delays in the idea generation process result in cognitive 
interference, which results in productivity loss (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Nijstad et al., 
2003; Paulus, 2000). The obvious proposed solution to this problem is to utilise a mech-
anism that facilitates simultaneous contributions (Briggs & Reinig, 2010). 




5.3.3 Evaluation Apprehension in Collaborative Groups 
Evaluation apprehension refers to the fear of negative evaluations from other group mem-
bers preventing subjects who are working in groups from presenting their more original 
ideas (Collaros & Anderson, 1969). Despite the benefits of group idea generation, work-
ing in a group could deter an individual from contributing for fear of embarrassment, 
hostile evaluation, the pressure to conform as well as other social forces (Collaros & 
Anderson, 1969; McGrath, 2015; Paulus, 2000). The original rules outlined for brain-
storming as detailed above attempted to combat the effects of evaluation apprehension by 
discouraging criticism of contributions (Dennis & Valacich, 1993). Diehl and Stroebe 
(1987) investigated the impact of evaluation apprehension on group productivity by tell-
ing members that either external judges or their peers would evaluate their ideas. Their 
results showed that by generating evaluation apprehension in a group, concerns about the 
quality of ideas increase among members, which resulted in a decrease in the number of 
ideas produced as individuals began to self-censor.   
When examining knowledge sharing from a social exchange theory perspective, Bordia 
et al. (2006) listed evaluation apprehension as a cost, which leads to underperformance in 
knowledge sharing groups. Their research also suggested that the effects of evaluation 
apprehension are increased when participants do not have control over who gets access 
to their contributions. Individual status within a group also has an effect on the levels of 
evaluation apprehension experienced, with low-status members being less likely to con-
tribute in the presence of high ranking members (Camacho & Paulus, 1995; Collaros & 
Anderson, 1969; McGrath, 2015). The effects of this are found to be reduced as members 
ascend the ranks within an organisation (Bordia et al., 2006). 
112 
 
Allowing participants to write their contributions down (Paulus & Yang, 2000) and in-
creasing levels of anonymity (Briggs & Reinig, 2010; Dennis & Valacich, 1993) are fre-
quent suggestions for alleviating the effects of evaluation apprehension. Connolly, 
Jessup, and Valacich (1990) suggested that increasing the level of anonymity “should 
encourage full participation of junior and shy group members, and expression of unpop-
ular, novel or heretical opinions”. However, through increasing anonymity, groups must 
maintain recognition and reward to ensure participants will continue to contribute (Bordia 
et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2014). 
Proposition 2: Evaluation Apprehension will result in the suboptimal performance of 
Distributed Collaboration. 
5.3.4 Free-Riding in Collaborative Groups 
The term ‘free-rider’ refers to a member of a group who obtains benefits from a group 
membership but does not bear a proportional share of the costs of providing the benefits 
(Albanese & Van Fleet, 1985). Free-riding occurs when team members decrease their 
efforts and expect others to pick up the slack (Suleiman & Watson, 2008). This can be 
due to a belief that one's contribution is dispensable and does not contribute to the success 
of the group (Dennis & Valacich, 1993; George, 1992; Kudrowitz & Wallace, 2013; 
Paulus, 2000). Furthermore, members of a group feel that the responsibility for the suc-
cess of the group does not rest on their shoulders to the same extent as the success of an 
individual task would (Latané et al., 1979). This problem is known as diffusion of respon-
sibility which is defined as ‘when everyone is responsible, no one really feels responsible’ 
(Bandura et al., 1996). This has been referenced as an essential factor to manage in en-
suring the success of these self-directed teams whereby team members can be inclined to 
put self-interests ahead of the shared interest of the group (Carte et al., 2006; Han et al., 
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2012; Spagnoletti et al., 2015). Diffusion of responsibility occurs more in the presence of 
perceived experts (Camacho & Paulus, 1995; Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Paulus, 2000). 
Free-riding is particularly relevant in the case of Distributed Collaboration due to the 
temporary nature of most teams. Members will be more likely to behave in an untrust-
worthy manner and take more from the team than they give in return (Lin & Huang, 2009; 
Sarker et al., 2011). The lack of face-to-face interaction can cause free-riding in Distrib-
uted Collaboration due to reduced accountability (Boughzala, De Vreede, & Limayem, 
2012). ‘Lack of trust and the propensity to attribute laziness or ineptitude to others could 
have led people to work less hard themselves’(Latané et al., 1979). On the other hand, 
groups in which all members pull their weight are able to maintain high trust between 
members (Piccoli & Ives, 2003).  
Distributed Collaborations that work and those that do not differ in the level of social 
distance. Social distance is the degree of emotional connection among team members 
(Robert Jr et al., 2008). In the case of traditional, co-located groups, Chidambaram and 
Tung (2005) cite social standards as key deterrents of free-riding. They argue that in a co-
located environment, social pressure results in individuals being more productive as they 
can see their peers working around them. This acts as a form of motivation to other team 
members who are not present in Distributed Collaboration. In fact, performance did not 
differ between co-located and distributed collaborative groups and the only impact of co-
location was the social pressure to appear productive. 
Although this form of electronic idea generation and knowledge sharing reduced what 
were seen as barriers to contribution, it also heightened concerns over levels of recogni-
tion and reward (Suleiman & Watson, 2008; Wasko & Faraj, 2005). With mass contribu-
tions from members who were not working in a co-located environment and were not 
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personally familiar with one another, the task of assigning credit to contributors became 
increasingly tricky (Beranek et al., 2005; Chidambaram & Tung, 2005). Research has 
found that feedback given on an individual basis, did not result in a reduction in the levels 
of free-riding in a group. However, when feedback was given to all members of the group 
and member’s feedback was visible to all other members, this acted as a comparative tool 
and decreased the level of free-riding (Suleiman & Watson, 2008). The proposed solution 
to free-riding in groups is increasing accountability and the ability to identify individual 
contributions (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Wang et al., 2014).  
George (1992) explored the area of the ‘Free-Rider Problem’, or ‘social loafing’; this 
study revealed that the two main variables that influence free-riding are task visibility and 
intrinsic involvement. George (1992) describes task visibility as; ‘the belief that a super-
visor is aware of individual effort on a job’, and intrinsic involvement as; ‘beliefs that the 
work being done is meaningful and significant and that one’s own efforts are an important 
contribution to the employing organisation’. Therefore, an organisation should focus on 
increasing task visibility and an individual’s intrinsic involvement to reduce free-riding 
and in turn, improve productivity.   
Proposition 3: Free-Riding will result in the suboptimal performance of Distributed Col-
laboration. 
5.3.5 Applying Technology in Collaborative Groups 
Electronic brainstorming (Dennis & Valacich, 1993; Gallupe et al., 1992; Nijstad et al., 
2003), or ‘brainwriting’ (Paulus & Yang, 2000) are commonly proposed solutions to pro-
duction blocking as members of the group can write their ideas down rather than wait to 
individually voice their suggestions. Writing ideas rather than verbalizing them has been 
found to combat production blocking and eliminate productivity loss (Nijstad et al., 2003; 
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Paulus & Yang, 2000). “Working under conditions that allowed them to verbalise their 
ideas as they occurred, subjects produced approximately twice as many ideas as they did 
when working under conditions in which subjects had to wait their turn” (Diehl & 
Stroebe, 1987). 
Gallupe et al. (1992) found that traditional brainstorming groups were less productive as 
group size increased. However, electronic brainstorming groups were not hampered by 
this as their members can work simultaneously by typing ideas into a computer. Inputting 
ideas in a system prevents any one individual from dominating the discussion, so produc-
tion blocking remains at a constant low, regardless of group size. They also suggest that 
the implementation of a system could further reduce production blocking in distributed 
groups. Gallupe et al. (1992) propose that adopting electronic brainstorming could prove 
to be especially useful when people are working on different schedules on account of their 
time zones and workloads. Therefore, suggesting that this is especially applicable for Dis-
tributed Collaboration.  
As for the role of technology in mitigating the negative effect of evaluation apprehension 
in group idea generation, evaluation apprehension in traditional brainstorming groups in-
creases with increasing group size as each additional member acted as an extra critic. 
However, apart from groups of two members, in electronic brainstorming groups, the 
level of evaluation apprehension remains constant with increasing group size (Briggs & 
Reinig, 2010).  This is the result of increased anonymity in technology-supported groups, 
which are an effective method of reducing evaluation apprehension. However, the ano-
nymity of users should be introduced with caution. First, because reducing the effect of 
evaluation apprehension could encourage bad or irrelevant ideas to be contributed (Briggs 
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& Reinig, 2010). Second, recognition must be maintained in order to avoid free-riding 
(Bordia et al., 2006; Dennis & Valacich, 1993). 
Electronic brainstorming combats free-riding by increasing individual accountability in 
their performance (Paulus, 2000). Free-riding occurs in the absence of management prac-
tices such as rewards and evaluations; however, knowledge management systems that 
induce accountability are found to increase contributions from group members (Wang et 
al., 2014). The temptation to free-ride is shown to increase with increasing group size in 
traditional co-located teams as the identifiability of individual contributions decreases 
(Gallupe et al., 1992; Gressgård, 2012; Kudrowitz & Wallace, 2013). However, electronic 
brainstorming techniques can improve the ability to identify individual contributions and 
therefore reduce free-riding (Paulus & Yang, 2000).  
Proposition 4: The implementation of a system could improve the performance of Dis-
tributed Collaboration. 
5.4 Methodology 
A series of exploratory interviews were conducted to investigate the operational chal-
lenges of Distributed Collaboration, and to gain insights from industry participants on 
how a technology-enabled solution could overcome these challenges. Each interview in-
cluded focused questions relating to the interviewee’s team as well as open-ended ques-
tions, which ensured that a complete understanding of the interviewees experience work-
ing in Distributed Collaboration was captured. These questions are provided in Appendix 
9.7.  
As previously stated, Distributed Collaboration encapsulates a wide variety of activities 
ranging from online communities and virtual teams to intra-organisational teams of glob-
ally distributed members.  For several reasons including, ease and speed of collection, 
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consistency of interviewee background, and culture, eight exploratory interviews were 
carried out within a single organisation, each interview lasting approximately 1 hour. The 
organisation, ‘DE Computers’, has a large multinational presence with globally distrib-
uted groups. A combination of managers and their subordinates were interviewed to gain 
insights into the challenges of both the management and participation in Distributed Col-
laboration. Interviewees worked in a cross-section of areas within DE Computers includ-
ing (1) the field delivery support team, (2) the IT service delivery team, (3) general ac-
counting team, and (4) the mobile development team. Diversifying the background of 
interviewees avoided producing results that would be specific to one department or team 
within DE Computers. Instead, the results produced are representative of Distributed Col-
laboration in general. Details of the interviewees are listed in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Interviewee Backgrounds 
Role (Pseudonym) Team 
Senior Manager (Manager A) Field Delivery Support  
Senior Manager (Manager B) IT Service Delivery  
Manager (Manager C) General Accounting  
Manager (Manager D) Mobile Development  
Financial Analyst (Employee A) Field Delivery Support  
Senior Financial Analyst (Employee B) Global Business Services  
IT Finance Business Consultant 
(Employee C) 
IT Service Delivery  
IT Project Manager (Employee D) Global Infrastructure & Services  
The data were analysed using open, axial, and selective coding techniques (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990; Urquhart, 2001) to refine the propositions into a set of hypothesis. This 
approach necessitates the researchers to be immersed in the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) 
and to draw on existing theoretical knowledge (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Urquhart, 2001). 
It thus encourages the researcher to be flexible and creative while imposing systematic 
coding procedures (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).  
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Open coding requires a brainstorming approach to analysis because, in the beginning, 
analysts want to open up the data to all potentials and possibilities contained within the 
data. Comments were first assigned labels based on the context of the comment, for in-
stance, Employee A said Long Projects don’t produce tangible outputs at first, but a lot 
of grunt work is put in. This was labelled as Evaluating Contributions (Table 5.3). 
Next, axial coding was performed to relate categories with one another. Comments were 
further categorized based on the relationships between the context of these comments. 
For example, Employee A’s comment above was one of a number of comments which 
related to employee’s desire to maintain autonomy over how they did their job. 
Finally, we analysed the relationship among these second-order categories (selective cod-
ing), it was logically determined that the overriding relationship between each of the cat-
egories highlights that the implementation of a system alone will not overcome the prob-
lems faced in Distributed Collaboration, rather it requires the effective balance of people, 
processes, and technology. Employee A’s comment above related specifically to the Peo-
ple aspect of this. Furthermore, comments relating to Technology are detailed in Table 
5.2, and those relating to Processes are outlined in Table 5.4. The relationship between 




Table 5.2 Insights from interviews related to Technology in Distributed Collaboration 
Context Comment Concept 




WebEx calls are used to see facial expressions and 
these can be very positive. (Employee C) 
System 
Requirements 
[The system] Should have better real-time 
information on the performance of offshore teams 




Simplicity and good user experience are essential. 
(Manager B) 
Better reporting and status updates. (Manager B) 
[The system] Should also capture when you helped 
out with smaller, ad-hoc tasks. (Employee C) 
Normal day to day tasks is enough without 
introducing another HR system. (Employee C) 
Perceived 
Benefits 
It would be great if it was transparent across the 
organisation and showed how employees in other 
teams were treated. (Employee A) 
Possibly an anonymous method of allowing people 
to get their ideas out there without having to stand 






Table 5.3 Insights from interviews related to People in Distributed Collaboration 
Context Comment Concept 
Interpersonal 
Relationships 
[It is difficult to establish personal relationships in 
Distributed Collaboration], especially when new 
members join the team in different locations that you 
haven’t met before. (Manager C) 
Distributed 
Members 
[Distributed members] may not benefit from having a 




[Distributed members] may have other priorities going 
on in their local areas that you are not aware of. 
(Manager C) 
[Distributed members] may not feel like they are 
determining what the goal is, but they do feel as though 
they are contributing toward executing it. (Manager A) 
Implementing 
a system  
You must be aware of cultural differences within the 




Some prefer to leave work until the last minute, others 
prefer to get it finished straight away. (Employee A) 
Individual’s 
Job 
Autonomy We operate on core hours of 10:00-16:00 and flexi-
time after that. 9 to 5 doesn’t exist anymore. (Employee 
A) 
[Individual goals are created] by setting the goal for the 
organisation and deriving individual goals from this. In 
bi-weekly one-to-one meetings, [individuals] prepare a 
four-quadrant chart showing; what they achieved last 
week; what they aim to do next week; goals for the 
quarter; any questions. (Manager A) 
Evaluating 
contributions 
[Managers] encourage people to try something new as 
long as they can justify their attempts. (Manager C) 
Long projects do not produce tangible outputs at the 
start, but a lot of grunt work is put in. When the 
emphasis is put on hours spent in the office, some 
people tend to stay late early in the week, being 
unproductive just so they can leave early on Friday. 
(Employee A) 
We are also encouraged to help to do smaller, ad-hoc 
tasks like training and roles which are not directly 
involved in the project. (Employee C) 
Implementing 
a system 
You don’t want to lose your independence and have to 




Table 5.4 Insights from interviews related to Processes in Distributed Collaboration 
Context Comment Concept 
Team 
Composition 
Teams are largely made up of members from 




(In relation to team size) 
Bigger teams are harder to stand out in. 
Bigger teams have poorer communication. 
In larger team's managers do not have the time to 
spend on one-to-one meetings so progress is not 
discussed on a regular basis, so if goals are not 




(In relation to managing a shared service team) The 
team is given a list of activities to perform. We know 
how long each activity takes and how much it will 
cost. Every quarter the performance is reviewed to 
ensure it aligns with the SLA. (Manager A) 
(In relation to the team’s capacity to innovate) 
Innovation in Finance is always going to have strict 
boundaries. A business team has more room for 
expansion and development. (Manager A) 
(In relation to adopting a more data-driven approach 
to tracking contributions) It depends on team size and 
function, in smaller team’s communication is key, in 
large teams or when the role is transaction then a 
data-driven approach is better. (Manager C) 
(In relation to implementing a system to track 
individual contributions) It depends on the type of 
organisation and team function. We must be careful 
not to micro-manage people, however, with a shared 




There may be reluctance as managers may shoot 
down an idea. 
People tend to lack confidence; people are often 
reluctant to stand up and speak their mind. Managers 




Having a strong personal relationship with my 
manager helps, I know that any overtime I do is being 
recognised but I can see how this would be difficult 





Teams try to arrange annual meetups where possible. 
(Employee C) 
[Managers and individuals] have bi-weekly one-to-
one progress meetings and a global team call on 
alternate weeks. (Manager A) 
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Involves chasing people to make sure files have been 
updated. 
Very subjective as it deals with how individuals 
interact with their team. (Manager C) 
[Rewards are allocated] based on a mixture of hitting 
targets and relationship with management. (Employee 
C) 
It relies on people to speak up about the state of their 
project. (Manager C) 
Background work is not captured. (Manager C) 
During global team calls meeting minutes are taken to 
record who has signed up for tasks. (Employee A) 
Freedom of this system is better as it is open to 
creativity. (Employee C) 
Implementing 
a system 
Micromanaging can demotivate people. (Manager A) 
Should support the existing trust and relationships 
between managers and the team. (Manager C) 
The team has to buy into the system. (Manager C) 
Communication up front to inform members why the 
system is being used to make sure they don’t feel 
targeted. (Manager C) 
It would create a level playing field, especially in 
teams where managers are based in one location and 
the members at that office have the advantage of a 
personal relationship. (Employee A) 
5.5 Research Synthesis 
Figure 5.1 groups the concepts which emerged from the analysis of interview data pre-
sented in Tables 5.2-5.4 as they relate to People, Processes, and Technology. This figure 
illustrates that People, Processes, and Technology must be coordinated effectively to en-




Figure 5.1 Balancing People, Processes, and Technology in Distributed Collaboration 
Next, the propositions outlined in the theoretical grounding of this paper are discussed. 
Insights gathered from the semi-structured interviews resulted in these propositions being 
refined into a set of hypotheses. 
5.5.1 The impact of production blocking on the performance of Distributed Collabo-
ration 
Data gathered from interviews with participants of Distributed Collaboration produced 
several findings that relate to the impact of production blocking on the performance of 
these groups. First interviewees noted that differences in team composition have a signif-
icant impact on performance. Larger teams were said to experience poor communication, 
making it difficult for individuals to stand out and resulting in less time for meetings 
between managers and team members. Manager A was responsible for a large group 
which consisted of co-located and distributed members. In order to maximise efficiency 
in bi-weekly one-to-one meetings with team members, they adopted a structured approach 
to tracking progress. For these meetings "[individuals] prepare a four-quadrant chart 
People
• Dispersed Members













showing; what they achieved last week; what they aim to do next week; goals for the 
quarter; any questions." As group size increases, managers have less time to spend with 
each individual. Therefore, they must adopt structured management approaches such as 
this. Although this is an effective way to track progress, it does not allow for free form 
discussion between team members and their managers. Therefore, new ideas cannot be 
shared and deliberated. This observation is consistent with the findings of Diehl and 
Stroebe (1987), who illustrated that communication decreases with increasing group size. 
Also, Distributed Collaboration teams are obligated to accept the different ways in which 
team members may approach their work. Interviewees highlighted that they must accept 
that distributed members may have to deal with ‘local priorities’ which they were not 
aware of, resulting in delays in their shared project. Another factor to consider is when 
team members will choose to work. This will often influence the productivity of other 
team members, especially when working on a collaborative project. Employee A de-
scribed the different approaches people take to work; "Some prefer to leave work until 
the last minute, others prefer to get it finished straight away". Employee A also described 
variances in individual’s availability “We operate on core hours of 10:00-16:00 and flexi-
time after that. Nine-to-Five does not exist anymore". These factors can lead to a break 
in the momentum of a project, which can be likened to cognitive interference, an estab-
lished factor in production blocking (Nijstad et al., 2003; Paulus, 2000; Wang, Rosé, & 
Chang, 2011). 
Analysing the data gathered from interviews with participants of Distributed Collabora-
tion using Open, Axial, and Selective coding techniques revealed that changes in team 
composition and differences in how individuals approach their work can negatively in-
fluence performance in Distributed Collaboration, thus providing empirical support for 
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Proposition 1; production blocking will result in the suboptimal performance of Distrib-
uted Collaboration. Proposition 1 can, therefore, be refined to specify the following two 
hypotheses: 
H1: The influence of production blocking on the performance of Distributed Collabora-
tion is affected by Team Composition. 
H2: The influence of production blocking on the performance of Distributed Collabora-
tion is affected by individual member’s Approach to Work. 
5.5.2 The impact of evaluation apprehension on the performance of Distributed Col-
laboration 
Data gathered from interviews with participants of Distributed Collaboration produced 
several findings that relate to the impact of evaluation apprehension on the performance 
of these groups. Interviews revealed that the social structures in place within a team have 
a distinct impact on the levels of evaluation apprehension in the group. Interviewees de-
scribed that in their current approach, individuals were expected to volunteer to take on 
project tasks. This may be a deterrent for individual members; Manager B discussed this 
issue, explaining that “people are often reluctant to stand up and speak their mind.” Man-
ager C admitted that there might be a reluctance to contribute as case managers “shoot 
down an idea”. Additionally, Manager B felt that it was the responsibility of management 
to “create an environment” to encourage contributions from all members. These observa-
tions support the notion that productivity is affected when individuals are being judged, 
especially when judges are of a higher status than them (Camacho & Paulus, 1995; 
Collaros & Anderson, 1969; McGrath, 2015). 
Second, our findings show that evaluation apprehension is also affected by team compo-
sition, specifically the function of the team. Evaluation apprehension refers to the fear of 
negative evaluations from other group members preventing subjects who are working in 
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groups from presenting their more original ideas (Collaros & Anderson, 1969). Interview-
ees indicated that ideas would be evaluated differently depending on the function of their 
team. For example, as described by Manager A, the regulation involved in finance means 
a team operating in this field would be far less likely to contribute innovative ideas be-
cause members are aware that they have little chance of being adopted. Also, when team 
members have been hired to execute a Service Level Agreement (SLA), their roles are 
monitored in detail. Manager A explained that “The team is given a list of activities to 
perform. We know how long each activity takes and how much it will cost”; therefore, 
they are less likely to contribute new ideas as it is not part of their role.   
We found that team members can experience evaluation apprehension as a result of the 
social structure within a group, and also due to the function of their team. This can result 
in reduced performance, thus providing empirical support for Proposition 2 and enabling 
it to be refined into the following two hypotheses: 
H3: The influence of evaluation apprehension on the performance of Distributed Collab-
oration is affected by Social Structures. 
H4: The influence of evaluation apprehension on the performance of Distributed Collab-
oration is affected by Team Function. 
5.5.3 The impact of free-riding on the performance of Distributed Collaboration 
Data gathered from interviews with participants of Distributed Collaboration produced 
findings that relate to the impact of free-riding on the performance of these groups. When 
analysing the data gathered from interviews, it was apparent that the interviewees placed 
much value in the amount of autonomy they had over their jobs. High levels of job au-
tonomy highlighted the importance of trust in preventing free-riding (Latané et al., 1979). 
Individuals are assigned quarterly goals that are tracked in bi-weekly one-to-one meetings 
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with their managers. Individuals present a graphic which details the quarterly goal, 
progress made last week, the objective for the coming week, and any outstanding 
questions. Outside of this, they are free to work as they please, some may choose to work 
consistently, others leave work build up. Team members are encouraged to work on ad-
hoc tasks and training initiatives. Also, managers understand that in long projects, there 
may not be tangible outputs at first but, as Employee A puts it, “a lot of grunt work” was 
being executed. Many stated that they would not want to lose this independence if a 
system was implemented in their team.  
Job autonomy was found to be moderated by team function. Management was 
comfortable with adopting a holistic approach to monitoring contributions and giving 
individuals ownership over how they operated for most roles. However, when team mem-
bers have been hired to execute a Service Level Agreement (SLA), their roles are moni-
tored in a more metric-driven approach, involving high levels of task visibility. 
The second observation made in relation to the presence of free-riding was the effect of 
the team's social structure. A number of interviewees acknowledge that they were fortu-
nate for being co-located with their manager. As a result, they benefited from a strong 
personal relationship. They were assured that if they had to work overtime or a project 
involved much background-work, their efforts would be acknowledged. However, they 
empathised with distributed members who did not have this advantage. All managers in-
terviewed indicated that the allocation of rewards was quite subjective. 
To overcome the differences between co-location and dispersion, all teams interviewed 
utilised many communication tools. An email was cited as being difficult to interpret, 
especially when culturally specific references were used in the text. Video conferencing 
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tools were also prevalent throughout DE Computers, and all interviewees rated it highly 
as it allowed for more fruitful communication. 
Analysing the data gathered from interviews, it became apparent that individual job au-
tonomy and social structures within the team rely on trust and communication between 
team members. Without this, free-riding will lead to suboptimal performance; this pro-
vides empirical support for Proposition 3 and enables further refinement into four hypoth-
eses: 
H5: The influence of free-riding on the performance of Distributed Collaboration is af-
fected by an Individual Member’s Job Autonomy. 
H6: Individual Member’s Job Autonomy is moderated by the Project Function. 
H7: The influence of free-riding on the performance of Distributed Collaboration is af-
fected by Team’s Social Structure. 
H8: Team’s Social Structure is moderated by Communication Media. 
5.5.4 The impact of system implementation on the performance of Distributed Col-
laboration 
First, the implementation of a system to track individual contributions in Distributed Col-
laboration could overcome the challenges created by team composition. Managers and 
team members alike alluded to the fact that as teams grew in size, it became increasingly 
difficult to maintain effective communication regarding the progress made by individuals. 
For example, Employee A outlined that "In larger team's managers do not have the time 
to spend on one-to-one meetings, so progress is not discussed on a regular basis, if goals 
are not reached management does not really understand". This was primarily caused by 
the fact that Manager C described the current approach to tracking contributions as “man-
ual” and “involves chasing people for updates”. They, therefore, called for a potential 
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solution to involve “better real-time information rather than having to chase them for 
updates”. 
Second, our analysis of qualitative data shows that the implementation of a system to 
track contributions could overcome the influence of social structures within a Distributed 
Collaboration. For example, when discussing the reluctance of shy team members to con-
tribute to the group, Manager B suggested that “Possibly an anonymous method of al-
lowing people to get their ideas out there without having to stand up and speak in front of 
a group would help”. This comment is consistent with previous research on the benefits 
of anonymity in electronic brainstorming (Briggs & Reinig, 2010). Employee A also noted 
that they were confident to make suggestions and were assured that they would receive 
appropriate recognition for their work. This confidence was because they had a strong 
personal relationship with their manager as they worked alongside one another. However, 
they empathised with their distributed team members and noted that implementing a sys-
tem "would create a level playing field, especially in teams where managers are based in 
one location, and the members at that office have the advantage of a personal relation-
ship".  
Third, interviewees specified that the implementation of a system could increase trans-
parency across a Distributed Collaboration group which would bring several benefits. 
According to Employee C, accountability would increase as there would be better report-
ing and status updates for tracking projects. Also, a system could "capture when you 
helped out with smaller, ad-hoc tasks". Employee A suggested that "It would be great if it 
was transparent across the organisation and showed how employees in other teams were 
treated". This level of transparency would be consistent with Chidambaram and Tung 
(2005), they argue that in a co-located environment, social pressure results in individuals 
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being more productive as they can see their peers working around them. This acts as a 
form of motivation to other team members which is not present in a Distributed Collabo-
ration group. Additionally, the use of group-level feedback to act as a comparative tool 
and decrease levels of free-riding (Suleiman & Watson, 2008). 
Finally, a common point that was discussed throughout the interviews was that partici-
pants stressed the importance of integrating a system as seamlessly as possible into their 
existing work schedule. It was apparent throughout that the introduction of technology 
itself would not help Distributed Collaboration and would most likely be destructive. 
Team members and managers alike agreed that a good user experience was essential. As 
Employee C put it, "Normal day to day tasks is enough without introducing another HR 
system". Participants were sceptical about the micromanagement which often comes with 
technology. Although their current approach was labelled as subjective, they appreciated 
the freedom it afforded them. The critical factors for success for system implementation, 
which emerged involved the people and the processes within the team, not the technology. 
Manager C mentioned that "Communication upfront to inform members why the system 
is being used to make sure they don't feel targeted". Also, the "Team have to buy in to the 
system". Any system "Should support the existing trust and relationships between man-
agers and the team". Employee A added that "You don't want to lose your independence 
and have to justify your role".   
Analysis of the data gathered revealed that participants supported the proposition that the 
implementation of a system could improve the performance of Distributed Collaboration. 
Thus, providing empirical support for Proposition 4 and concluding the implementation 
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of a system to track individual contributions could improve the performance of Distrib-
uted Collaboration. Proposition 4 can, therefore, be refined to specify the following four 
hypotheses: 
H9: The implementation of a system to track individual contributions in Distributed Col-
laboration could impact overall team performance by combatting the effects of changing 
team composition. 
H10: The implementation of a system to track individual contributions in Distributed 
Collaboration could impact overall team performance by supporting social structures 
within the group. 
H11: The implementation of a system to track individual contributions in Distributed 
Collaboration could impact overall team performance by increasing transparency 
throughout the team. 
H12: The impact on overall team performance resulting from the implementation of a 
system to track contributions is moderated by the effect it has on the people and processes 
established in the team. 
5.6 Discussion and Conclusions  
Growth and increased adoption of digital technologies have increased the breadth of col-
laboration from traditional, co-located, to large, globally Distributed Collaborations 
(Asatiani & Penttinen, 2019; Cheng et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2017; Tapscott & Williams, 
2008). This growth has increased the potential geographic distance between team mem-
bers and expanded the range of expertise and talent available for teams to utilise and 
collaborate on a shared goal (Faraj & Sproull, 2000; Surowiecki, 2004). 
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While there is a wealth of extant research available which discusses the factors to success 
(Carte et al., 2006; Jarvenpaa et al., 1998; Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1999; Kayworth & 
Leidner, 2002; Ridings et al., 2002; Sarker et al., 2011), as well as the challenges faced 
by these collaborative groups (Albanese & Van Fleet, 1985; Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; 
Gallupe et al., 1992), the objective of this study is to investigate the operational chal-
lenges of Distributed Collaboration, and also to gain insights from industry participants 
on how a technology-enabled solution could overcome these challenges A review of the 
relevant existing literature was conducted to understand the evolution from co-located to 
Distributed Collaboration and the challenges involved. This subsequently informed a set 
of propositions to structure the research. 
5.6.1 Implications for practice 
Regarding implications for practice, by conducting semi-structured interviews with in-
dustry participants, this research was able to capture rich, nuanced findings which would 
not have been possible with a structured interview approach, or even quantitative data 
gathering techniques. This provides valuable, practical insights as much of the extant re-
search on the challenges of free-riding, production blocking, and evaluation apprehension 
base their findings on experiments which involved relatively short periods of idea gener-
ation or collaboration between participants (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Gallupe et al., 1992; 
Suleiman & Watson, 2008). Participants interviewed for this study recalled their day-to-
day experiences of the reality of operating in Distributed Collaboration.  
First, the fact that many projects which they work on involve large amounts of "grunt 
work" in which no tangible results are produced. However, this is a necessary step in 
order to pave the way for the completion of the overall project. This observation stresses 
the importance of team and project function, which we have discussed as moderating 
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factors in our hypothesis. Extant literature which used workshops and simulations to pro-
duce results-focused on idea generation exercises (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Gallupe et al., 
1992; Suleiman & Watson, 2008). However, the reality of Distributed Collaboration is 
much different and not all roles have the same tangible outputs. Therefore, different roles 
require specialised evaluation techniques to account for these intangible contributions. 
Second, interviewees discussed the fact that when operating in Distributed Collaboration, 
the group project will not be their only concern and often their time will be consumed by 
"local priorities". These ad-hoc tasks require their attention and halt their progress. This 
is yet another reality that must be accepted and resolved in Distributed Collaboration. 
Local priorities are another element which would not have been captured in much of the 
prior research. Distributed members may be allocated to many different projects at one 
time. Without the benefit of face-to-face interactions and social presence that would be 
available in a co-located environment, these local priorities which must be attended to are 
often forgotten about by distributed colleagues. Practitioners should be more cognizant 
of this reality when operating with distributed colleagues. 
Third, managers and team members alike drew attention to the fact that not all teams 
should be treated equally. Teams should be managed in accordance with their function 
and objective. For instance, certain groups should be evaluated using a holistic approach. 
Whereas other groups, primarily contracted groups of distributed workers, require a more 
detailed, data-driven model in order to ensure targets and objectives are reached. This 
was a valuable insight that again, like the importance of “grunt work” and “local priori-
ties”, highlights the reality of Distributed Collaboration in operation rather than a simu-
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lation. Practitioners should have a clear evaluation strategy in place when assessing dis-
tributed members, which should consider the team function and adopt an appropriate 
method of evaluation to suit.  
Finally, this research has also detailed the features which should be included in a solution 
to manage Distributed Collaboration. Similar to Briggs and Reinig (2010) we believe an 
optimal solution to overcome all three challenges would be a tool which could reveal the 
number of contributions made by individuals without revealing their identities. The sys-
tem could allow users to rate ideas and then reveal who contributed the highest-ranked 
ideas. Such a solution would allow simultaneous contributions to overcome production 
blocking, incorporate an element of anonymity to overcome evaluation apprehension, as 
well as identifiability to dissuade free-riding.  
5.6.2 Implications for theory 
This research raises several potential questions that would be of interest to future research 
efforts. First, as touched on in the introduction to this study, Distributed Collaboration 
can take many forms, this study has examined the experience of participants operating in 
firm-hosted Distributed Collaboration. The next obvious challenge would be to research 
the experiences of those operating in non-firm hosted collaborations. Considering the po-
tential background of individuals in these groups is likely to be more diverse, and the 
likelihood of members having prior relationships with one another is slim, the results may 
provide further insights regarding the operations of Distributed Collaboration.  
Second, considering part of the objective of this study was gaining insights from industry 
participants on how a technology-enabled solution could overcome these challenges, an-
other avenue for future research would be to explore potential technologies that would be 
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appropriate to build such a solution. Findings have shown the importance of team mem-
bers having autonomy over their jobs, which requires trust between management and 
team members. Increased anonymity was suggested as a possible approach to increasing 
shy members willingness to contribute. Participants in management roles noted that they 
would like to see improved real-time reporting on the performance of their teams. Team 
members suggested that increased transparency would allow them to observe how indi-
viduals across DE Computers are being recognised and rewarded. Perhaps future research 
could examine Blockchain technology as a potential solution for managing distributed 
groups. Blockchain has been cited as improving levels of trust (Beck et al., 2016; Cholewa 
& Shanmugam, 2017), facilitating pseudonymous contributions (Beck et al., 2018), cre-
ating a single source of record across a distributed network, and increasing transparency 
(Hyvärinen et al., 2017). 
5.6.3 Limitations of the study  
The limitations of this study must also be recognised, primarily the scope of the data 
gathered. As outlined in the methodology of this study, we conducted a series of explor-
atory interviews with participants within the same multinational organisation, each of 
whom operated in a team with members distributed across different departments and 
across the globe. The reason for this approach was that it facilitated better ease and speed 
of data collection. However, it must be conceded that this is a limitation of the research. 
It is encouraged that future research should broaden the scope of the data gathering pro-
cess to include participants from virtual teams and online communities with increased 
diversity of background.   
As we have discussed, Distributed Collaboration is a multidisciplinary, diverse concept 
which has been applied in almost every industry. Therefore, it should be noted that the 
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results presented in this study may not be directly transferable across all industries. DE 
computers in primarily an IT company and the findings may be reflective of this. Future 
research should assess the relevance of these findings across Distributed Collaboration as 
it is applied in different domains.   
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Chapter 6. Designing a Blockchain system for Creative Ances-
try in Distributed Collaboration 
6.1 Abstract 
Distributed Collaborations allow teams to pool knowledge from multiple domains, often 
across dispersed geographic locations to find innovative solutions for complex, multi-
faceted problems. However, motivating individuals within these dynamic groups can 
prove difficult, as individual contributions are easily missed or forgotten. This study in-
troduces the design construct of Creative Ancestry, which describes how collaborative 
outputs can be traced back to the individual contributions that preceded them. This con-
struct is operationally enabled by emerging Blockchain technologies, which we argue are 
naturally suited to maintain an immutable and irrevocable view of individual contribu-
tions in Distributed Collaborations. We build a proof-of-concept decentralised applica-
tion on the Ethereum Blockchain to demonstrate how Creative Ancestry can benefit Dis-
tributed Collaborations. An experiment-based evaluation suggests the addition of Crea-
tive Ancestry has a positive impact on perceptions of social justice, which in turn has a 
positive effect on the perceived quality of the collaboration.  





The growth of digital technologies has created an increasing appetite for Distributed Col-
laborations, i.e. the pursuit of a shared objective by groups that include non-proximate 
members, whose participation is facilitated by ICT (Asatiani & Penttinen, 2019; Cheng 
et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2017; Tapscott & Williams, 2008). These collaborations have typ-
ically taken place on the web, where large projects can attract vast numbers of participants 
from different areas and with different interests (Kotlarsky & Oshri, 2005; Ransbotham 
& Kane, 2011). Common examples include mass-produced publicly-editable archives of 
information such as Wikipedia, global social questions and answers sites such as Yahoo! 
Answers, and large open source software projects such as Apache Hadoop. Similar de-
velopments have been taking place within large organisations, as intra-organisational 
platforms have emerged to facilitate globally dispersed teams and work-from-home em-
ployees (O'Leary & Cummings, 2007). Thus, many organisations rely on distributed 
teams interacting through voice, video, and text; meaning they may not work in a fixed 
space or even at the same time (Robert Jr et al., 2008). This allows individuals with a 
range of backgrounds, expertise, and geographical locations to bring new perspectives to 
bear on various complex problems (Faraj & Sproull, 2000; Surowiecki, 2004).  
Distributed Collaboration has changed the landscape for many industries, from entertain-
ment, to software development, and even gold mining (Tapscott & Williams, 2008). Tra-
ditionally structured companies face competition from dynamic online communities 
which can harness the collective wisdom and talents of a global audience quickly and 
cheaply due to their ability to leverage flat, decentralised structures (Gupta et al., 2009). 





individual contributions (Wang & Fesenmaier, 2003). This is important, as many individ-
uals require some form of formal or informal acknowledgement (Wasko & Faraj, 2005). 
Traditional management structures impose strict controls and measures to determine the 
performance of individuals and sub-teams. This strategy is more challenging with Dis-
tributed Collaborations, due to sheer number of contributions, and the changing roles re-
quired. For example, large numbers of non-specialised individuals tend to be effective  at 
rooting out bad contributions; however, they may struggle when it comes to separating 
the good from the great (Klein & Garcia, 2015). This places a premium on expert evalu-
ations at some parts of the process but not others. Similar challenges occur when one 
individual proposes an idea and another adapts it, or when some individuals’ contribution 
is an enabler of others (Forte, Larco, & Bruckman, 2009; Scarbrough, Panourgias, & 
Nandhakumar, 2015). Hence, perceived fairness, or social justice has been found to be a 
key element in ensuring the success of collaborative groups (Son & Kim, 2008; Wasko 
& Faraj, 2000; Wu & Chiu, 2018). Yet it is not clear how such fairness can be accommo-
dated. Transparency is often touted as the most important enabling quality (Sharma, 
Sugumaran, & Rajagopalan, 2002). Yet the value of transparency decreases where there 
are large numbers of unstructured interactions, as this limits both the reliability of their 
capture and our capacity to inspect them (Oldroyd & Morris, 2012; Woods, Patterson, & 
Roth, 2002). 
This study presents an alternative approach to perceived fairness in Distributed Collabo-
ration, specifically the design construct of Creative Ancestry, i.e. the ability of a collabo-
rative system to take some particular output of note and navigate backwards through the 





mutable manner. This construct avoids the information overload associated with trans-
parency, while minimizing the complexity of assembling and integrating data to analyse 
individual contributions.  
The emergence of Blockchain has obvious relevance for Creative Ancestry. Blockchain 
has received much attention over the last number of years, largely due to its links with 
the cryptocurrency market. However, Blockchain is more than an enabler of financial 
exchange; it is a way of recording interactions in a structured, secure, and scrutinizable 
manner, offering increased fault tolerance and availability (Pahl, El Ioini, & Helmer, 
2018; Peters & Panayi, 2016; Swan, 2015; Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016). Thus, Blockchain 
technologies have already been extended to create supply chain management tools to cap-
ture the origins of component products, for example, Provenance in product assembly 
(Provenance, 2015) and Everledger in the diamonds industry (Everledger, 2017). Alt-
hough they may only be in their infancy, these developments have inspired several com-
panies including Microsoft, IBM and Maersk to conduct their own research and develop 
proof-of-concept Blockchain solutions to fit their respective needs (Beck & Müller-
Bloch, 2017; Hyvärinen et al., 2017). We argue the same security, scalability, and scru-
tiny which Blockchain has brought to these industries can also benefit Distributed Col-
laboration. Thus, the objective of this study is to design a system for Distributed Collab-
orations that improves collaboration quality and perceived fairness by implementing Cre-
ative Ancestry using Blockchain technologies.  
We adopt a design science perspective to achieve this objective (Gregor & Hevner, 2013; 
Hevner et al., 2004; March & Smith, 1995) and follow the design science research model 





and motivation, in this case the need for perceived fairness and individual acknowledg-
ment in Distributed Collaboration. Following this, we lay out the objectives of a solution 
based on existing literature on social justice (Konovsky, 2000; Martínez‐Tur, Peiró, 
Ramos, & Moliner, 2006; Son & Kim, 2008; Wu & Chiu, 2018). Then we present the 
design and development, in which an embedded design-relevant causal model (Kuechler 
& Vaishnavi, 2012) is proposed to explain how increased Creative Ancestry for individ-
ual contributions could increase perceived fairness and, consequently, the perceived qual-
ity of the collaboration. Next is the demonstration; a proof-of-concept Blockchain system 
that instantiates the embedded model linking Creative Ancestry to perceived collabora-
tion quality. The evaluation follows, based on an experiment that simulates a Distributed 
Collaboration. Findings support the role of Creative Ancestry as an enabler of perceived 
collaboration quality. Structural equation modelling also shows the complex relationship 
between Creative Ancestry, different elements of perceived fairness, and moderating fac-
tors of cognitive group consensus and perceived group creativity. Finally, the implica-
tions of these findings are discussed for industry and research.  
6.3 Problem Identification and Motivation: Perceptions of Fairness in 
Distributed Collaboration 
Distributed Collaboration has been referred to under a number of different synonyms in 
extant literature including, mass collaboration, online communities, and virtual work, 
based off these terms, we define Distributed Collaboration as the pursuit of a shared ob-
jective by groups that include non-proximate members, whose participation is facilitated 
by ICT (Asatiani & Penttinen, 2019; Cheng et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2017; Tapscott & 
Williams, 2008). Such collaborations have become increasingly common inside and out-





the depth, breadth, and scale of expertise required (Kane & Ransbotham, 2016). This has 
created a new ‘flat world’ of participation, where old collaborative hierarchies give way 
to more open and inclusive collaborations involving large numbers of distributed collab-
orators - collaborations that organisations must embrace within evolving and boundary-
spanning technological ecosystems (Friedman, 2005).   
The types of creative tasks performed through Distributed Collaboration may vary. First, 
participation may require a selective skillset, so limiting the inclusion of contributors. For 
example, Open Source Software Development draws upon a dynamic community of ac-
tors and commons of inputs to synergistically create a complex information good 
(Crowston & Wade, 2010). Yet extensive participation requires a level of technical expe-
rience that not all users possess, placing practical restraints on what some potential con-
tributors can do (Bagozzi & Dholakia, 2006). This contrasts with High-Inclusion plat-
forms such as wikis, where low technical barriers encourage contribution from individu-
als with a wider range of backgrounds (Pei Lyn Grace, 2009). Second, contributions may 
be essentially cooperative and iterative, as in wikis and Open Source Software Develop-
ment, or contributions may be in high-competition, i.e. one or more contributions is se-
lected from a larger set of less-desirable alternatives. An example of Low-Inclusion / 
High-Competition collaboration is Threadless; a platform where graphic designers put 
forward ideas for imagery on clothing and other users vote on which are put into produc-
tion. An example of High-Inclusion / High-Competition collaboration is Walker’s 
crowdsourcing initiative/platform ‘Do Us a Flavour’ competition, where members of the 
public suggested new flavours for crisps, then voted for the eventual winner (Forbes & 





Distributed Collaboration is fuelled by four qualities, specifically openness, peering, shar-
ing, and acting globally (Tapscott & Williams, 2008). The first three qualities can be 
operationalised in local ‘small worlds’ (Xiaobao, Wei, & Yuzhen, 2013), yet the final 
quality, acting globally, is challenging to integrate into design. Individuals interacting 
outside their familiar social groups are likely to struggle with uncertain norms and roles 
(Dionysiou & Tsoukas, 2013) . Further, psychological ownership of global ventures typ-
ically relies on some perceived individual connection to leaders (Scott & Lane, 2000). 
Perhaps most importantly, the push to create ‘global actors’ may create tensions with the 
need for individual acknowledgement when ideas are successful, as Distributed Collabo-
ration pools large amounts of disparate competencies in a way that is often difficult to 
disentangle (Tapscott & Williams, 2008; Yan et al., 2018).  
This tension is meaningful, as individual acknowledgement is key for repeated participa-
tion. For contributors, a lack of intellectual, social, or material reward means there is little 
motivation to continuously engage (Wasko & Faraj, 2005). This is especially problematic 
when competition between contributions is high and/or inclusivity is high among contrib-
utors. This leads to phenomena such as free-riding; a common occurrence in online col-
laborations where participants exert less effort on a collaborative task than they would on 
a comparable individual task (Ling et al., 2005). Perhaps more importantly, the ability to 
identify others making valuable contributions is an important antecedent to relationship-
building (Altschuller & Benbunan-Fich, 2013). Hence, Distributed Collaboration systems 
require a balance of group-level feedback and individual accountability, suggesting the 
origins and evolution of group outputs must be part of the evaluation process (Suleiman 





6.4 Objectives of a Solutions: Key Predictors of Perceived Social Jus-
tice 
Social justice (also referred to as perceived fairness) is perceived along multiple dimen-
sions, notably between employees (Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000), be-
tween managers and employees (McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992), and between the organisa-
tion as an entity and its employees (Greenberg, 1988).  Previous research has noted the 
importance of perceived social justice in Distributed Collaboration, where contrasting 
perceptions of surveillance and depersonalisation may create suspicions the paradigm will 
be abused (Alge, 2001; Wu & Chiu, 2018; Zweig & Webster, 2002). The following sub-
sections discuss the three major components of social justice, specifically distributive 
justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice.  
6.4.1 Distributive Justice 
Distributive justice primarily relates to the perceived fairness of outcomes that one party 
receives from another party based on their inputs into an exchange relationship (Son & 
Kim, 2008). Son and Kim (2008) go on to describe that this can be applied to a customer-
retailer relationship, where a customer inputs money and/or time into the relationship in 
expectation of goods or services. Similarly, in an online setting, users must make the 
decision of whether or not to expose their personal data to the service they are using in 
exchange for the benefits of using the service (Son & Kim, 2008).  
The idea of distributive justice has been around for many decades (Folger & Konovsky, 
1989; McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992). It may even be argued the idea of distributive justice 
was central to the rise of Blockchain technologies, which grew at the same time as the 
2007/2008 financial crisis. That crisis that gave rise to numerous accusations of outcome-
related favouritism in the prevailing financial systems, particularly towards wealthy indi-





movements such as Occupy Wall Street (Calhoun, 2013) and national protests in Greece, 
Ireland, and other countries (Karanikolos et al., 2013; Theodossopoulos et al., 2013). It 
was against this backdrop that Bitcoin was proposed as a distributed, equitable, and fair 
alternative to traditional systems of financial exchange; one in which no central body 
could skew outcomes in their favour (Nakamoto, 2008).  
6.4.2 Procedural Justice 
Procedural justice refers to the perceived fairness of the process associated with the allo-
cation of limited resources for members, relative to demand (Wu & Chiu, 2018). Proce-
dural justice can be further subcategorised into subjective and objective procedural jus-
tice, where objective procedural justice refers to actual or factual justice, and subjective 
procedural justice refers to perceptions of objective procedures and their capacity to en-
hance fairness judgements (Konovsky, 2000).  
Procedural justice is typically associated with the overarching governance bodies, as in-
dividuals must determine whether they believe the rules and laws governing behaviour, 
and the enforcement of those rules and laws, are fair (Alge, 2001; Cropanzano, Prehar, & 
Chen, 2002). For this reason, the idea of procedural justice has also been a dominant 
concept during the rise of Blockchain technologies. Unlike many traditional systems, 
Blockchain minimises the role of the ‘enforcer’ by integrating these procedures directly 
into the technology. This is key, as the disintermediation of central bodies relies on each 
person’s faith in the procedural integrity of interactions with peers (Beck et al., 2016; 
Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016). Blockchain interactions take place in an open setting where 
fraudulent or impermissible interactions are rejected by the network, while accepted in-





(Nakamoto, 2008; Peters & Panayi, 2016). This means users can’t dispute or delay legit-
imate interactions when it benefits them to do so (Swan, 2015). 
6.4.3 Interactional Justice 
Interactional justice describes the manner in which an individual perceives their interper-
sonal treatment from decision makers during an exchange relationship (Cropanzano et 
al., 2002). This differs from procedural justice, as interactional justice focuses on the 
social instance-specific component of an exchange, rather than the generalised formal 
standards and rules for interactions (Wu & Chiu, 2018). Thus, perceptions of interac-
tional justice are closely linked to interpersonal trust between parties involved in an ex-
change (Lu, 2006).  
This link between trust and interactional justice is particularly relevant for Distributed 
Collaboration (Altschuller & Benbunan-Fich, 2013; Kanawattanachai & Yoo, 2002). Col-
laboration asks individuals to commit time and effort to shared goals in the hope others 
will do the same (Piccoli & Ives, 2003; Wasko & Faraj, 2005). Local teams manage this 
need for bilateral effort with normative systems of formal and informal controls, which 
sanction those who stray from common expectations (Kirsch, 1997). However, this be-
comes more challenging for Distributed Collaborations as (i) remote collaborators oper-
ate under limited moment-to-moment visibility (Boss, Kirsch, Angermeier, Shingler, & 
Boss, 2009; Kirsch, Sambamurthy, Ko, & Purvis, 2002) (ii) diverse collaborators may 
have only partial understanding of other domains, meaning task complexity or effort can 
be overstated (Kirsch et al., 2002; Saam, 2007) (iii) collaborators can leave specific pro-





6.5 Design & Development: Creative Ancestry as a Design Construct 
This study employed a Design Science Research (DSR) methodology, the principles of 
which are described in detail in Chapter 3. This study focuses on three types of design 
contribution. First, is the design construct of Creative Ancestry, defined and discussed 
here with particular regard to Blockchain as an enabling technology. Second, is the em-
bedded design-relevant explanatory/predictive theory (Kuechler & Vaishnavi, 2012), 
which draws on social justice theory to explain how Creative Ancestry impacts on Dis-
tributed Collaboration via perceived fairness. Third, is the design instantiation. This in-
stantiation demonstrates how a Blockchain-enabled system can introduce Creative An-
cestry to increase perceived fairness and improve the perceived quality of Distributed 
Collaborations. This instantiation is presented as a second iteration of this system. Build-
ing on the first iteration which was presented in Chapter 3, the system has been refined 
and redeveloped based on the findings presented in Chapters 4 and 5. 
6.5.1 Creative Ancestry as a Design Construct 
Distributed Collaborations allow large numbers of individuals to contribute to a project, 
either by producing/suggesting content directly or by filtering mass-produced content into 
more manageable siloes of quality contributions (Klein & Garcia, 2015; Ransbotham & 
Kane, 2011). However, most collaborations are sustainable only if the relative contribu-
tion of each individual can be identified and acknowledged (Ling et al., 2005). This iden-
tification and acknowledgement of individual contributions presents three problems for 
Distributed Collaboration.  
First, the relationship is not always positive between a collaborator’s frequency of col-
laboration and their creative/constructive impact. Many collaborations have been hi-





desirable goals and hierarchies (Kittur & Kraut, 2008). This can mean many individuals 
who appear disengaged or ‘free-riding’ were actually struggling to have their voice heard 
before becoming disillusioned and giving up (Bandura et al., 1996; Latané et al., 1979). 
Research on crowdsourcing further suggests this sense of limited interaction also de-
creases collaborators’ psychological ownership of the outputs (Gleasure & Feller, 2016; 
Zheng, Xu, Zhang, & Wang, 2018b).  
Second, an inability to determine the origins of an idea means it is difficult to 
acknowledge/reward those who contributed most. This creates resentment among the 
more committed collaborators and reinforces lazy or selfish behaviours among the least 
committed (George, 1992; Suleiman & Watson, 2008). Such resentment alienates core 
community members over time, stagnating progress and diluting interest among special-
ists (Chidambaram & Tung, 2005; Kidwell & Bennett, 1993).  
Third, the inability to trace the evolution of ideas creates problems for managing 
intellectual property (IP) rights. This is especially challenging for Distributed Collabora-
tions, the purpose of which is ultimately to produce emergent knowledge that transcends 
the understanding of any one person or group involved (Kittur & Kraut, 2008; 
Surowiecki, 2004). This is a significant issue, given IP ownership is a key asset for many 
individuals and firms and the threat of uncertain ownership and/or theft can create serious 
issues (UK Government Office for Science, 2016). 
The intuitive answer to address these issues is to accommodate inspect ability and ensure 
all interactions are open to scrutiny (Sharma et al., 2002). However, such a solution is not 
practical. Large Distributed Collaborations may have hundreds of thousands of interac-
tions, meaning even if they could all be reliably captured, the scale prohibits extensive 





also does not align with the output-specific backwards-traversing needs of the practical 
problem. Not all collaborations need to be inspected; only those that eventually produced 
some outcome of note. Hence, we propose the design construct of ‘Creative Ancestry’, 
i.e. the ability of a collaborative system to take some particular output of note and navi-
gate backwards through the individual contributions that preceded it in a consistently 
structured, inspectable, and immutable manner.  
The presence of consistent structure is important, as the ability to inspect interactions 
shrinks if the presentation and format of those interactions requires continuous interpre-
tation. This has been demonstrated in studies of mental load, which show repeating 
presentational structure and hierarchy lowers attentional and working-memory demands 
(DeStefano & LeFevre, 2007). Thus, consistent structure allows inspecting agents to sep-
arate details of interest from other data or meta-data.  
The presence of interaction-level inspectability is important, as this allows each 
interaction to be evaluated independently by collaborators. This is important, as systems 
must typically not only take efforts to be fair; they must also take efforts to demonstrate 
their intentions to be fair (Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012). This is often referred to in studies of 
platform or institutional trustworthiness as ‘integrity’ (Robert et al., 2009), meaning 
collaborators not only believe evaluators are capable and benevolent, they also understand 
how those evaluators are making judgements.  
The presence of immutability is important, as this prevents malicious or dishonest parties 
from attempting to interfere with records of interactions. Without such immutability, the 
reliability of these records would rely on the competence and integrity of some controlling 





undermined, at which point the value of legitimate inspectability is compromised by 
suspicions of selective record-keeping (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). 
Thus, Creative Ancestry avoids the information overload of full transparency, while min-
imizing complexity of assembling and integrating data when analysing individual contri-
butions.  
6.5.2 Embedded Design-Relevant Explanatory/Predictive Theory 
Embedded in many designs (albeit often implicitly) is a mid-range causal theory that 
shows the mechanism by which design interventions interact with moderating variables 
to produce desired outcomes (Kuechler & Vaishnavi, 2012). This model grounds design 
assumptions in existing literature and provides additional diagnostic clarity when evalu-
ating outcomes (Gleasure, Feller, & O'Flaherty, 2012; Goldkuhl, 2004). The embedded 
causal model linking Creative Ancestry to perceived social justice and the quality of a 
Distributed Collaboration is presented in Figure 6.1. This model builds upon models pro-
posed and validated by Folger and Konovsky (1989), Colquitt (2001), Tyler and Blader 
(2003), and Wu and Chiu (2018).  
 





The impact of perceived distributive justice on collaboration is well-established in con-
texts where individuals, groups, and organisations must work together towards common 
goals (Griffith, Harvey, & Lusch, 2006; Wu & Chiu, 2018). In some cases, such collab-
orations occur within organisations, e.g. as regards perceptions of power disparity with 
managers in large organisations (Cropanzano, Bowen, & Gilliland, 2007). These percep-
tions of perceived distributive justice may take on many forms, notably regarding benefits 
and pay (Tremblay, Sire, & Balkin, 2000). In many other cases, perceptions of distributive 
justice have a strong impact when individuals in one organisation collaborate with indi-
viduals in another. For example, it was found that perceived distributive justice played an 
important role in the formation of satisfactory supply chains, as partners were reluctant 
to engage with other entities with whom power relations were asymmetrical (Wu & Chiu, 
2018). We predict a similar positive impact for Distributed Collaborations: 
Hypothesis 1.  Perceived distributive justice positively impacts on Distributed Collabo-
ration. 
The impact of perceived interactional justice on collaborations is also well-established. 
Perceptions of interaction justice are incrementally embedded in a social exchange cli-
mate and it is this accumulation of instance-level social exchanges that differentiates in-
teractional justice from procedural justice (Cropanzano et al., 2002). Interactional justice 
considers the quality of interpersonal treatment perceived by exchange partners, higher 
levels of which lead to greater mutual collaborative effort (Luo, 2007). However, inter-
actional justice is not only perceived at an individual-level. As with, distributive justice, 
interactional justice has been found to positively impact supply-chain collaborations, in 





beneficial and reciprocal in the long term (Griffith et al., 2006). Thus, we also predict a 
positive impact for perceived interactional justice on Distributed Collaboration: 
Hypothesis 2. Perceived interactional justice positively impacts on Distributed Collabo-
ration. 
The impact of perceived procedural justice is potentially more complicated than distrib-
utive justice and interactional justice. Procedural justice relates to the formal policies and 
procedures which manage a relationship (Masterson et al., 2000). This ultimately repre-
sents the core agreed-upon collaborative structure for the group; a structure that should 
transcend identity and encourage bilateral commitment (Tyler & Blader, 2003). However, 
while distributive and interactional justice operate, at least partly, independently, the per-
ception of procedural justice is entangled with other forms of justice. One collaborator 
may interact badly with another without there necessarily being any distributive injustice. 
Similarly, distributive injustice does not necessarily imply interactional injustice. Yet, 
either interactional or distributive injustice is required for there to be procedural injustice. 
For example, the presence of distributive injustice around water shortages create a height-
ened importance for procedural justice between the affected individuals and the authori-
ties (Tyler & Degoey, 1995). Similarly, when some employees are reluctant to share im-
portant workplace concerns (e.g. grievances) and interactional injustice is perceived, it is 
procedural justice that moderates their willingness to come forward (Tangirala & 
Ramanujam, 2008). Put differently, the perceived fairness of the laws is most important 
when the system is under threat. It is not clear the extent to which procedural justice has 
an impact on Distributed Collaboration outside of these moderated relationships. Thus, 
we predict both a direct impact of procedural justice and a moderated effect via distribu-





Hypothesis 3. Perceived procedural justice positively impacts on Distributed Collabora-
tion. 
Hypothesis 4. Procedural justice positively impacts on perceived interactional justice. 
Hypothesis 5. Procedural justice positively impacts on perceived distributive justice. 
In addition to perceived justice around the distribution of resources, the nature of individ-
ual interactions, and the guiding procedures, the individuals must also be satisfied with 
the system used for collaborations (Wu & Chiu, 2018). This is because attitudes towards 
a platform may change how an individual perceives an interaction, particularly if users 
have doubts about the ability of the system to behave as expected (Pavlou & Gefen, 2004). 
Thus, we expect users’ satisfaction with the collaborative system to positively impact on 
perceptions of Distributed Collaboration. 
Hypothesis 6. Satisfaction positively impacts on Distributed Collaboration. 
We predict that Creative Ancestry will have a positive impact on each dimension of per-
ceived social justice. For distributive justice, where high-resource individuals (intellec-
tual, social, or material) share freely and make best use of their assets, Creative Ancestry 
should bring attention to the higher proportional contribution of those individuals. Simi-
larly, Creative Ancestry should provide greater visibility where those high-resource indi-
viduals choose to behave selfishly. This ability to identify selfish individuals is important 
so other collaborators can hold them accountable and factor their behaviours into future 
collaborations (Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes, 2010).  
Hypothesis 7. Creative ancestry positively impacts on perceived distributive justice. 
For interactional justice, the addition of Creative Ancestry reduces the opportunity for 
duplicitous individuals to present themselves differently to some groups than others. This 





individuals, spread reputation-harming rumours, and create barriers to information-shar-
ing (Newman, Holden, & Delville, 2005). This allows third party perceptions to be ma-
nipulated in a way that hides abusive behaviours, so reducing the likelihood of formal or 
informal sanctioning (Rayner & Hoel, 1997; Van der Wal, De Wit, & Hirasing, 2003). 
Thus, Creative Ancestry limits the potential for oppressive or otherwise unfair interac-
tions by creating a traversable and exhaustive record of interactions that is openly visible 
to all.  
Hypothesis 8. Creative ancestry positively impacts on perceived interactional justice. 
For procedural justice, the addition of Creative Ancestry affords scrutiny over the appli-
cation of rules and processes, any attempts to circumvent them, and how they are enforced 
(Bertot et al., 2010; Mawby, 1999). A common legal dictum states ‘Justice should not 
only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done’ (attributed to 
Lord Chief Justice Hewart in the 1924, quoted from (Marmor, 2005). Thus, Creative An-
cestry is essential for widespread confidence that collaborative interactions cannot be 
skewed in favour of specific individuals or escape scrutiny.  
Hypothesis 9. Creative ancestry positively impacts on perceived procedural justice. 
Two additional control variables are included in the form of cognitive group consensus 
(Mohammed, 2001; Mohammed & Ringseis, 2001) and perceived group creativity 
(Nunamaker Jr, Applegate, & Konsynski, 1987; Paulus & Nijstad, 2003). The effect of 
Creative Ancestry on perceived social justice assumes some shared output has been pro-
duced. However, this is not necessarily the case for all collaborations, particularly Dis-
tributed Collaborations. First, large numbers of heterarchical participants means consen-
sus may not occur. This is often the case in large open source software collaborations, 





in sites such as Wikipedia, where contributing groups can become adversarial and terri-
torial (Kittur & Kraut, 2008). Under these conditions, the positive potential of Creative 
Ancestry is less obvious, as increased visibility may bring negative aspects of the collab-
oration to light, perhaps increasing the sense of injustice. Second, not all collaborations 
produce creative outcomes likely to inspire collaborators to seek credit. Some collabora-
tions simply peter out over time, often resulting in those responsible becoming dispas-
sionate (Martin & Eisenhardt, 2010). Hence, a lack of meaningful output may also mean 
the impact of Creative Ancestry diminishes, as there is nothing of note to inspect. Thus, 
the following moderating relationships are also considered.  
Hypothesis 10. The impact of Creative Ancestry on the perception of distributive, inter-
actional, and procedural justice is positively moderated by cognitive consensus.  
Hypothesis 11. The impact of Creative Ancestry on the perception of distributive, inter-
actional, and procedural justice is positively moderated by perceived group creativity.  
6.5.3 Blockchain and Creative Ancestry 
The digital nature of most Distributed Collaborations means digital discourse can be cap-
tured with comparatively little effort as a by-product of other behaviours (Morey, Forbath, 
& Schoop, 2015). Thus, digital technologies provide an essential prerequisite to Creative 
Ancestry by creating visibility of collaborative interactions that does not necessarily exist 
in other media. Yet this visibility does not imply Creative Ancestry, as they do not ensure 
inspect ability (data can be lost or hidden), consistent structures (formatting validation 
may be loose or non-existent), immutability (the integrity and of data is not independently 
guaranteed), and perhaps most importantly sequential interactions may become uncou-
pled and unrelatable to specific outputs. Fortunately, the emergence of Blockchain tech-





Regarding the ability to relate outputs to specific interactions, Blockchain allows interac-
tions to be traversed backwards from some output at a given point in time. While this 
ability is often associated with uses of Blockchain as a platform for financial currencies 
(which are arguably themselves a form of Distributed Collaboration) (Hyvärinen et al., 
2017; Peters & Panayi, 2016), it has also been applied to numerous other domains with 
similar demands for traceability. For example, sites such as SteemIt (an online peer-
driven news site) pay members for posting and curating content using micropayments 
based on the site’s own cryptocurrency Steem (Thelwall, 2017). Blockchain has also been 
proposed as a means of tracking food ingredient (Aitken, 2017) and keeping track of 
medical records (Azaria, Ekblaw, Vieira, & Lippman, 2016). There have also been calls 
for Blockchain-enabled systems to track embedded IP by the UK Government’s Chief 
Scientific Advisor in 2016, who argued “Enabling companies to register their Intellectual 
Property (IP) within a distributed ledger, rather than through traditional patent applica-
tions, may reduce the overall number of contract disputes” (UK Government Office for 
Science, 2016).  
Regarding the need for immutability, Blockchain records and validates individual inter-
actions continuously into a distributed ledger (Swan, 2015). This makes it increasingly 
unfeasible to fabricate or remove interactions as a Blockchain network grows (Nakamoto, 
2008). This ability to withstand attempts to distort records of longitudinal was a driving 
motivation for the application of Blockchain to cryptocurrencies, as this capacity was 
seen as pivotal to the immutability of the system (Risius & Spohrer, 2017; UK 
Government Office for Science, 2016). It has also motivated Blockchain platforms in 
other high-stakes industries. Take for example, Everledger a company that has introduced 





Specifically, Everledger have used Blockchain to develop a digital ledger that tracks di-
amonds (and potentially other valuable assets) during their lifecycle; a ledger that is then 
used by various stakeholders across the assets supply chain to form provenance and verify 
authenticity (Everledger, 2017). Similarly, Provenance have created a ‘digital passport’ 
for any physical asset to create an auditable record of the lifecycle of those assets. Each 
operation is recorded and archived across the network so auditing becomes as simple as 
joining that network and replaying the operation of the past (Provenance, 2015). 
Regarding the need for interaction-level inspect ability, Blockchain affords this is two 
key ways. First, they can provide records in the form of a comprehensive and borderless 
open registry (Locher, Obermeier, & Pignolet, 2018). This, combined with the immuta-
bility of the system, means exhaustive inspect ability is built into Blockchain platforms. 
Second, Blockchain systems ensure a persistent connection to pseudonymous nodes; 
hence they provide a single source of the truth (Beck et al., 2018). Once again, this is a 
key reason why Blockchain is touted as a strong technical fit with the data management 
needs of intellectual property (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016), digital art (Swan, 2015), no-
tary services (Hyvärinen et al., 2017; Locher et al., 2018), or proof of origin for important 
documents (Fridgen, Guggenmoos, Lockl, Rieger, & Schweizer, 2018). 
Finally, regarding the need for consistent structure, Blockchain systems build a consistent 
structure into the recorded interactions at the point of design. Records of these interactions 
are created from both the content of the new interaction and algorithmic derivatives of 
the preceding records (Nakamoto, 2008). Hence the ability for structural drift is limited. 
Equally importantly, where some programming code is uploaded to assist with the storage 





often taking the form of a ‘smart contract’ coordinating between multiple parties (Wüst 
& Gervais, 2017).  
This is not to suggest Creative Ancestry could not be accommodated with a centralised 
database. Platforms such as GitHub, Wikipedia, and Innocentive might each argue they 
fulfil the individual requirements of Creative Ancestry using traditional (non-Blockchain) 
data storage. Nonetheless, Blockchain appears particularly well-suited, given its pro-
nounced capacity for resisting faults and/or malicious interference (Beck et al., 2016; Pahl 
et al., 2018), for linking interactions with individuals (Hawlitschek, Notheisen, & 
Teubner, 2018; Locher et al., 2018), and for providing inspect ability and independent 
oversight (Beck, Becker, Lindman, & Rossi, 2017b; Nair & Sutter, 2018). 
6.6 Demonstration: A Blockchain-based Distributed Collaboration sys-
tem 
The demonstration sought to create a Distributed Collaboration system where both inclu-
sion and competition are high, as these conditions place most strain on Creative Ancestry. 
Thus, the Distributed Collaboration Blockchain system was demonstrated as an ideation 
platform, in which individuals could put forward ideas and ‘up-vote’ specific ideas put 
forward by others.  
Individual threads were created around different topics of ideation and users were free to 
make recommendations/vote in any thread they wished. Once a recommendation received 
five ‘up-votes’, that idea was selected for shortlisting and the corresponding thread was 
closed. This concept has been suggested in previous research as an effect way of engaging 
collaborators to improve data quality by evaluating, and filtering the large volume of 
contributions in Distributed Collaboration (Blohm, Leimeister, & Krcmar, 2013; Klein & 






Figure 6.2 Screenshot of recommendation page (details blurred for anonymity pur-
poses) 
6.6.1 Design process 
Design took place over multiple agile iterations intended to allow flexibility and explora-
tion in the early stages, while progressively hardening the design into a rigorously testable 
artefact (Conboy et al., 2015). Earlier prototypes were built using Truffle, a development 
environment, testing framework and asset pipeline for Ethereum. Truffle handles a large 
amount of the technical complexity for simple Ethereum solutions (Truffle, 2017). Also, 
latency issues associated with Blockchain systems (Casino et al., 2018; Lindman et al., 
2017) were avoided by using TestRPC, a Node.js based Ethereum client for testing and 
development. TestRPC is a complete Blockchain-in-memory that runs on your local ma-
chine. Transactions are processed instantly rather than having to wait for the default block 
time, which allows a developer to test code faster and be notified of errors immediately 
(TestRPC, 2017). This allowed a preliminary system to be produced quickly for the pur-
poses of prototyping.  
Early Truffle/ TestRPC-based prototypes were demonstrated to academic audiences at 





East China, and also in industry workshops with large multinational financial services 
and software development firms. Feedback refined the scope of the use-case and the cor-
responding features of the system. Having established the practical demand for the sys-
tem, a more sophisticated technical solution was developed to facilitate simulation-based 
testing. This was necessary to move beyond hypothetical scenarios and speculation and 
observe how system features impacted on actual behaviours and perceptions. Thus, the 
subsequent iteration was built using more robust and scalable Amazon Web Services 
(AWS) and Ropsten platforms.  
6.6.2 Technical overview 
The system was built on the Ethereum network. Ethereum is a public, permissionless 
network, meaning anyone is free to participate in the network, as opposed to networks 
such as Hyperledger which are private and permissioned, allowing only approved users 
to engage (Casino et al., 2018). Ethereum is arguably the largest Blockchain system 
widely in circulation that is not limited to just financial transactions (Sapuric et al., 2017). 
Instead, Ethereum supports the development of ‘smart contracts’ (Casino et al., 2018; 
Lindman et al., 2017); a piece of code that the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) is able 
to execute on the Blockchain. Once this piece of code has been added to the Blockchain, 
the smart contract itself cannot be altered, only the storage of the smart contract can. This 
means a piece of code now exists that is available for anyone to use (Beck et al., 2016; 
Swan, 2015). Specific to this study, this meant smart contracts could be developed to 
capture on the Blockchain both the ideas put forward by individuals and the votes to back 





The three main technical components involved in the development were Amazon Web 
Services Elastic Cloud Compute (EC2) instance, the Web3 API, and Ropsten Ethereum 
testnet. 
The user interface was created using traditional web development languages, HTML, 
CSS, PHP, and JavaScript. These were then hosted on the EC2 instance provided by 
AWS. We used the web3 object provided by the web3.js library to run the system on the 
Ethereum network. This communicates behind the scenes to a local node through RPC 
(Remote Procedure Call) calls, as web3.js is configured to work with any Ethereum node 
which exposes an RPC layer (Web3, 2017). In this instance the web3 interface was han-
dled using the Metamask extension for Google Chrome. Metamask allows users to run 
Ethereum dApps right from their browser without having to run a full Ethereum node 
(Metamask, 2018). This was essential as, by hosting the front-end application on AWS, 
users were able to access the system from their own machines. We asked each participant 
to add the Metamask extension to their Chrome. This allowed them to interact with the 
Blockchain-enabled application.  
The smart contracts were coded using Solidity and mined to the Ropsten Ethereum test-
net. The ropsten testnet is a simple version of the Ethereum network that was developed 
for testing. Hence it uses test ether which cost nothing and can be drawn down from a 
faucet (Dannen, 2017). Participants in each of our demo sessions started by funding their 
Metamask accounts by requesting ether from a faucet (https://faucet.metamask.io/).  
6.6.3 Implementing Creative Ancestry 
Throughout the experiment, participants uploaded recommendations and voted on those 
put forward by others. Participants were also free to browse the shortlisted 





was presented in a backwards-traversible sequence, allowing individual contributions to 
be independently evaluated against the contributions on which they built.  
A consistent structure was imposed, meaning each comment (including preceding 
recommendations) was displayed in an identical tabular format that laid out the text of 
the comment, the contributor, and a timestamp. Immutability was ensured by the technical 
mechanics of the Ethereum Blockchain and by allowing users to independently navigate 
records and compare them them with their own experience and memory.  
Two additional details were added in the interests of interaction-level inspectability. The 
first was the number of votes received by selected or preceding recommendations. This 
created visibility over the progression of collective approval from collaborators as 
discussion neared the selected idea, particularly when combined with the timestamp data. 
The second was the comment ID for each selected or preceding recommendation. This 
was arguably unnecessary; however, it represented the last item of data stored on the 
ideation system so was included to ensure no details were withheld from users.  
For comparative purposes, a second system was also built that did not facilitate Creative 
Ancestry for selected ideas. This second system did not display the recommendations that 
preceded shortlisted ideas (see Figure 6.3). Thus, while interactions were similarly 
structured, immutable, and inspectable as they happened, successful collaborations could 








Figure 6.3 Screenshot of recommendation-filtering stage with Creative Ancestry 
(bottom) and without (top) (details blurred for anonymity purposes) 
6.6.4 Implementing distributive, procedural, and interactional justice with Creative 
Ancestry  
The system leveraged Creative Ancestry to facilitate each form of social justice (distrib-
utive, procedural, and interactional). It did this at three levels; a technical-level, an inter-
face design-level, and an interaction/context-level.  
Distributive justice was enabled at a technical-level by ensuring collaborators operate 
under a pseudonym. Pseudonymous interactions are typical in Blockchain environments 
such as Ethereum (Lindman et al., 2017). This is valuable, as there is a tendency in many 
collaborations for junior or shy individuals to refrain from sharing their ideas in case they 
come under ridicule; a tendency referred to as ‘evaluation apprehension’ (Diehl & 
Stroebe, 1987). Allowing individuals to contribute without disclosing their identity has 
been found to reduce these effects and increase participation (Connolly et al., 1990), 





Hence, the interface design of the system further limited anything that would enable in-
dividuals to add additional contextual information to their profiles, e.g. job titles, bios, or 
images. A separate problem occurs where groups contain a subset of members that have 
collaborated previously, as these individuals often communicate independently and be-
come gatekeepers of vital information (Robert Jr et al., 2008). For this reason, the inter-
action/context design avoided any direct or ancillary communication channels that could 
result in privileged information sharing or offline discussion.  
Procedural justice was enabled at a technical-level through the implementation of smart 
contracts. These smart contracts operate as a governance mechanism for the system, au-
tonomously enforcing predefined rules in the system (Beck et al., 2018). This satisfies 
three key rules for fair procedures (i) the consistency rule, which states that the allocation 
of procedures should be consistent across persons and over time (ii) the bias-suppression 
rule, which states that personal self-interests and decision-makers should be prevented 
from operating during the allocation process and (iii) the representativeness rule, which 
states that needs, values and, outlooks of all parties should be considered equal in the 
process (Leventhal, 1976). However, it must also be noted that even seemingly fair and 
democratic procedures can also be undermined where individuals manufacture criticism 
to drown out positive support and foster distrust (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998; 
Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). Hence, after extensive consideration and discussion, the 
design of the system did not allow users to ‘down-vote’ ideas; they could only express 
their support with positive ‘up-votes’ or non-support by abstaining. Interaction/context 
design reinforced this by presenting selected ideas as interesting enough to warrant further 





Interactional justice was enabled at a technical-level by (i) ensuring users were tied to 
their specific pseudonyms indefinitely and (ii) removing any capacity to remove or amend 
records of interactions. This is important, individuals often voice ideas early in the col-
laborative process that are deemed of marginal value, only to have those ideas re-emerge 
later on with little or no credit to the original contributor (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987). Dis-
tributed Collaborations are particularly vulnerable to this effect, as much of the benefit 
comes from allowing individuals to operate in parallel when groups are large (Gallupe et 
al., 1992). Interactional justice was further enabled at an interface design-level by ensur-
ing screens allow historic interactions to be browsed all the way back to the beginning of 
the collaboration. This reassures individuals that even minor or indirect contributions are 
visible; an important quality for collaborators who assume important supporting roles 
(George, 1992; Jones, 1984). The interaction/context-level design supports this by en-
couraging users to scrutinise interactions when viewing specific outputs, rather than as-
suming the collaboration is no longer of interest once ideas have been selected.   
6.7 Evaluation 
An experiment was used to evaluate the system, as this allows for greater contextual con-
trol and the isolation of specific effects (Venable, Pries-Heje, & Baskerville, 2016). Par-
ticipants were university students with a background in IT. The use of students is recog-
nised as appropriate for social/organisational/business research, provided the research 
questions focus on general traits, rather than comparative questions demanding repre-
sentative between-subject diversity (see discussion in Greenberg (1987); Peterson (2001); 
Bello, Leung, Radebaugh, Tung, and Van Witteloostuijn (2009)). No such constraints 
apply for this study, which focuses on helping contributors bring different ideas to bear 





population at large. Hence, the use of student participants was deemed suitable and these 
students participated as part of coursework.  
The first group contained 52 participants, the second contained 28, and the third contained 
41 (N = 121 participants overall). The evaluation took place before a national holiday, the 
context of which was integrated into the experimental collaboration task. Specifically, 
participants were asked how businesses in certain industries (retails, transport, 
pubs/nightclubs and café/restaurant) could take advantage of the busy weekend ahead. 
All participants were equally free to make suggestions and once these suggestions were 
verified on the ropsten testnet, they were visible to all other participants. Participants 
could then either vote on ideas they felt were relevant or make a recommendation of their 
own.  
Three identical smart contracts were created, and we manipulated the JavaScript file on 
our EC2 instance to read and write data from a new contract address for each session to 
allow each session to operate with their own set of ideas. At the end of each session, we 
divided the groups in half and each participant was presented with the shortlisted recom-
mendations from the vote. Half the participants (randomly determined) received the full 
list of recommendations with Creative Ancestry around shortlisted recommendations. The 
alternative group were presented with only the full list of shortlisted recommendations 
(no Creative Ancestry). After each session participants were asked to complete a survey 
to measure each item in the embedded design-relevant explanatory/predictive model.  
A components-based estimation approach to structural equation modelling was taken to 
reflect the exploratory nature of theory building, specifically the partial least squares 





discussion of these testing methods is presented in Appendix 9.11, and the results of these 
tests are detailed in Tables 6.1 to 6.5 below. 
Table 6.1 Discriminant Validity 
Construct Coll DJ IJ PJ CA US 
Collaboration Quality  0.75 - - - - - 
Dist. Justice 0.72 0.74 - - - - 
Inter. Justice 0.72 0.67 0.71 - - - 
Proc. Justice 0.57 0.70 0.67 0.79 - - 
Creative Ancestry 0.65 0.64 0.61 0.68 0.72 - 
User Satis. 0.64 0.57 0.59 0.58 0.59 0.85 
Coll=Collaboration Quality, DJ=Distributed Justice, IJ=Interactional Justice, 
PJ=Procedural Justice, CA=Creative Ancestry, US=User Satisfaction 
 
Table 6.2 Convergent Validity 




Alpha Communality Redundancy 
Coll. 
Quality 0.56 0.86 0.66 0.80 0.56 0.23 
Dist. 
Justice 0.55 0.83 0.40 0.72 0.55 0.22 
Inter. 
Justice 0.50 0.80 0.37 0.67 0.50 0.18 
Proc. 
Justice 0.63 0.84 0.47 0.71 0.63 0.29 
Creative 
Ancestry 0.52 0.81 0.00 0.69 0.52 0.00 



















Creative Ancestry***† 2.73 2.12 1.02 3.43 <.001 14417 <.001 
Collaboration Quality† 2.99 2.74 1.05 1.31 .19 14513 <.001 
Procedural Justice**† 2.72 2.17 1.01 3.14 .002 14353 <.001 
Interactional Justice† 3.05 2.84 0.99 1.11 .268 14545 <.001 
Distributive justice**† 2.70 2.14 0.98 3.38 .001 14481 <.001 
User Satisfaction*† 2.88 2.37 1.13 2.53 .012 14385 <.001 
Cognitive group 
consensus**† 
3.17 2.58 1.14 2.97 .003 14417 <.001 
Group creativity*† 2.69 2.29 1.04 2.09 .038 14417 <.001 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, †p<.001 (non-parametric tests) 
 











Distr. Just. -> Coll. Quality*** 0.3867 0.3987 0.1038 3.7255 <.001 
Inter. Just.-> Coll. Quality*** 0.3828 0.3872 0.0966 3.9612 <.001 
Proced. Just. -> Coll. Quality -0.1073 -0.1094 0.1256 0.8544 0.394 
Proced. Just. -> Distr. Just*** 0.5053 0.5001 0.0923 5.4741 <.001 
Proced. Just. -> Inter. Just.*** 0.4791 0.4758 0.101 4.7422 <.001 
Creative Ancestry -> Distr. 
Just.*** 
0.2934 0.3087 0.1027 2.8577 <.001 
Creative Ancestry -> Inter. 
Just.* 
0.2792 0.2809 0.1121 2.4898 0.013 
Creative Ancestry -> Proced. 
Just.*** 
0.6821 0.6921 0.0518 13.1782 <.001 
Sat -> Coll. Quality* 0.2586 0.2448 0.1012 2.5559 0.011 











SE  T Stat.  P Val. 
Cog. Gr. Consensus -> Distr. Just.** 0.2792 0.2712 0.1027 2.7178 0.007 
Cog. Gr. Consensus -> Inter. Just. 0.0109 0.0091 0.1146 0.0947 0.924 
Cog. Gr. Consensus -> Proced. Just. 0.0676 0.062 0.133 0.508 0.612 
Group Creativity -> Distr. Just. 0.1723 0.1804 0.0949 1.8145 0.071 
Group Creativity -> Inter. Just.** 0.3312 0.3241 0.1043 3.1751 0.002 
Group Creativity -> Proced. Just.* 0.2248 0.2305 0.1079 2.0829 0.038 
Distr. Just. -> Coll. Quality*** 0.4039 0.4068 0.0992 4.0729 <.001 
Inter. Just.-> Coll. Quality*** 0.3728 0.3733 0.0853 4.372 <.001 
Proced. Just. -> Coll. Quality -0.1065 -
0.1034 
0.1221 0.872 0.383 
Proced. Just. -> Distr. Just*** 0.3799 0.3765 0.1039 3.6553 <.001 
Proced. Just. -> Inter. Just.** 0.36 0.3581 0.1093 3.2943 0.001 
Creative Ancestry -> Cg. Gr. 
Consensus*** 
0.5922 0.5974 0.0662 8.9506 <.001 
Creative Ancestry -> Group 
Creativity*** 
0.5062 0.5177 0.0805 6.2915 <.001 
Creative Ancestry -> Distr. Just. 0.122 0.1328 0.1177 1.0368 0.301 
Creative Ancestry -> Inter. Just. 0.1866 0.1969 0.1249 1.4938 0.136 
Creative Ancestry -> Proced. Just.*** 0.5271 0.5307 0.0923 5.7123 <.001 
Sat -> Collaboration* 0.2525 0.246 0.1081 2.3364 0.020 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
When looking at perceived collaboration quality, the data in Table 6.4 suggests perceived 
distributive justice and interactional justice both positively affect perceived collaboration 
quality with path coefficients of 0.3867 and 0.383 respectively (p<0.001). Therefore, H1 
and H2 are both supported. H3 was rejected with a path coefficient of 0.107 and a p-value 
of 0.39, suggesting no direct impact for procedural justice on perceived collaboration 
quality. H4 and H5 were supported, however, suggesting procedural justice has a positive 
impact on both perceived distribute justice and interactional justice. 
The data support positive relationships between Creative Ancestry and the perception of 
distributive, procedural, and interactional justice in the unmoderated model, with path 






Table 6.5 further shows the results of moderation tests with cognitive group consensus 
and perceived group creativity. The introduction of cognitive group consensus and per-
ceived group creativity into path modelling suggested two of these relationships are mod-
erated. The first is the relationship between Creative Ancestry and distributive justice, 
which is moderated by cognitive group consensus. The second is the relationship between 
Creative Ancestry and interactional justice, which is moderated by perceived group cre-
ativity. Thus, hypotheses 10 and 11 are partially supported.  
6.8 Communication: Discussion and Implications 
This study has explored the broad potential of Distributed Collaboration systems and 
identified the key role played by perceived social justice in the success of such systems.  
Drawing on prior research, the study theorises the construct of Creative Ancestry as a key 
enabler of perceived social justice. In order to leverage Creative Ancestry in an effective 
way, systems must provide consistent structure, inspect ability, and immutability for rec-
ords of contributions. We argue Blockchain technologies provide a clear foundation for 
implementing such systems. A design science approach was adopted to bound the idea of 
Creative Ancestry as a design construct, to build an embedded model linking Creative 
Ancestry to perceived collaboration quality, and to demonstrate and evaluate a Distrib-
uted Collaboration system that puts this construct and model in action.  
6.8.1 Contributions to Knowledge 
The study provides three key high-level scientific contributions. First, the study improves 
our understanding of the relationship between perceived social justice and the effective-
ness of Distributed Collaboration. Distributive justice (fairness of reward) and interac-





ity. Additionally, the impact of procedural justice (fairness of process) is indirect, mod-
erated by distributive and interactional justice. These findings point to the primacy of the 
individual experience (the relationship between individual input and reward, and the ex-
perience of individual relationships), and the support role played by the process itself. In 
other words, fair procedures are not important in isolation; rather fair procedures enable 
the fair distribution of resources and fair interactions between collaborators. This supports 
historic findings from the management literature that position perceptions of procedural 
justice as an important, though often subtle, enabler of organisational culture 
(Cropanzano et al., 2002; Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Greenberg, 1987).  
Second, the study demonstrates the impact of Creative Ancestry, as an emerging theoret-
ical construct, on perceived social justice. In the evaluation, collaborators scored the Cre-
ative Ancestry-enabled system more highly than the control system along every measured 
dimension, even though collaborators’ experiences up to the point of evaluation should 
have been identical. Collaborators weren’t notified in advance of the differences between 
the systems, nor were individuals invited to compare their version of the system with the 
alternative. Nonetheless, the addition of Creative Ancestry clearly added to perceptions 
of fairness and the favourability of outcomes. We interpret these findings as evidence that 
Creative Ancestry is a significant asset for Distributed Collaboration systems.   
Third, the study demonstrates the utility of Blockchain technologies for implementing 
Creative Ancestry. Specifically, it was revealed that the technical characteristics of Block-
chain can have a significant effect on subjective social experiences when they are used to 
support Creative Ancestry. This finding extends our understanding of the potential of 
Blockchain; specifically, it encourages us to think of Blockchain as a human-facing tech-





6.8.2 Implications for practice 
This study has implications for practice at three main levels of abstraction. First, at the 
instance-level, this study has produced a system that demonstrates how Distributed Col-
laboration can be accommodated on a Blockchain-enabled system. This provides a tangi-
ble exposition to show both that and how such a system can be developed (Gregor & 
Jones, 2007). The empirically-demonstrated utility of the system further supports its rel-
evance as an IT artefact of note for system developers and information systems profes-
sionals.  
Second, at the design construct-level, this study illustrates the importance of Creative 
Ancestry in facilitating the mechanism of social justice for improving perceptions of fair-
ness in Distributed Collaborations. While such Creative Ancestry is possible in traditional 
non-Blockchain systems, the underlying architecture of Blockchain makes it increasingly 
salient and practical for systems design. This helps to answer one of the most pressing 
questions facing Blockchain – what novel value does it offer compared to existing sys-
tems (Lindman et al., 2017)?   
Third, at the explanation-level, this study shows how the impact of a Blockchain-based 
system enabling Creative Ancestry is dependent on perceptions of social justice. At the 
heart of this relationship is perceived procedural justice, i.e. the laws of interaction, which 
mediate other situational perceptions of distributive or interactional justice. System de-
signers and developers must, therefore, understand the importance of defined procedures 
for the perceptions of collaborators. Put differently, if designers/developers are to lever-
age the benefits of Blockchain-enabled Creative Ancestry, they must understand that an 
exchange is being managed in the absence of a designated third party, meaning these 





develop systems that take their security and reliability responsibilities seriously; some-
thing that has been found to be an issue in the past (Atzei, Bartoletti, & Cimoli, 2017). 
6.8.3 Limitations and future research 
Four limitations must be acknowledged for this study. The first has to do with the rela-
tively synchronicity of collaborations in the simulation. Unlike many Distributed Collab-
orations, which can take place over days, weeks, or even years, the simulation asked col-
laborators to participate during the same one-hour period. This has the potential to in-
crease interaction richness and shared social presence by increasing the capacity for rapid 
feedback among those communicating (Yoo & Alavi, 2001). This was offset in the ex-
periment by the natural delay in uploading recommendations and ‘up-votes’ on the 
Ethereum network. As well as the gas cost of executing transactions on the Ethereum 
network, transactions take time before they are verified – a process that takes anywhere 
from 15 seconds to a couple of minutes. Collaborators were, therefore, encouraged to 
browse other threads and continuously refresh their browser during the pre-simulation 
brief; behaviours that more closely resemble the asynchronous interactions of real-world 
Distributed Collaborations. Separately, this limitation is also something that must be con-
sidered by future designers. If a collaboration is time sensitive and requires instantaneous 
feedback, typical Blockchain technologies may present limitations.  
The second limitation has to do with the lack of repeated use by collaborators over ex-
tended periods. Many online systems rely on repeat users to generate and sustain collab-
orations. For example, many Innocentive solvers reuse similar solutions for multiple 
problems to offset the amount of effort required for uncertain rewards (Cahalane, Feller, 
Finnegan, Hayes, & OReilly, 2014). Similarly, Wikipedia contributors often rely on long-





must consider how Blockchain-enabled Creative Ancestry impacts on longer-term behav-
iours.   
The third limitation concerns the restricted collaborative behaviours available. Several 
valuable suggestions for use-cases and features emerged during the demonstration of pre-
liminary systems to academic and industrial audiences, e.g. the potential for big data anal-
yses to deconstruct successful creative patterns and the scope for a Blockchain-enabled 
‘engineer’s notebook’. These experiences suggested the range of use-cases needs to be 
explored in depth, rather than attempting to recreate existing platforms and follow exist-
ing online practices.   
The final limitation was the use of the Ethereum network. This system has many benefits, 
including the relative simplicity of development. This allowed development efforts to 
move quickly and focus on topics of theoretical interest over technical granularity. How-
ever, where collaborative systems are being designed for use within an organisation, or 
where discussion is not intended to be publicly visible, there may be strong justification 
for a private, permissioned Blockchain network such as Hyperledger (Hyperledger, 
2017). The impact of this decreased visibility outside of collaborating parties may change 
some of the dynamics, particularly where future access to the collaboration is limited. 






Chapter 7. Conclusion 
7.1 Chapter Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to leverage the overall findings of this research which 
have been presented in the preceding chapters in order to articulate the contributions this 
study makes to research, theory, and practice. Section 7.2 provides an overview of each 
of the papers included in this thesis. Section 7.3 then articulates the thesis level contribu-
tions of my research. Section 7.4 considers the limitations of the study. Section 7.5 out-
lines potential avenues for further research while Section 7.6 concludes the research. 
7.2 Overview of Research Papers 
The overall objective of my thesis has been to explore Distributed Collaboration and the 
potential of Blockchain as an enabling technology. To achieve this objective, I undertook 
research, as illustrated in Figure 7.1. Due to the evolving nature of this research domain 
it was imperative to adopt multiple research approaches across the different studies in-
cluded in this body of work.  
Initially, Chapter 2 provided a unique perspective on Distributed Collaboration and the 
role of Blockchain as an enabling technology by analysing the cryptocurrency market as 
a network of distributed collaborators, evaluating Blockchain as a technology. Over 700 
observations of daily price data for Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Litecoin were analysed using 
vector autoregression and polynomial regression, providing a macro-level view of the 
research domain. This study highlighted that unlike traditional stocks or fiat currencies, 
there is no established framework for valuing cryptocurrencies; in the absence of a con-





price movements. In addition, this paper suggests that Ethereum is actually a better pre-
dictor of price changes than Bitcoin, possibly representing that perceptions of Blockchain 
as a technology and not as an alternative financial asset, are driving price movements. 
Chapter 3 presented my first iteration of Design Science Research (DSR), introducing 
the concept of Distributed Collaboration as ‘cross-functional group projects’, the chal-
lenges faced in these groups, as well as the potential of a Blockchain-enabled system 
which would alleviate these problems. This research found that Blockchain had the po-
tential to add value to an organisation’s innovation process and recognition and reward 
programs, as well as addressing the problem of free-riding. In keeping with the iterative 
nature of DSR, the subsequent chapters examined Distributed Collaboration and its chal-
lenges in isolation to inform a second iteration of this study.  
Chapter 4 presented a literature review; this was necessary to build a comprehensive 
understanding of Distributed Collaboration. I searched for literature published in Senior 
Scholars Basket of 8 IS Journals in AIS Electronic Library (AISel); Web of Science; and 
Google Scholar for articles published between 2000 and 2019 with a set of 25 different 
synonyms for Distributed Collaboration. This chapter provided a comprehensive under-
standing of Distributed Collaboration. First, by synthesising a single definition from an 
array of synonyms used in the existing literature. Second, by presenting a core model of 
the contributing factors to successful Distributed Collaboration (Figure 4.1) along with 
the resulting benefits.  
Chapter 5 outlined the results of an exploratory study with industry participants and their 
experience of the challenges in Distributed Collaboration. Semi-structured interviews 





Collaboration. Rather than dealing with the ideal scenario of successful Distributed Col-
laboration as is presented in Figure 4.1, this chapter discussed the reality of this type of 
work with industry participants and presented their insights. This chapter gives a perspec-
tive of the day-to-day operations of Distributed Collaboration, specifically Low-Inclusion 
/ Low-Competition. While this study found that Blockchain could enable this form of 
Distributed Collaboration, it was not an ideal solution, therefore, I decided to focus on 
High-Inclusion / High-Competition in the next chapter.  
Chapter 6 presented the second iteration of DSR. This chapter built on the foundation of 
knowledge developed in Chapters 4 and 5 by developing a system instantiation which 
implements the theoretical construct of Creative Ancestry. The system was built using 
smart contracts on the Ethereum Blockchain network and evaluated by 121 participants. 
The two main contributions of this chapter are the artefacts developed. First, the construct 
of Creative Ancestry which provided a mechanism to improve perceptions of fairness in 
Distributed Collaboration by increasing transparency of individual contributions. Second, 
a Blockchain-enabled system instantiation which implemented Creative Ancestry. This 
paper not only shows that Blockchain can enable Distributed Collaboration but also how 






Figure 7.1 Thesis Conceptual Structure 
7.3 Thesis Contributions 
The following sections will illustrate the main contributions of this thesis. In keeping with 
the overall objective of this research, the contributions presented are multidisciplinary in 
their nature, providing valuable insights to researchers and practitioners alike with interest 
in Distributed Collaboration as an innovative working arrangement, as well as Blockchain 
as a disruptive, emerging technology. 
As stated already, the overall research objective of this thesis is to explore Distributed 
Collaboration and the potential of Blockchain as an enabling technology. In keeping with 
this objective, the contributions of this research relate first, to Distributed Collaboration 
and how my research examines this as a social construct. Second, this thesis extends our 
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understanding of how Distributed Collaboration is facilitated by technology. Addition-
ally, my research contributes to our understanding of Blockchain, its applications beyond 
finance, the need to differentiate the technology from cryptocurrencies, and the novelty 
of Blockchain systems versus traditional technologies. 
Table 7.1 Thesis Contributions  
Contribution Value Add 
An analysis of Distributed 
Collaboration as a social 
construct. 
This examines multiple forms of Distributed 
Collaboration and the common elements which 
lead to their success. 
An assessment of the role of 
technology in collaborative 
groups. 
This provides an overview of how technology 
facilitated the evolution of collaboration from 
co-located to distributed environments.  
Feasibility study of the 
application of Blockchain 
technology for non-financial use-
cases. 
Illustrates the steps involved in applying 
Blockchain to a use-case. 
The need to differentiate 
Blockchain technology from 
cryptocurrencies. 
This emphasises the different value propositions 
offered by opposing Blockchain networks. 
Highlighting the unique user 
experience of Blockchain-enabled 
application. 
This informs researchers and practitioners about 
how a Blockchain-enabled system operates 
differently compared to traditional systems. 
First, I will present how my research has contributed to the theoretical understanding of 
Distributed Collaboration as a social construct. Chapter 4 presents a definition of Dis-
tributed Collaboration, the pursuit of a shared objective by groups that include non-prox-
imate members, whose participation is facilitated by ICT. This definition stresses the so-
cial element of Distributed Collaboration as it requires coordinated participation from 
multiple members. Figure 7.3 details how my research has examined the social elements 
of Distributed Collaboration. I believe that examining Distributed Collaboration in this 
manner has revealed that a common determinant for successful Distributed Collaboration 






Figure 7.2 Distributed Collaboration as a social construct 
Chapter 2 argues that, distributed collaborators interacting in a market context are prone 
to herding behaviour, i.e. when some agents imitate the prior actions (Cakan et al., 2019; 
Deng et al., 2018; Rompotis, 2018) and social amplification of risk, which is where people 
tend to over or under-react to risk when it must be evaluated based on social observations 
(Kasperson et al., 1988). This shows the effects of information asymmetry across an entire 
market. In the absence of established mechanisms, market participants have been unable 
to evaluate Blockchain in an efficient manner.  
Chapter 4 presented the human elements necessary for successful collaboration as en-
demic-social and relational-social factors (Figure 4.1). Endemic-social factors represent 
the characteristics of the individual collaborator, such as leadership skills (Oh et al., 2016; 
Pauleen, 2003) and personality (Brown et al., 2004). Relational-social represents how 
members of the group interact with one another, including shared understanding within 
the group (Mathieu et al., 2000; Minas et al., 2014; Park et al., 2019) and effective coor-
dination among group members (Espinosa et al., 2007; Lindberg et al., 2016; Yang et al., 
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2015). Relational-social factors, in particular, illustrate the need for transparency across 
the group. Successful Distributed Collaboration results when members have a shared ob-
jective, and their efforts are appropriately coordinated. 
While the model presented in Figure 4.1 illustrated successful Distributed Collaboration, 
Chapter 5 discussed the social challenges of these groups. Free-riding occurs when team 
members decrease their own efforts and expect others to pick up the slack (Suleiman & 
Watson, 2008), this can be due to a belief that one’s contribution is dispensable and does 
not contribute to the success of the group (Dennis & Valacich, 1993; George, 1992; 
Kudrowitz & Wallace, 2013; Paulus, 2000). Evaluation apprehension deters an individual 
from contributing for fear of embarrassment, hostile evaluation, the pressure to conform 
as well as other social forces (Collaros & Anderson, 1969; McGrath, 2015; Paulus, 2000). 
Production blocking occurs when members do not have the opportunity to contribute their 
ideas, thus reducing productivity in collaborative groups (Camacho & Paulus, 1995; 
Dennis & Valacich, 1993; Diehl & Stroebe, 1987). These challenges are ultimately the 
result of information asymmetry where individuals are unaware if they will have the op-
portunity to contribute, how their contributions will be received by their peers, and how 
their contributions affect the overall group objective. Reducing contributions from mem-
bers will have a negative effect on the potential benefits which result from Distributed 
Collaboration, for example mutual learning (Figure 4.1) as ideas will not be generated, 
shared, and recombined to create synergies.  
Finally, Chapter 6 proposed that Blockchain could facilitate Creative Ancestry, i.e. the 
ability of a collaborative system to take some particular output of note and navigate back-
wards through the individual contributions that preceded it in a consistently structured, 





or social justice, thereby ensuring the success of collaborative groups (Son & Kim, 2008; 
Wasko & Faraj, 2000). Creative Ancestry is a proposed solution to the information asym-
metry which can exist in Distributed Collaboration. By providing a transparent, immuta-
ble record of contributions across the entire network of collaborators, members are aware 
of how their efforts determine the success of the entire group. This enables a number of 
factors which are listed in Figure 4.1 as central to successful Distributed Collaboration, 
for example implementing knowledge tracking fulfilment, motivating further knowledge 
sharing, and improving task specific alignment. 
The second contribution of this research relates to our theoretical understanding of the 
role of technology and its potential to support collaboration. This thesis not only analyses 
the potential of Blockchain in enabling Distributed Collaboration, as is stated in the re-
search objective but also illustrates the evolving role of technology in facilitating collab-
oration. Figure 7.3 illustrates how the changing nature of collaboration from co-located 
groups to distributed environments and the role of technology to support this. 
 
Figure 7.3 The evolving role of technology in enabling collaboration 
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The development and growth of the world-wide-web is commonly categorised under 
three generations; originally, The Web of Documents consisted primarily of static HTML 
pages, following this, The Web of People, provided a more dynamic, social environment 
where people could share information with one another, today, The Web of Data aims to 
run on individually developed smart applications (Hiremath & Kenchakkanavar, 2016; 
Patel, 2013). 
The way in which we collaborate with one another has developed in concert with the 
progression through each generation of the web. The Web of Documents created an op-
portunity for electronic brainstorming whereby individuals could contribute to a group 
electronically rather than waiting for their chance to speak in a group setting (Dennis & 
Valacich, 1993; Gallupe et al., 1992; Nijstad et al., 2003; Paulus & Yang, 2000).  
The Web of People created a social web environment where people could both read and 
write information. This generation of the web led to the emergence of online communities 
and virtual teams where dispersed contributors worked via wikis, blogs, and open-source 
software initiatives (Colazo & Fang, 2010; Forte et al., 2009; Ransbotham & Kane, 2011; 
Von Krogh et al., 2012). The Web of People facilitated what I have defined in this thesis 
as Distributed Collaboration. 
My research has illustrated the potential of Blockchain to offer an enhanced solution to 
support Distributed Collaboration. These findings demonstrate how the nature of collab-
oration can change dramatically with emerging technologies, which are largely focused 
on enhancing participation and collaboration (Garrigos-Simon, Lapiedra Alcami, & 
Barbera Ribera, 2012). The Web of Data will be built on smart contracts and smart appli-





Kenchakkanavar, 2016; Patel, 2013). This next generation of the web focuses on empow-
ering the individual in an increasingly distributed environment. 
Third, my thesis represents a comprehensive feasibility study of the application of Block-
chain for a non-financial use-case, the process of which is illustrated in Figure 7.4. Block-
chain technology has garnered increased interest over recent years, primarily for its ap-
plications in finance and related fields, as is demonstrated by Holub and Johnson (2018). 
However, a number of major industry members have also invested R&D resources in 
exploring the application of Blockchain for diverse use-cases (Beck et al., 2016).  
 
Figure 7.4 Process of applying Blockchain to a non-financial use-case 
Previous studies have detailed efforts to build and evaluate Blockchain applications for a 
variety of applications including Beck et al. (2016) which built a proof-of-concept Block-
chain application coffee shop payment solution and Beck et al. (2018) which explored the 
Swarm City Blockchain case which provides a Blockchain infrastructure for the sharing 
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Concerns persist regarding perceptions of fairness in these groups. Individuals 





Creative Ancestry clearly added to perceptions of fairness and the favourability of 
outcomes. Blockchain ensures inspectability, consistent structures, immutability, 





economy. My thesis extends this work by going beyond focusing on the design and de-
velopment of a Blockchain-enabled system and understanding its role as an enabler of 
Distributed Collaboration. First, I present a comprehensive understanding of Distributed 
Collaboration, the domain for which Blockchain may serve as an enabling technology. 
This is essential in any feasibility study to understand the as-is process and identify any 
inadequacies. I execute this by conducting both a systematic literature review of the ex-
isting research in this domain and also, carrying out exploratory interviews with industry 
participants with first-hand experience of the daily operations of distributed groups.  
These steps identified a number of weaknesses which exist in the current approach. Spe-
cifically, concerns persist whether these Distributed Collaborations do enough to recog-
nise individual contributions (Wang & Fesenmaier, 2003). This is important, as many 
individuals require some form of formal or informal acknowledgement (Wasko & Faraj, 
2005). Hence, perceived fairness, or social justice has been found to be a key element in 
ensuring the success of collaborative groups (Son & Kim, 2008; Wasko & Faraj, 2000; 
Wu & Chiu, 2018). Yet it is not clear how such fairness can be accommodated. 
Once a sufficient knowledge of the existing use-case has been demonstrated, the next step 
was to illustrate that Blockchain could serve as an enabling technology. This involved 
two sub-processes. First, I harnessed the work of Wüst and Gervais (2017) which detailed 
if Blockchain is an appropriate solution for Distributed Collaboration, this discussion is 
detailed in Appendix 9.1. Second, assured that Blockchain could support Distributed Col-
laboration, I analysed the benefits it would offer. These are presented in Appendix 9.3.  
Third, having formed a foundational understanding of Distributed Collaboration and es-
tablished that Blockchain would, the final step was to show how Blockchain can enable 





of the design and development of a Blockchain-enabled system to track individual con-
tributions. This study presents Distributed Collaboration as a supply chain relationship 
between dispersed collaborators exchanging intellectual property. The immutability, 
traceability, and transparency afforded by Blockchain make it an ideal technology for 
managing such relationships. I believe this research could inform practitioners looking to 
apply Blockchain to any supply chain use-case.  
The fourth contribution of my thesis is, throughout my research, I found that because of 
widespread media attention, Blockchain is synonymous with Bitcoin and cryptocurren-
cies. Therefore, participants limited knowledge was often sullied by a negative or false 
predisposition towards the technology and its potential. I believe that there is a need to 
disentangle Blockchain from cryptocurrencies. Although there is a symbiotic relationship 
between Blockchain and cryptocurrencies as an instantiation of that technology, the term 
‘cryptocurrency’ carries primarily financial connotations, which therefore, is not fully 
representative of Blockchains potential.  
Different cryptocurrencies have disparate purposes, for instance, Bitcoin was introduced 
by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 as a “peer-to-peer version of electronic cash”, intending to 
be a viable alternative to the traditional financial system and allow people to buy and sell 
products and services in exchange for Bitcoin. Bitcoin has been the leading cryptocur-
rency ever since, and as a result a common misunderstanding is that all cryptocurrencies 
are also a form of alternative finance.  
However, Ether, the cryptocurrency of the Ethereum network, has a vastly different value 
proposition. Unlike Bitcoin, Ether is not intended to act as a token of exchange for good 
and services; rather it is seen as a “fuel” to run the smart contract development platform 





developers perceived to be a weakness in Bitcoin, that Bitcoin transactions could not sup-
port smart contracts. A smart contract is a piece of code that the Ethereum Virtual Ma-
chine (EVM) is able to execute on the Blockchain. By supporting smart contracts, 
Ethereum increases the potential of Blockchain beyond just finance to any number of use-
cases including intellectual property, health care, supply chain management and, legal. 
The juxtaposition of cryptocurrencies and Blockchain was especially pronounced during 
my research as the cryptocurrency market experienced unprecedented growth in 2017. 
Bitcoin reported a rise in price of over 1300% in 2017 while the price of Ether increased 
by more than 9,000% the same year. My research certainly benefited as a result of this 
increased interest in all things Blockchain and cryptocurrency as I had ample opportuni-
ties to present my work and discuss my opinions on the topic with those who wanted to 
learn more. However, it quickly became apparent that the majority of people I encoun-
tered had exaggerated expectations for the potential of cryptocurrencies. The term 
‘HODL’ became popular online during this bullish period in the cryptocurrency market, 
it is assumed to be an acronym for Hold On for Dear Life, which I believe to be the perfect 
metaphor for the failure of most people to see the potential of Blockchain and instead 
rush into the market expecting to turn an easy profit. From personal anecdotal evidence I 
can say that the majority of people who bought cryptocurrency in 2017 never used their 
Bitcoin to pay for a coffee and, struggled to pronounce Ethereum, never mind develop or 
even interact with a smart contract application. When the bubble inevitably burst in 2018, 






The fifth contribution of this thesis is a discussion of the unique user experience involved 
when interacting with Blockchain-based applications compared to traditional technolo-
gies. The study presented in Chapter 6 involved 121 participants interacting with my 
Blockchain-enabled system, the vast majority of whom had never experienced such a 
system before. In order to overcome this issue, it was necessary to first, give each group 
an overview of Blockchain, and second, to design the system to be as interactive and 
intuitive as possible. 
When giving an overview of the technology, I had a number of topics to cover — first, 
the rise of Blockchain, its relationship with Bitcoin, and the emergence of Ethereum. Sec-
ond, smart contracts, their benefits but also their limitations. Third, the importance of 
code correctness in smart contracts and the importance of a solution which requires 
Blockchain rather than Blockchain being a solution looking for a problem. Fourth, I 
would introduce the novel features of a Blockchain application such as the latency of 
Blockchain transactions, the transparency of Blockchain transactions, the cost of trans-
acting on the Ethereum network, and the pseudonymity of users. 
In designing the system, I made an effort to make these elements of Blockchain as intui-
tive as possible. Starting with the pseudonymity of users, I built my system on the 
Ethereum network, a public, permissionless network, meaning that anyone can join and 
access the network. Ethereum users are represented by a persistent alphanumeric account 
address for example “0x627306090abab3a6e1400e9345bc60c78a8bef57”. The persis-
tence is key here as it means users are not strictly anonymous as all their transactions 
correspond to the same account address. However, with 121 participants it can be difficult 
to distinguish between different users. Therefore, for the purpose of display all users were 





with their Ethereum account address. Transactions then rendered alongside a readable 
username rather than an alphanumeric string. I found this to be the most effective way of 
highlighting the benefit of pseudonymity. 
The next challenge to address was how users would complete transactions on my system. 
Transaction refers to posting on the system, just as you would on a traditional system 
such as Twitter. There are three unique elements to a Blockchain transaction when com-
pared to traditional technologies: transaction cost; transaction latency; transaction trans-
parency. All three elements were facilitated by a simple Google Chrome extension I used 
called Metamask. Metamask acts as a bridge to allow users to access the Ethereum net-
work and interact with dApps on their browser. In order to submit a transaction on the 
system, users first had to ‘top-up’ their Metamask accounts in order to pay for the cost of 
their transaction. Participants in each of our demo sessions started by funding their Meta-
mask accounts by requesting ether from a faucet (https://faucet.metamask.io/). This is a 
foreign concept to any user of internet technologies as we have become accustomed to 
free internet usage. However, the integrity of the Ethereum distributed ledger is main-
tained by multiple nodes executing computations which consume a lot of energy. There-
fore, they require reimbursement for their efforts in the form of these transaction costs. I 
found that this resulted in users justifying their posts before executing them and paying 
the necessary price. The cost involved in Blockchain-based transactions may introduce a 
unique set of challenges for Blockchain-enabled applications, analysing and overcoming 
these challenges was deemed out of scope for my research, this will be discussed further 





Once the cost is overcome, users were faced with another novel experience, transaction 
latency. Time is necessary in order to allow for a distributed network to maintain con-
sistent integrity of data across the entire network. In the case of Ethereum, this latency 
period is roughly 15 seconds. I found that participants struggled to adapt to this and were 
concerned when their posts were not immediately rendering on screen. However, Meta-
mask does provide status updates on all transactions which helped reassure users that 
everything was working as expected and users became increasingly comfortable as time 
progressed.  
Finally, transaction transparency was an important feature of Blockchain that I made an 
effort to illustrate to participants. I built my system on a public, permissionless network, 
meaning that all users could view all transactions, not just their own, through their 
browser (https://ropsten.etherscan.io/address/0xc3c543fec8531bc10dda16e1c39aa34d3cf094b5). 
Participants enjoyed the ability to dig deeper into the transaction details and see who sent 
a transaction, when transactions were confirmed, and how much they cost. 
Overall, my research has made contributions to literature from diverse fields. First, in the 
field of Distributed Collaboration. While existing research has focused on specific factors 
which influence the success of Distributed Collaboration, for example trust (Jarvenpaa et 
al., 2004; Ridings et al., 2002), leadership (Eseryel & Eseryel, 2013; Johnson et al., 2015; 
Kayworth & Leidner, 2002) and communication (Bartelt & Dennis, 2014; Sarker et al., 
2011), my research synthesis these findings to provide a single definition of Distributed 
Collaboration and a core model for its success. 
Second, my research extends our understanding of the role of social justice and perceived 
fairness in collaboration. Perceived fairness, or social justice has been found to be a key 





2000; Wu & Chiu, 2018). My research has found this to be true for Distributed Collabo-
ration and illustrated the potential of Blockchain to facilitate this. In addition, this research 
contributes to an emerging body of research which explores the implementation of Block-
chain-enabled applications (Beck et al., 2016; Beck et al., 2018). 
Third, my research builds on an emerging body of extant literature which has found vol-
atility connectedness and herding behaviour in the cryptocurrency market, especially in 
periods of uncertainty (Bouri et al., 2018; da Gama Silva et al., 2019; Stavroyiannis & 
Babalos, 2019; Vidal-Tomás et al., 2018; Yi et al., 2018). This study contributes to the 
existing research by extending the findings on herding in the market through the applica-
tion of the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF). SARF is traditionally ap-
plied when researching responses to disaster situations, explaining how individuals rely 
on social observation in situations where the stakes are high and information is limited 
(Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996; Renn et al., 1992). I applied SARF to my research to 
show how participants in the cryptocurrency market also lack complete information, and 
therefore, rely on social observations when evaluating cryptocurrencies. 
7.4 Limitations of the thesis 
Although I am satisfied that the research outlined in this thesis has been executed to a 
high standard and has made significant contributions to both research and practice, all of 
which have been outlined in detail above, I also acknowledge that there will inevitably be 
limitations which must be taken into consideration when assessing this work. 
First, I draw attention to limitations in relation to size and scope. By size and scope, I 
refer to a number of factors which were considered throughout my studies. Distributed 
Collaboration is a broad term I have applied in this research to encapsulate a large spec-





in Figure 7.1. Although I believe findings from my research can be applied to all forms 
of Distributed Collaboration, for the purpose of this research I made the decision to focus 
on one area in particular, which I define as being ‘High-Inclusion / High-Competition’, 
this is discussed in detail in Appendix 9.2.  
Another element relating to size and scope, which I accept to be a limitation of my re-
search is the limited scope of my evaluation methods. I conducted exploratory interviews 
in an intraorganizational Distributed Collaboration environment. For the purpose of con-
sistency and ease of data collection, these interviews were conducted within a single mul-
tinational organisation, referred to as ‘DE Computers’. Also, when evaluating the proof-
of-concept Blockchain platform, it was evaluated in a simulated environment, perhaps 
alternative results could have been yielded had this been implemented within an organi-
sation or an established collaborative group over a longer period of time. 
Second, this research has focused on the application of Blockchain and cryptocurrencies, 
an emerging area which has experienced significant research and development in recent 
years; therefore, I must acknowledge and accept the limitations associated. As has been 
outlined throughout this thesis, Blockchain is simply the technology which underpins 
cryptocurrencies and smart contract development platforms. Blockchain itself comes in 
many flavours, the primary options being public vs private Blockchains. This research 
has exclusively leveraged public Blockchains, primarily focusing on Bitcoin, Ethereum 
and Litecoin. The reasons for this choice have been discussed in the appropriate Chapters. 
Ethereum is the first major cryptocurrency to establish itself as a smart contract develop-
ment platform. Also, due to its open-source nature and ever-growing community of de-
velopers it was an obvious choice to use for POC development. I do acknowledge the 





offer over public Blockchains, especially for large, established organisations who are con-
cerned with security and scalability issues associated with Blockchain.  
As for the cryptocurrencies studied, Bitcoin is the leading cryptocurrency and most re-
nowned application of Blockchain technology. Bitcoin has held this position consistently 
for the duration of this research effort and has paved the way for all subsequent develop-
ments; therefore, overlooking Bitcoin would be ill-advised. Litecoin was arguably the 
first and leading ‘altcoin’, a brand of cryptocurrency which took advantage of the open-
source nature of Bitcoin; therefore, I chose Litecoin as a representation of this fragment 
of the overall cryptocurrency market. 
Third, through developing the second iteration of the system instantiation presented in 
Chapter 6 I found that the concept of incurring a cost for transactions on a Blockchain-
enabled system could pose additional challenges for the users of the system. Analysing 
these challenges and how they could be overcome was considered out of scope for my 
research, however I must acknowledge their potential impact. The system presented in 
this Chapter 6 facilitates idea generation through a Blockchain-enabled application. When 
the user is faced with a cost for contributing to the system, they may deem that their 
contribution no longer makes economic sense, thus reducing the knowledge shared within 
the group, a factor which I have identified as key to the success of collaborative groups 
(Figure 4.1). Additionally, if users are required to fund their own accounts, less wealthy 
individuals will be affected more than affluent users.  
7.5 Opportunities for Further Research  
In light of the contributions this research has made thus far to the field of Distributed 
Collaboration and Blockchain as a technology, as well as the limitations of this research 





pace as this area continues to grow and develop. Unfortunately, there came the point 
where I had to draw a line in the sand and deem certain avenues of beyond the scope of 
this body of work. I would now like to take the opportunity to suggest a selection of these 
topics as areas for potential future research efforts to build on the contributions which I 
have made. 
First, the scope and potential for distributed groups to organise, collaborate and produce 
seem to be growing at an exponential rate. With the emergence of the Web of Data, Dis-
tributed Collaboration, as has been presented in this thesis could change dramatically. 
The evolution of a semantic web is believed to allow for the development of machine 
learning and artificial intelligence (O’Reilly, 2007). Not only will individuals be able to 
communicate and collaborate from anywhere on the globe, but also machines will be able 
to communicate with one another. The continued adoption of VR and AR technologies 
has the potential to greatly improve media richness and communication between dis-
persed members (Baccon, Chiarovano, & MacDougall, 2019; Campbell, Holz, Cosgrove, 
Harlick, & O’Sullivan, 2019; Rosedale, 2017), which could help overcome many of the 
challenges discussed throughout this research.  
Second, although I am proud of my efforts to conduct this research with an action-oriented 
approach by building, testing and, evaluating a Blockchain-enabled system, I accept that 
the system was tested under a limited time frame. This was largely due to the maturity of 
the technology at the time of development as well as the low levels of end-user knowledge 
of Blockchain systems. Blockchain-enabled solutions are now becoming more common 
with large organisations expressing their interests in developing with the technology; it is 
expected that such systems will be rolled out into production in the coming years. There-





research with a more robust solution which could be implemented within a Distributed 
Collaboration environment over an extended period of time in order to perhaps capture 
more detailed results.  
Third, it would also be beneficial to research the potential for a private Blockchain solu-
tion to enable Distributed Collaboration. I chose to implement a solution using the 
Ethereum network as a public, permissionless network allowed for fast, affordable devel-
opment. Also, at the time of development, Ethereum itself was in its infancy, and there 
were not a lot of established alternatives to choose from, this is no longer the case. Future 
research should assess their options and build on the network, which they feel best facil-
itates their desired solution. 
Of course, as well as increased options for Blockchain development platforms, the cryp-
tocurrency market upon which many of these networks are evaluated by an open market 
is also continually growing due to the open-source nature of many cryptocurrency proto-
cols. This research and the results presented within are representative of the state of this 
field at the time of writing. Considering the pace of expansion, I acknowledge that the 
specific details of these results will be outdated soon after this work has been completed. 
To illustrate this point, upon commencing this research there were 590 cryptocurrencies 
overall and the price of the three which I have largely focused on, Bitcoin, Ether and 
Litecoin stood at $629, $13, $4 respectively, At the time of writing this conclusion, there 
over 2300 cryptocurrencies in circulation and the prices of Bitcoin, Ether and Litecoin 
stand approximately $10,000, $200, $90 respectively. Future researchers will likely pro-






Finally, with such rapid growth, there also comes increased threats to Blockchain, both 
in the form of competing solutions and threats to the security of the network. One of the 
leading technologies looking to compete with Blockchain at the time of writing is Hash-
graphs. Hashgraphs boast a solution which also provides consensus in the form of a public 
ledger, however, it claims to have far greater transaction throughput (250,000 tps vs 7-10 
tps), better cost and performance as it does not waste resources as is the case with proof-
of-work mining mechanisms which are implemented in Blockchain networks, and im-
proved fairness of transactions as they are serialised and timestamped as they happen 
rather than being grouped in blocks and batch verified as occurs in Blockchain (Baird, 
Harmon, & Madsen, 2018; Choe, 2018; Hoxha, 2018). As for threats to the security of 
Blockchain networks, quantum computing is the focus of extensive research efforts which 
believe that it could potentially break the security mechanisms which maintain the net-
work, in particular, asymmetric cryptography. In simple terms, asymmetric cryptography 
relies on the difficulty of prime factorisation, i.e. the breaking up of a number into its 
factors, all of which are prime (Shor, 1999). Since finding prime factors of extremely 
large numbers is virtually impossible for classical computers, Blockchains are essentially 
tamper-proof (Kiktenko et al., 2018). However, Shor’s algorithm shows that quantum 
computers, using superposition, could perform prime factorisation in polynomial time 
rather than exponential time (Shor, 1999), potentially exposing the security of Blockchain 
networks. Threats such as these will inevitably change the landscape of Blockchain and 





7.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
Finally, I am very pleased to have taken the opportunity to conduct my research in an 
emerging and exciting domain. This research presented an opportunity for me to distin-
guish myself from others, I believe that I have achieved this and through the work I have 
completed over the past three years. Adopting a selection of different research approaches 
allowed me to experience both Blockchain and Distributed Collaboration from multiple 
perspectives, develop a rich understanding of each, and contribute to the research and 
practitioner communities by continuously collaborating and communicating my findings. 
I am looking forward to applying the knowledge I have accumulated from my research in 
an industry setting as this domain develops further over the coming years.  
Thank you for taking the time to review my research, I hope you enjoyed it and found the 
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Chapter 9. Appendix 
9.1 Blockchain Decision Model 
The application of Blockchain to a particular use-case can be guilty of being a solution 
looking for a problem. In order to avoid this criticism of my work I adapted the decision 
model put forward by Wüst and Gervais (2017), to analyse the appropriateness of Block-
chain to enable Distributed Collaboration. Figure 9.1 illustrates the steps in the model and 
the decisions as they relate to Distributed Collaboration. 
 
Figure 9.1 Blockchain Decision Model adapted from (Wüst & Gervais, 2017) 
The definition of Creative Ancestry detailed in Chapter 5 addresses the requirement of 
storing state/data in this use-case; the ability of a collaborative system to take some par-
ticular output of note and navigate backwards through the individual contributions that 





eluded to previously, a major benefit of Distributed Collaboration is that it attracts multi-
ple parties from across the world with diverse interests and skills (Cormode & Krishna-
murthy, 2008; Faraj & Sproull, 2000; Howe, 2006; Surowiecki, 2004). Therefore, we can 
be sure that the use-case involves multiple parties who may not know one another, all 
requiring write-access to the system. The distributed nature of these teams also makes 
trust more difficult to establish between members as individuals struggle to develop rela-
tionships with one another (affective trust) and assess one another competencies (cogni-
tive trust) (Altschuller & Benbunan-Fich, 2013; Iacono & Weisband, 1997; Kanawat-
tanachai & Yoo, 2002). Another challenge which Distributed Collaboration must over-
come is free-riding, which results from the lack of face-to-face interaction in these envi-
ronments leading to reduced accountability (Bandura et al., 1996; Boughzala et al., 2012). 
Again, through smart contracts and the public verifiability of a solution built on a public 
Blockchain such as Ethereum, this issue can be eradicated (Beck et al., 2018; Nair & 
Sutter, 2018).   
The final factor to consider is whether or not a solution could be delivered using a Trusted 
Third Party (TTP) which would be built on a centralised database. TTP solutions such as 
GitHub, Wikipedia, Innocentive, or any intra-organization solution to name a few already 
exist to facilitate Distributed Collaboration. However, we argue that these centralised so-
lutions still have weaknesses. First, storing all contributions on a centralised storage sys-
tem can be a security risk both from software and hardware attacks. Blockchain increases 
fault tolerance and availability of the system as one node failing will not bring down the 
entire network (Beck et al., 2016; Lewis, Larsen, & Goh, 2016; Pahl et al., 2018). TTP 
solutions accommodate niche use-cases. However, Distributed Collaboration is known 





record of all their contributions across multiple projects they have worked on, again 
Blockchain offers a solution to this (Hawlitschek et al., 2018; Locher et al., 2018). Block-
chain provides increased transparency so contributors can verify that their contributions 
have been recorded (Beck et al., 2017b; Nair & Sutter, 2018). We utilised this in our POC, 
as detailed in Chapter 5. All contributions from the workshops we conducted in this 
study can be verified through a web browser. Finally, in an intra-organizational solution, 
the trusted third party is usually management; however, employees still feel they do not 
receive appropriate recognition for their contributions (Chidambaram & Tung, 2005). 
Blockchain can improve this as it allows for ‘the creation of trust without the need for a 
concrete third-party watcher who has vested authority and impartiality’ (Nair & Sutter, 
2018). Blockchain shifts the focus of trust from trust with an institution to trust in the 
technology (Beck et al., 2017b). Also, smart contracts could extend this by automatically 
rewarding contributors when certain conditions are met (Beck et al., 2016; Beck et al., 
2018; Walsh et al., 2016). 
9.2 Forms of Distributed Collaboration 
As presented in Chapter 3, Distributed Collaboration is defined as the pursuit of a shared 
objective by groups that include non-proximate members, whose participation is facili-
tated by ICT. According to this definition, Distributed Collaboration encapsulates a large 
class of applications, servicing disparate purposes. We attempt to categorise and illustrate 
these different use-cases in Figure 9.2 below.  
We have identified forms of Distributed Collaboration along two axes; the range of col-
laboration participation and, the competition between inputs. The range of collaboration 





group with each new contributor. In Figure 9.2 we use Open Source Software as an ex-
ample of Distributed Collaboration with a relatively low range of collaboration participa-
tion. OSS benefits from the Distributed Collaboration as technology enables that the best 
individuals to work together on the development of software (Chou & He, 2011; Lin, 
2006). However, all contributors require a background in software development. Appli-
cations such as Wikipedia benefit from Distributed Collaboration not only because it con-
nects talented individuals, but also because contributors often have assorted backgrounds 
and introduce novel perspectives (Kittur, Chi, Pendleton, Suh, & Mytkowicz, 2007; Tap-
scott & Williams, 2008). 
Along the horizontal axis of Figure 9.2 we categorise Distributed Collaboration by the 
level of competition between individuals’ inputs. Examples such as OSS and Wikipedia 
allow for individuals to build on top of one another’s contributions and create a product 
or service which contains multiple individual contributions (Howison & Crowston, 2014; 
Kyriakou, Nickerson, & Sabnis, 2017; Ransbotham & Kane, 2011). As the level of com-
petition between inputs increases, individual contributions are more independent of one 
another. For example, Threadless is an online t-shirt company that crowdsources the de-
sign process for its shirts through an ongoing online competition (Brabham, 2010). Each 
contribution is an individual design, and each contribution competes with one another to 
receive the highest number of votes. However, similar to OSS, this form of Distributed 
Collaboration requires a certain level of design competency. An example of Distributed 
Collaboration which includes competition between inputs as well as a range of collabo-
ration participation is Walker’s ‘Do Us a Flavour’ competition (Forbes & Schaefer, 





of Distributed Collaboration here is that multiple contributions coming from diverse 
backgrounds as there are no obvious prerequisite skills to suggest a new flavour.  
The POC developed in Chapter 5 facilitates Distributed Collaboration with high levels 
of both ranges of collaboration participation as well as competition between inputs. With 
the increase in competition in these use-cases there is also increased incentive to act dis-
honestly (Cartwright & Menezes, 2014; Rick et al., 2008). Therefore, we propose that the 
addition of Creative Ancestry will inflate perceptions of fairness and, overall quality in 
the collaboration.   
 





























9.3 Benefits of Blockchain as they relate to Distributed Collaboration 
We conducted a brief systematic literature review of journal papers related to Blockchain, 
published in the last ten years. We searched for papers in four academic databases; AIS 
Electronic Library, Web of Science, ProQuest, and Google Scholar, paying particular at-
tention to studies published in the “IS Senior Scholars Basket”, an approach recom-
mended by previous studies (Alter, 2018; Steininger, 2018). From our analysis of the 
prior literature we were able to determine several benefits which are provided by Block-
chain technology. We then categorised these benefits as they relate to; the ability of 
Blockchain to capture individual contributions, the performance of a Blockchain system 
for Distributed Collaboration, the ability of a system to prevent malicious behaviour in a 
collaborative environment, and the ability of the system to manage interactions among 
collaborators. A complete record of the benefits we found is presented in Table 9.1 below. 
Table 9.1 Review of the benefits of Blockchain as they relate to Distributed Collabora-
tion 

























(Marten Risius, 2017) (Hyvärinen et al., 2017) (Nofer, Gomber, 
Hinz, & Schiereck, 2017) (Cholewa & Shanmugam, 2017) (Nie-
derman et al., 2017) (Avital, 2018) (Mendling, Decker, Richard, 
Hajo, & Ingo, 2018) (Lacity, 2018) (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017) 
(Wang et al., 2018) (Moyano & Ross, 2017) (Gozman, Liebenau, 
& Mangan, 2018) (Gomber, Kauffman, Parker, & Weber, 2018) 
(Egelund-Müller, Elsman, Henglein, & Ross, 2017) (Mendling et 
al., 2018) (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017) (Zheng et al., 2018a) 
(Clemons, Dewan, Kauffman, & Weber, 2017) 
Prevent Dou-
ble Spend 
(Hyvärinen et al., 2017) (Cholewa & Shanmugam, 2017) (Yuan, 
Xia, Chen, Zang, & Xie, 2018) (Gao et al., 2018) (Derks, Gordijn, 








(Marten Risius, 2017) (Egelund-Müller et al., 2017) (Nofer et 
al., 2017) (Cholewa & Shanmugam, 2017) (Mendling et al., 
2018) (Yuan et al., 2018) (Lacity, 2018) (Moyano & Ross, 2017) 
(Gao et al., 2018) (Beck et al., 2018) (Hyvärinen et al., 2017) 
(Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017) (Zheng et al., 2018a) (Derks et al., 
2018) (Gozman et al., 2018) (Clemons et al., 2017)  
Immutability (Marten Risius, 2017) (Hyvärinen et al., 2017) (Cholewa & 
Shanmugam, 2017) (Mendling et al., 2018) (Yuan et al., 2018) 
(Lacity, 2018) (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017) (Wang et al., 2018) 
(Moyano & Ross, 2017) (Gao et al., 2018) (Gozman et al., 2018) 
(Clemons et al., 2017) (Gomber et al., 2018) 
Accessibility (Marten Risius, 2017) (Hyvärinen et al., 2017) (Cholewa & 













(Marten Risius, 2017) (Hyvärinen et al., 2017) (Wang et al., 
2018) (Moyano & Ross, 2017) 
Modularity (Marten Risius, 2017) (Cholewa & Shanmugam, 2017) (Avital, 
2018) 
Reduce Costs (Hyvärinen et al., 2017) (Egelund-Müller et al., 2017) (Nofer et 
al., 2017) (Cholewa & Shanmugam, 2017) (Yuan et al., 2018) 
(Lacity, 2018) (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017) (Moyano & Ross, 
2017) (Gozman et al., 2018) (Gomber et al., 2018) (Beck et al., 
2018) 



























(Marten Risius, 2017) (Hyvärinen et al., 2017) (Beck, Avital, 
Rossi, & Thatcher, 2017a) (Avital, 2018) (Yuan et al., 2018) (Lac-
ity, 2018) (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017) (Zheng et al., 2018a) 
(Wang et al., 2018) (Gao et al., 2018) (Steininger, 2018) (Beck 
et al., 2018) 
Security (Hyvärinen et al., 2017) (Egelund-Müller et al., 2017) (Nofer et 
al., 2017) (Nofer et al., 2017) (Cholewa & Shanmugam, 2017) 
(Niederman et al., 2017) (Thatcher, Pu, & Pienta, 2018) (Avital, 
2018) (Yuan et al., 2018) (Lacity, 2018) (Tapscott & Tapscott, 
2017) (Zheng et al., 2018a) (Wang et al., 2018) (Gao et al., 
2018) (Derks et al., 2018) (Clemons et al., 2017) (Gomber et al., 
2018) (Beck et al., 2018) 






































(Marten Risius, 2017) (Nofer et al., 2017) (Beck et al., 2017a) 
(Cholewa & Shanmugam, 2017) (Niederman et al., 2017) 
(Thatcher et al., 2018) (Mendling et al., 2018) (Yuan et al., 
2018) (Lacity, 2018) (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017) (Zheng et al., 
2018a) (Wang et al., 2018) (Moyano & Ross, 2017) (Derks et 
al., 2018) (Clemons et al., 2017) (Gomber et al., 2018) (Stein-
inger, 2018) (Beck et al., 2018) (Hyvärinen et al., 2017) (Ege-
lund-Müller et al., 2017) (Avital, 2018) (Kane, 2016) (Gao et al., 
2018) (Steininger, 2018)  




(Hyvärinen et al., 2017) (Avital, 2018) (Moyano & Ross, 2017) 
Authentica-
tion 
(Hyvärinen et al., 2017) (Cholewa & Shanmugam, 2017) 







9.4 Technical Architecture of Blockchain Proof-of-Concept 
 
Figure 9.3 dApp Architecture, adapted from (Koppelmann, 2016) 
The three main technical components involved in the development were Amazon Web 
Services Elastic Cloud Compute (EC2) instance, the Web3 API, and Ropsten Ethereum 
testnet. 
Concerning Figure 9.3 above, the AWS EC2 instance is represented by the ‘DAPP - UI’ 
element. We created our user interface using traditional web development languages, 
HTML, CSS, PHP, and JavaScript. These were then hosted on the EC2 instance provided 
by AWS. 
We used the web3 object provided by the web3.js library to run the system on the 
Ethereum network. Behind the scenes it communicates to a local node through RPC (Re-
mote Procedure Call) calls, as web3.js is configured to work with any Ethereum node 
which exposes an RPC layer (Web3, 2017). In our instance the web3 interface was han-
dled using the Metamask extension for Google Chrome. Metamask allows users to run 





(Metamask, 2018). Metamask was essential in order for users to participate in our system 
demo. By hosting the front-end application on AWS, users were able to access the system 
from their machines, we then had each participant add the Metamask extension to their 
Chrome which allowed them to interact with the Blockchain-enabled application.  
The smart contracts were coded using Solidity and mined to the Ropsten Ethereum testnet 
(Appendix 9.6). The ropsten testnet is simply a version of the Ethereum network which 
is no different from the live network except for the fact that it was developed for testing 







9.5 Cutter Prediction Article – Cryptocurrency Adoption in 2018 
2017 was, without doubt, the breakout year for cryptocurrencies. As of 31 December 
2017, the total market cap was over US $614 billion; a week later, it reached an all-time 
high of over $820 billion (coinmarketcap.com, 2019). This wealth is spread across 1,340 
different cryptocurrencies, the leading two being Bitcoin and Ethereum with market caps 
of over $191 billion and $116 billion respectively, at the time of writing. Indeed, both 
Bitcoin and Ethereum have experienced incredible growth during the last 12 months. 
Bitcoin’s closing price as of 1 January 2017 was $958.70. It closed out the year at 
$14,156.40, representing a 1,477% rise, having reached a record high in December of 
$17,899.70. While Bitcoin grabbed most of the headlines due to its long-established po-
sition as the crypto-market leader, Ethereum outperformed Bitcoin in terms of percentage 
increase. The number two currency rose in value by 8,688% this year, from a closing 
price of $8.17 on New Year’s Day 2017 to $756.73 on New Year’s Eve. Naturally, these 
eye-watering figures have led to suggestions that the market is in a dangerous bubble that 
is about to pop. For instance, Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan stated that Bitcoin traders 
are “stupid” and if he were to catch one of his employees trading Bitcoin, that person 
would be fired on the spot (Son, Levitt, & Louis, 2017). 
This article focuses on Bitcoin and Ethereum and how 2018 will prove to be a make-or-
break year for both cryptocurrencies, where they will either continue to be viewed as 
highly volatile, speculative assets, or transition to commercially viable instantiations of 
Blockchain technology.  
The term “cryptocurrency” has been used to describe both currencies. However, they each 
represent unique Blockchain networks with disparate value propositions. Bitcoin is “[a] 





directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution” (Naka-
moto, 2008). Ethereum is “[a] decentralised platform that runs smart contracts: applica-
tions that run as programmed without any possibility of downtime, censorship, fraud, or 
third-party interference” (Ethereum, 2018). However, several studies have shown that us-
ers of the cryptocurrencies have only entered the market to trade the currencies as specu-
lative assets and to cash in on their returns for traditional fiat currency (Glaser et al., 
2014). Speculative trading is not the purpose of either currency or as the prices of both 
assets increase, their adoption for their originally intended purpose becomes less likely.  
The Winklevoss twins, widely known for their IP theft lawsuit with Facebook, recently 
became the first “Bitcoin Billionaires” (Morris, 2017). The brothers invested $11 million 
of their pay-out from Facebook into the cryptocurrency in April 2013. However, they 
have reportedly never sold a single coin, meaning that their crypto-portfolio is only worth 
a fortune on paper.  
The reality is that they still buy their coffees using US dollars. The cruel irony in all this 
is that if news broke that the Winklevoss twins had sold a portion of their holdings, it 
would likely be taken as a sign that they had lost confidence in the currency, leading to a 
mass sell-off in the market. In fact, despite widespread media attention focusing on 
Bitcoin, until it is possible to be paid in Bitcoin, and pay rent in Bitcoin, the cryptocur-
rency remains unsuccessful.  
9.5.1 Bitcoin and Ethereum: The Year Ahead  
As the price of Bitcoin continues to rise, retailers become more reluctant to accept it as a 
means of payment. For instance, online gaming service Steam announced in December 
that it would stop accepting Bitcoin payments, citing “high fees and volatility” as the 





North American Bitcoin Conference no longer accepts Bitcoin payments due to network 
congestion and manual processing (Price, 2018). Unfortunately, I predict that this trend 
will continue, and Bitcoin will struggle to be accepted as a viable alternative to fiat cur-
rencies.  
In addition to rising prices, increased transaction fees, and network congestion, another 
serious threat to Bitcoin adoption in 2018 will be energy consumption. Over the last 
month or so, media attention has increasingly focused on the amount of energy the Bitcoin 
network consumes during the proof-of-work (POW) mining process, with many sources 
reporting that the network requires the same amount of electricity in a year as entire coun-
tries such as Denmark or Ireland (Compare, 2018). China has already started to crack 
down on this issue and has announced that it plans to shut down Bitcoin miners. I believe 
that more governments will adopt a similar approach to regulating Bitcoin in the year 
ahead.  
Similarly, despite a meteoric rise in market price in 2017, Ethereum also remains rela-
tively unsuccessful. The vision for Ethereum is to create a platform for others to develop 
smart contracts. Ether, the cryptocurrency, is simply a fuel to run this platform. Therefore, 
the rise in the price of Ether over the past 12 months is a double-edged sword in that it 
has now become more expensive to develop and interact with smart contract applications 
hosted on the Ethereum network.  
However, there have been signs of progress to come, tongue-in-cheek though it may ap-
pear. November 2017 saw the launch of perhaps the first viral Ethereum application, 
CryptoKitties (CryptoKitties, 2018). CryptoKitties is an online marketplace where users 
can buy virtual cats with Ethereum and then breed them with other users of the service. 





of the Ethereum network to host a smart contract application that tracks the provenance 
of digital assets in a secure, verifiable, and immutable fashion.  
Plans for more serious applications have been announced, and we will likely see many of 
these go live in the next 12 months. In May 2017, Bank of America demonstrated the 
progress it had made on an Ethereum-based application that automates the process of 
creating a standby letter of credit ("Bank of America Reveals Progress on Ethereum-
Based Application for Global Treasuries," 2017). Both the Canadian and Russian gov-
ernments have expressed significant interest in Ethereum as well, perhaps due to Vitalik 
Buterin, founder of the network, holding dual citizenship in these countries. Moreover, 
the Enterprise Ethereum Alliance, formed in May 2017, now consists of roughly 200 
companies, ranging from Fortune 500 companies to start-ups, all working to develop 
smart contract applications on the Ethereum platform (Alliance, 2017). I predict that 2018 
will be the year that these applications begin to go live.  
Another significant value proposition offered by Ethereum is that it is actively working 
on moving from the energy-sapping POW mining process to proof-of-stake (POS), which 
is said to be far more environmentally friendly and more efficient to run. Ethereum ex-
pects this transition to be completed in the next year.  
Although 2017 was the year that the cryptocurrency market exploded, I believe that the 
unprecedented growth has exposed Bitcoin as an impractical alternative to traditional, 
government-backed currencies. Ethereum, on the other hand, has benefited from the in-






9.6 Survey Questions from Chapter 5 
Questionnaire 
Questions for Management 
Are the teams in your organisation distributed among; different departments in the 
same office, different offices in the same country, different offices in multiple 
countries? 
Do project teams in your organisation consist of members from the same operating 
department or many different operating departments? 
What is the typical size of a project team in your organisation? 4 or less, 4-10, 10+ 
How do you currently track and reward individual contributions to an overall group 
project? (End-of-week Timesheet system or a more holistic approach) 
From a managerial perspective, do you see any weaknesses in the current approach to 
tracking individual contributions? What do you believe is not being captured by the 
current system which should be captured in order to properly reflect an individual’s 
output. 
From a user-experience perspective, what are the primary pain points you encounter 
when using this system? 
When conducting performance reviews, what metrics do you currently use to assess 
employee performance? 
What additional metrics would you like to have data on if it were possible to assist 
you in your review? 
Do you believe that when operating as part of a Distributed Collaboration group, 
individual members begin to feel less responsible for the overall success or failure of 
a project?  
If so how do you attempt to combat this? 
Do you believe that when operating as part of a Distributed Collaboration group, 
individual members find it difficult to establish a personal relationship with their 
colleagues due to a lack of face-to-face social interaction?  
If so how do you attempt to combat this? 
Do you currently recognise or reward unsuccessful attempts to innovate/solve 
problems being faced by a group in your organisation? 
Do you believe that individuals are reluctant to contribute an innovative idea to assist 
in a group project for fear that their IP will not be recognised or rewarded? 
Do you experience issues with task allocation in group projects whereby multiple 
streams are attempting to tackle the same issue rather than each member adopting 
separate approaches and then sharing their results with one another? 
Do you believe that employees in your organisation recognise the personal benefits of 
contributing to the overall objective of a group project (are your employees 
intrinsically motivated to contribute)? 
Do you believe that a system that would record each individuals contribution to a 
group project could improve employee motivation to work? 
If there was a system in place for tracking individual contributions to group projects, 
what do you believe would be the key factors to success for this system? 
If there was a system in place for tracking individual contributions to group projects, 






Questions for Employees 
Do you believe that when operating as part of a Distributed Collaboration group, your 
own contribution is being recognised and rewarded by management? 
How is your contribution to group projects currently recorded? Timesheet systems 
etc. 
From a user-experience perspective, what are the primary pain points you encounter 
when using this system? 
Do you believe that the current approach is effectively capturing a true reflection of 
the contribution you make to your team? 
What aspects of your work would you like to see captured by a system in order to 
guarantee that management is aware of your efforts? 
When operating in group projects, what performance metrics are you judged on? 
What additional metrics would you like to see gathered and analysed by management 
to present a better representation of your performance?  
Do you believe that when operating as part of a Distributed Collaboration group, your 
own contributions contribute directly to the overall success or failure of the group?  
Do you believe that when operating as part of a Distributed Collaboration group, 
members from other business functions are often the cause of issues within the group 
that lead to project failure? 
Do you believe that when operating as part of a Distributed Collaboration group, it is 
difficult to establish a personal relationship with their colleagues due to a lack of 
face-to-face social interaction?  
When operating as part of a Distributed Collaboration group have you ever been 
reluctant to contribute an idea to the team for fear that your IP will be consumed by 
the team and your individual effort will not be recognised and rewarded? 
In terms of end of year bonuses or internal rewards, do you believe these are allocated 
based on performance data that has been analysed by management or a more personal 
selection process? 
Do you believe that a data-driven approach to these programs would be more 
suitable?  
If there was a system in place for tracking individual contributions to group projects, 
what do you believe would be the key factors to success for this system? 
If there was a system in place for tracking individual contributions to group projects, 







9.7 Survey Questions from Chapter 6 
Questionnaire 
Creative Ancestry 
The system makes it easy for everyone to see the ideas that were presented by 
different people. 
I feel it would be difficult for someone to take all the credit by hiding the contribution 
made by other people. 
The system makes it easy to see the specific people responsible for developing an 
idea. 
It was easy to see how individual ideas grew from previous ideas put forward by 
other people. 
I could see how a particular idea emerged as part of a larger conversation involving 
multiple people. 
Perceived distributive justice 
I had an important contribution to this ideation collaboration. 
The credit I receive from this ideation collaboration is likely to be fair. 
Each person had an important contribution to this ideation collaboration. 
The credit each person receives from this ideation collaboration is likely to be fair. 
Perceived procedural justice 
The system used for this ideation collaboration has fair policies for each person using 
it. 
The system used for this ideation collaboration generally treats all people using it 
fairly. 
The system used for this ideation collaboration is equitable in its treatment of each 
person using it. 
Perceived interactional justice 
Each person participating in this ideation collaboration is honest in dealing with other 
people. 
Each person participating in this ideation collaboration respects the other people 
using it. 
Each person participating in this ideation collaboration always communicates with 
other people using it openly and directly. 
Each person participating in this ideation collaboration always provides other people 
using it timely feedback. 
Collaboration 
The people participating in this ideation collaboration figured out effective ways to 
communicate. 
The people participating in this ideation collaboration worked together in developing 
new high-level topics. 
The people participating in this ideation collaboration collaborated in coming up with 
new ideas. 
The people participating in this ideation collaboration collaborated in fleshing out the 
details of ideas. 
The people participating in this ideation collaboration had frequent interactions when 






The ideation collaboration system was satisfactory as a whole. 
The ideation collaboration system is of high quality. 
The ideation collaboration system meets my expectations. 
Group Creativity 
We were insightful in our work  
I felt like we were innovative in our thinking 
Overall, I think our ideas were creative 
Cognitive Group Consensus 
I am confident in the ideas the group put forward 
I feel the ideas selected were the best ideas the group came up with 
I personally argued for specific ideas before they were selected 
The ideas selected were consistent with my own personal priorities and interests 
Behavioural intention to use 
Assuming that I have access to mobile banking systems, I intend to use them. 
I intend to increase my use of mobile banking in the future. 
Control variables 
Did you contribute one or more ideas? (Y/N) 
Did you vote on one or more other people’s ideas? (Y/N) 
Age: __/prefer not to say 






9.8 Solidity Smart Contract 
pragma solidity ^0.4.19; 
contract Threads { 
  struct IdeaStruct { 
    uint ideaID; 
    string ideaText; 
    address ideaOwner; 
    string ownerName; 
    uint ideaTime; 
    uint ideaVotes; 
    bool isIdea; 
    bool isAgreed; 
  } 
  struct CommentStruct { 
    uint ideaID; 
    uint commentID; 
    string commentText; 
    address commentOwner; 
    string ownerName; 
    uint commentTime; 
    uint commentVotes; 





    bool isAgreed; 
  } 
  mapping(uint => IdeaStruct) public ideaStructs; 
  mapping(uint => CommentStruct) public commentStructs; 
  event NewIdea(uint indexed _ideaID, string _ideaText, address _ideaOwner, string 
ownerName, uint _ideaTime, uint _ideaVotes, bool _isIdea, bool _isAgreed); 
event NewComment(uint indexed _ideaID, uint indexed _commentID, string _com-
mentText, address _commentOwner, string ownerName, uint _commentTime, uint 
_commentVotes, bool _isComment, bool _isAgreed); 
  uint[] public ideaList; 
  uint[] public commentList; 
  function isIdea(uint ideaID) public constant returns(bool isIndeed) { 
      return ideaStructs[ideaID].isIdea; 
  } 
  function ideaVoteCount (uint ideaID) public constant returns(uint voteCount){ 
      return ideaStructs[ideaID].ideaVotes; 
  } 
  function isIdeaAgreed(uint ideaID) public constant returns(bool isIndeedAgreed) { 
      return ideaStructs[ideaID].isAgreed; 
  } 
  function isComment(uint commentID) public constant returns(bool isIndeed) { 





  } 
  function commentVoteCount (uint commentID) public constant returns(uint 
voteCount){ 
      return commentStructs[commentID].commentVotes; 
  } 
  function isCommentAgreed(uint commentID) public constant returns(bool isIn-
deedAgreed) { 
      return commentStructs[commentID].isAgreed; 
  } 
  function getIdeaCount() public constant returns(uint ideaCount) { 
    return ideaList.length; 
  } 
  function getCommentCount() public constant returns(uint commentCount) { 
    return commentList.length; 
  } 
  function newIdea(string ideaText, string ownerName) public returns(uint rowNumber) 
{ 
    uint IdeaCount = ideaList.length; 
    uint ID = IdeaCount + 1; 
    require (!isIdea(ID)); 
    ideaStructs[ID].ideaID = ID; 





    ideaStructs[ID].ideaOwner = msg.sender; 
    ideaStructs[ID].ownerName = ownerName; 
    ideaStructs[ID].ideaTime = now; 
    ideaStructs[ID].ideaVotes = 0; 
    ideaStructs[ID].isIdea = true; 
    ideaStructs[ID].isAgreed = false; 
    NewIdea(ID, ideaText, msg.sender, ownerName, now, 0, true, false); 
    return ideaList.push(ID) - 1; 
  } 
  function newComment(uint ideaID, string commentText, string ownerName) public re-
turns(uint rowNumber) { 
    uint CommentCount = commentList.length; 
    uint ID = CommentCount + 1; 
    require (!isComment(ID)); 
    commentStructs[ID].ideaID = ideaID; 
    commentStructs[ID].commentID = ID; 
    commentStructs[ID].commentText = commentText; 
    commentStructs[ID].commentOwner = msg.sender; 
    commentStructs[ID].ownerName = ownerName; 
    commentStructs[ID].commentTime = now; 
    commentStructs[ID].commentVotes = 0; 





    commentStructs[ID].isAgreed = false; 
    NewComment(ideaID,ID, commentText, msg.sender, ownerName, now, 0, true, 
false); 
    return commentList.push(ID) - 1; 
  } 
  function updateIdeaVotes(uint ideaID) public returns(bool success) { 
    require (isIdea(ideaID)); 
    require (!isIdeaAgreed(ideaID)); 
    if (ideaVoteCount(ideaID) == 4){ 
    ideaStructs[ideaID].ideaVotes ++; 
    ideaStructs[ideaID].isAgreed = true; 
    } 
    else{ 
    ideaStructs[ideaID].ideaVotes ++; 
    return true; 
  } 
  } 
  function updateCommentVotes(uint commentID) public returns(bool success) { 
    require(isComment(commentID)); 
    require (!isCommentAgreed(commentID)); 
    if (commentVoteCount(commentID) == 4){ 





        commentStructs[commentID].isAgreed = true; 
    } 
    else{ 
    commentStructs[commentID].commentVotes ++; 
    return true; 
  } 







9.9 R Scripts for Cryptocurrency Market Analysis 










Bitcoin <- read.csv("/Users/kevinoleary/College Drive/State Street ATC/4.Crypto Mar-
ket Paper/ECIS 2019/Data Analysis/Raw Data/BTC-USD.csv") 
Ether <- read.csv("/Users/kevinoleary/College Drive/State Street ATC/4.Crypto Market 
Paper/ECIS 2019/Data Analysis/Raw Data/ETH-USD.csv") 
Litecoin <- read.csv("/Users/kevinoleary/College Drive/State Street ATC/4.Crypto Mar-
ket Paper/ECIS 2019/Data Analysis/Raw Data/LTC-USD.csv") 
Euro <- read.csv("/Users/kevinoleary/College Drive/State Street ATC/4.Crypto Market 
Paper/ECIS 2019/Data Analysis/Raw Data/EUR-USD.csv") 
JapYen <- read.csv("/Users/kevinoleary/College Drive/State Street ATC/4.Crypto Mar-
ket Paper/ECIS 2019/Data Analysis/Raw Data/JPY-USD.csv") 





BTCweekly <- read.csv("/Users/kevinoleary/College Drive/State Street ATC/4.Crypto 
Market Paper/ECIS 2019/Data Analysis/Raw Data/Weekly Raw Data/BTC-USD.csv") 
ETHweekly <- read.csv("/Users/kevinoleary/College Drive/State Street ATC/4.Crypto 
Market Paper/ECIS 2019/Data Analysis/Raw Data/Weekly Raw Data/ETH-USD.csv") 
LTCweekly <- read.csv("/Users/kevinoleary/College Drive/State Street ATC/4.Crypto 
Market Paper/ECIS 2019/Data Analysis/Raw Data/Weekly Raw Data/LTC-USD.csv") 
EURweekly <- read.csv("/Users/kevinoleary/College Drive/State Street ATC/4.Crypto 
Market Paper/ECIS 2019/Data Analysis/Raw Data/Weekly Raw Data/EUR-USD.csv") 
GBPweekly <- read.csv("/Users/kevinoleary/College Drive/State Street ATC/4.Crypto 
Market Paper/ECIS 2019/Data Analysis/Raw Data/Weekly Raw Data/GBP-USD.csv") 
JPYweekly <- read.csv("/Users/kevinoleary/College Drive/State Street ATC/4.Crypto 
Market Paper/ECIS 2019/Data Analysis/Raw Data/Weekly Raw Data/JPY-USD.csv") 
# Transform weekly data 
BTCweekly <- BTCweekly$Close 
ETHweekly <- ETHweekly$Close 
LTCweekly <- LTCweekly$Close 
EURweekly <- EURweekly$Price 
GBPweekly <- GBPweekly$Price 
JPYweekly <- JPYweekly$Price 
# Transform Bitcoin data 
BTC <- Bitcoin$Close 
BTClog <- log(BTC) 





BTCdiff2 <- BTCdiff+((min(BTCdiff)*-1)+1) 
confirm <- max(BTCdiff) - min(BTCdiff) 
confirm2 <- max(BTCdiff2) - min(BTCdiff2) 
BTClogdiff <- log(BTCdiff2) 
BTCdiff2 <- diff(BTC, differences = 2) 
# Transform Ether data 
ETH <- Ether$Close 
ETHlog <- log(ETH) 
ETHdiff <- diff(ETH, differences = 1) 
ETHdiff2 <- ETHdiff+((min(ETHdiff)*-1)+1) 
confirm <- max(ETHdiff) - min(ETHdiff) 
confirm2 <- max(ETHdiff2) - min(ETHdiff2) 
ETHlogdiff <- log(ETHdiff2) 
ETHdiff2 <- diff(ETH, differences = 2) 
# Transform Litecoin data 
LTC <- Litecoin$Close 
LTClog <- log(LTC) 
LTCdiff <- diff(LTC, differences = 1) 
LTCdiff2 <- LTCdiff+((min(LTCdiff)*-1)+1) 
confirm <- max(LTCdiff) - min(LTCdiff) 







LTClogdiff <- log(LTCdiff2) 
LTCdiff2 <- diff(LTC, differences = 2) 
# Transform Euro data 
EUR <- Euro$Price 
EURlog <- log(EUR) 
EURdiff <- diff(EUR, differences = 1) 
EURdiff2 <- EURdiff+((min(EURdiff)*-1)+1) 
confirm <- max(EURdiff) - min(EURdiff) 
confirm2 <- max(EURdiff2) - min(EURdiff2) 
EURlogdiff <- log(EURdiff2) 
EURdiff2 <- diff(EUR, differences = 2) 
# Transform JPYo data 
JPY <- JapYen$Price 
JPYlog <- log(JPY) 
JPYdiff <- diff(JPY, differences = 1) 
JPYdiff2 <- JPYdiff+((min(JPYdiff)*-1)+1) 
confirm <- max(JPYdiff) - min(JPYdiff) 
confirm2 <- max(JPYdiff2) - min(JPYdiff2) 
JPYlogdiff <- log(JPYdiff2) 
JPYdiff2 <- diff(JPY, differences = 2) 





CryptoPriceChart <- data.frame(BTC, ETH, LTC, XRP)  






CurrenciesWeekly <- data.frame(BTCweekly, ETHweekly, LTCweekly, EURweekly, 
GBPweekly, JPYweekly)  
colnames(CurrenciesWeekly) <- c("BTC","ETH","LTC", "EUR", "GBP", "JPY") 
corrplot(corrplotCurrenciesWeekly, p.mat = res1$p, sig.level = .05) 
corrplotCurrenciesWeekly <- cor(CurrenciesWeekly, method = c("pearson")) 
summary(corrplotCurrenciesWeekly) 
corrplot(corrplotCurrenciesWeekly) 
col <- colorRampPalette(c("#BB4444", "#EE9988", "#FFFFFF", "#77AADD", 
"#4477AA")) 
res1 <- cor.mtest(CurrenciesWeekly, conf.level = .95) 
corrplot(corrplotCurrenciesWeekly, method="color", col=col(200),   
         type="full",  
         addCoef.col = "black", # Add coefficient of correlation 
         tl.col="black", tl.srt=45) #Text label color and rotation) 





         type="full",  
         p.mat = corrplotCurrenciesWeekly, insig = "p-value") 
corrplot(corrplotCurrenciesWeekly, p.mat = res1$p, insig = "p-value") 
BTCETHChart <- data.frame(BTC, ETH)  
colnames(BTCETHChart) <- c("BTC","ETH") 
plot(BTC, ETH) 
9.9.2 Stationarity Tests 
                                                      ############## ADF and KPSS tests for Stationarity 
                                                      ############## ADF tests for Stationarity 
# Run ADF tests for Bitcoin 
BTCadf <- adf.test(BTC) 
BTClogadf <- adf.test(BTClog) 
BTCdiffadf <- adf.test(BTCdiff) 
BTClogdiffadf <- adf.test(BTClogdiff) 
BTCdiffadf2 <- adf.test(BTCdiff2) 
# Run ADF tests for Ether 
ETHadf <- adf.test(ETH) 
ETHlogadf <- adf.test(ETHlog) 
ETHdiffadf <- adf.test(ETHdiff) 
ETHlogdiffadf <- adf.test(ETHlogdiff) 
ETHdiffadf2 <- adf.test(ETHdiff2) 





LTCadf <- adf.test(LTC) 
LTClogadf <- adf.test(LTClog) 
LTCdiffadf <- adf.test(LTCdiff) 
LTClogdiffadf <- adf.test(LTClogdiff) 
LTCdiffadf2 <- adf.test(LTCdiff2) 
# Run ADF tests for Euro 
EURadf <- adf.test(EUR) 
EURlogadf <- adf.test(EURlog) 
EURdiffadf <- adf.test(EURdiff) 
EURlogdiffadf <- adf.test(EURlogdiff) 
EURdiffadf2 <- adf.test(EURdiff2) 
# Run ADF tests for JPYo 
JPYadf <- adf.test(JPY) 
JPYlogadf <- adf.test(JPYlog) 
JPYdiffadf <- adf.test(JPYdiff) 
JPYlogdiffadf <- adf.test(JPYlogdiff) 
JPYdiffadf2 <- adf.test(JPYdiff2) 
############## ADF Tests Results  
BTCadfpvalue <- BTCadf$p.value 
BTClogadfpvalue <- BTClogadf$p.value 
BTCdiffadfpvalue <- BTCdiffadf$p.value 





BTCdiffadfpvalue2 <- BTCdiffadf2$p.value 
ETHadfpvalue <- ETHadf$p.value 
ETHlogadfpvalue <- ETHlogadf$p.value 
ETHdiffadfpvalue <- ETHdiffadf$p.value 
ETHlogdiffadfpvalue <- ETHlogdiffadf$p.value 
ETHdiffadfpvalue2 <- ETHdiffadf2$p.value 
LTCadfpvalue <- LTCadf$p.value 
LTClogadfpvalue <- LTClogadf$p.value 
LTCdiffadfpvalue <- LTCdiffadf$p.value 
LTClogdiffadfpvalue <- LTClogdiffadf$p.value 
LTCdiffadfpvalue2 <- LTCdiffadf2$p.value 
EURadfpvalue <- EURadf$p.value 
EURlogadfpvalue <- EURlogadf$p.value 
EURdiffadfpvalue <- EURdiffadf$p.value 
EURlogdiffadfpvalue <- EURlogdiffadf$p.value 
EURdiffadfpvalue2 <- EURdiffadf2$p.value 
JPYadfpvalue <- JPYadf$p.value 
JPYlogadfpvalue <- JPYlogadf$p.value 
JPYdiffadfpvalue <- JPYdiffadf$p.value 
JPYlogdiffadfpvalue <- JPYlogdiffadf$p.value 





pvaluesadf <- c(BTCadfpvalue, BTClogadfpvalue, BTCdiffadfpvalue, BTClogdiffad-
fpvalue, BTCdiffadfpvalue, 
                ETHadfpvalue, ETHlogadfpvalue, ETHdiffadfpvalue, ETHlogdiffadfpvalue, 
ETHdiffadfpvalue2, 
                LTCadfpvalue, LTClogadfpvalue, LTCdiffadfpvalue, LTClogdiffadfpvalue, 
LTCdiffadfpvalue2, 
                EURadfpvalue, EURlogadfpvalue, EURdiffadfpvalue, EURlogdiffadfpvalue, 
EURdiffadfpvalue2, 
                JPYadfpvalue, JPYlogadfpvalue, JPYdiffadfpvalue, JPYlogdiffadfpvalue, 
JPYdiffadfpvalue2) 
#Create adf Data Frame 
dfadf <- data.frame(pvaluesadf) 
rownames(dfadf) <- c("BTC", "BTClog", "BTCdiff", "BTClogdiff","BTCdiff2", 
                     "ETH", "ETHlog", "ETHdiff", "ETHlogdiff", "ETHdiff2", 
                     "LTC", "LTClog", "LTCdiff", "LTClogdiff", "LTCdiff2", 
                     "EUR", "EURlog", "EURdiff", "EURlogdiff", "EURdiff2", 
                     "JPY", "JPYlog", "JPYdiff", "JPYlogdiff", "JPYdiff2") 
                                                ############## KPSS tests for Stationarity 
# Run KPSS tests for Bitcoin 
BTCkpss <- kpss.test(BTC) 
BTClogkpss <- kpss.test(BTClog) 





BTClogdiffkpss <- kpss.test(BTClogdiff) 
BTCdiffkpss2 <- kpss.test(BTCdiff2) 
# Run KPSS tests for Ether 
ETHkpss <- kpss.test(ETH) 
ETHlogkpss <- kpss.test(ETHlog) 
ETHdiffkpss <- kpss.test(ETHdiff) 
ETHlogdiffkpss <- kpss.test(ETHlogdiff) 
ETHdiffkpss2 <- kpss.test(ETHdiff2) 
# Run KPSS tests for Litecoin 
LTCkpss <- kpss.test(LTC) 
LTClogkpss <- kpss.test(LTClog) 
LTCdiffkpss <- kpss.test(LTCdiff) 
LTClogdiffkpss <- kpss.test(LTClogdiff) 
LTCdiffkpss2 <- kpss.test(LTCdiff2) 
# Run KPSS tests for Euro 
EURkpss <- kpss.test(EUR) 
EURlogkpss <- kpss.test(EURlog) 
EURdiffkpss <- kpss.test(EURdiff) 
EURlogdiffkpss <- kpss.test(EURlogdiff) 
EURdiffkpss2 <- kpss.test(EURdiff2) 
# Run KPSS tests for Euro 





JPYlogkpss <- kpss.test(JPYlog) 
JPYdiffkpss <- kpss.test(JPYdiff) 
JPYlogdiffkpss <- kpss.test(JPYlogdiff) 
JPYdiffkpss2 <- kpss.test(JPYdiff2) 
############## KPSS Tests Results 
BTCkpsspvalue <- BTCkpss$p.value 
BTClogkpsspvalue <- BTClogkpss$p.value 
BTCdiffkpsspvalue <- BTCdiffkpss$p.value 
BTClogdiffkpsspvalue <- BTClogdiffkpss$p.value 
BTCdiffkpsspvalue2 <- BTCdiffkpss2$p.value 
ETHkpsspvalue <- ETHkpss$p.value 
ETHlogkpsspvalue <- ETHlogkpss$p.value 
ETHdiffkpsspvalue <- ETHdiffkpss$p.value 
ETHlogdiffkpsspvalue <- ETHlogdiffkpss$p.value 
ETHdiffkpsspvalue2 <- ETHdiffkpss2$p.value 
LTCkpsspvalue <- LTCkpss$p.value 
LTClogkpsspvalue <- LTClogkpss$p.value 
LTCdiffkpsspvalue <- LTCdiffkpss$p.value 
LTClogdiffkpsspvalue <- LTClogdiffkpss$p.value 
LTCdiffkpsspvalue2 <- LTCdiffkpss2$p.value 
EURkpsspvalue <- EURkpss$p.value 





EURdiffkpsspvalue <- EURdiffkpss$p.value 
EURlogdiffkpsspvalue <- EURlogdiffkpss$p.value 
EURdiffkpsspvalue2 <- EURdiffkpss2$p.value 
JPYkpsspvalue <- JPYkpss$p.value 
JPYlogkpsspvalue <- JPYlogkpss$p.value 
JPYdiffkpsspvalue <- JPYdiffkpss$p.value 
JPYlogdiffkpsspvalue <- JPYlogdiffkpss$p.value 
JPYdiffkpsspvalue2 <- JPYdiffkpss2$p.value 
pvalueskpss <- c(BTCkpsspvalue, BTClogkpsspvalue, BTCdiffkpsspvalue, BTClog-
diffkpsspvalue, BTCdiffkpsspvalue2, 
                ETHkpsspvalue, ETHlogkpsspvalue, ETHdiffkpsspvalue, ETHlog-
diffkpsspvalue, ETHdiffkpsspvalue2, 
                LTCkpsspvalue, LTClogkpsspvalue, LTCdiffkpsspvalue, LTClog-
diffkpsspvalue, LTCdiffkpsspvalue2, 
                EURkpsspvalue, EURlogkpsspvalue, EURdiffkpsspvalue, EURlog-
diffkpsspvalue, EURdiffkpsspvalue2, 
                JPYkpsspvalue, JPYlogkpsspvalue, JPYdiffkpsspvalue, JPYlog-
diffkpsspvalue, JPYdiffkpsspvalue2) 
#Create kpss Data Frame 
dfkpss <- data.frame(pvalueskpss) 
rownames(dfkpss) <- c("BTC", "BTClog", "BTCdiff", "BTClogdiff", "BTCdiff2", 





                     "LTC", "LTClog", "LTCdiff", "LTClogdiff", "LTCdiff2", 
                     "EUR", "EURlog", "EURdiff", "EURlogdiff", "EURdiff2", 
                     "JPY", "JPYlog", "JPYdiff", "JPYlogdiff", "JPYdiff2") 
##Combined Data Frame of Both Results 
dfStationarityPvalues <- cbind(dfkpss, dfadf) 
9.9.3 VAR Tests 
                                                            ####      Diff Log      ##### 
                                                              ###   BTC vs ETH  #### 
BTCETHdifflog=cbind(BTClogdiff, ETHlogdiff) 
BTCETHdifflog_VAR=VAR(BTCETHdifflog, type = "const", lag=1, ic="AIC") 
BTCETHdifflog_VAR 
##Null: btc does not cause eth 
causality(BTCETHdifflog_VAR, cause = "BTClogdiff")$Granger 
##Null: eth does not cause btc 
causality(BTCETHdifflog_VAR, cause = "ETHlogdiff")$Granger 
                                                                ###   BTC vs LTC  #### 
BTCLTCdifflog=cbind(BTClogdiff, LTClogdiff) 
BTCLTCdifflog_VAR=VAR(BTCLTCdifflog, type = "const", lag=1, ic="AIC") 
BTCLTCdifflog_VAR 
##Null: btc does not cause eth 
causality(BTCLTCdifflog_VAR, cause = "BTClogdiff")$Granger 





causality(BTCLTCdifflog_VAR, cause = "LTClogdiff")$Granger 
                                                                ###   ETH vs LTC  #### 
ETHLTCdifflog=cbind(ETHlogdiff, LTClogdiff) 
ETHLTCdifflog_VAR=VAR(ETHLTCdifflog, type = "const", lag=1, ic="AIC") 
ETHLTCdifflog_VAR 
##Null: Litecoin does not cause Ether 
causality(ETHLTCdifflog_VAR, cause = "LTClogdiff")$Granger 
##Null: Ether does not cause Litecoin 
causality(ETHLTCdifflog_VAR, cause = "ETHlogdiff")$Granger 
###   BTC vs EUR  #### 
BTCEURdifflog=cbind(BTClogdiff, EURlogdiff) 
BTCEURdifflog_VAR=VAR(BTCEURdifflog, type = "const", lag=1, ic="AIC") 
BTCEURdifflog_VAR 
##Null: btc does not cause EUR 
causality(BTCEURdifflog_VAR, cause = "BTClogdiff")$Granger 
##Null: EUR does not cause btc 
causality(BTCEURdifflog_VAR, cause = "EURlogdiff")$Granger 
###   LTC vs EUR  #### 
LTCEURdifflog=cbind(LTClogdiff, EURlogdiff) 
LTCEURdifflog_VAR=VAR(LTCEURdifflog, type = "const", lag=1, ic="AIC") 
LTCEURdifflog_VAR 





causality(LTCEURdifflog_VAR, cause = "LTClogdiff")$Granger 
##Null: EUR does not cause LTC 
causality(LTCEURdifflog_VAR, cause = "EURlogdiff")$Granger 
###   ETH vs EUR  #### 
ETHEURdifflog=cbind(ETHlogdiff, EURlogdiff) 
ETHEURdifflog_VAR=VAR(ETHEURdifflog, type = "const", lag=1, ic="AIC") 
ETHEURdifflog_VAR 
##Null: ETH does not cause EUR 
causality(ETHEURdifflog_VAR, cause = "ETHlogdiff")$Granger 
##Null: EUR does not cause ETH 
causality(ETHEURdifflog_VAR, cause = "EURlogdiff")$Granger 
###   BTC vs JPY  #### 
BTCJPYdifflog=cbind(BTClogdiff, JPYlogdiff) 
BTCJPYdifflog_VAR=VAR(BTCJPYdifflog, type = "const", lag=1, ic="AIC") 
BTCJPYdifflog_VAR 
##Null: btc does not cause JPY 
causality(BTCJPYdifflog_VAR, cause = "BTClogdiff")$Granger 
##Null: JPY does not cause btc 
causality(BTCJPYdifflog_VAR, cause = "JPYlogdiff")$Granger 
###   LTC vs JPY  #### 
LTCJPYdifflog=cbind(LTClogdiff, JPYlogdiff) 






##Null: LTC does not cause JPY 
causality(LTCJPYdifflog_VAR, cause = "LTClogdiff")$Granger 
##Null: JPY does not cause LTC 
causality(LTCJPYdifflog_VAR, cause = "JPYlogdiff")$Granger 
###   ETH vs JPY  #### 
ETHJPYdifflog=cbind(ETHlogdiff, JPYlogdiff) 
ETHJPYdifflog_VAR=VAR(ETHJPYdifflog, type = "const", lag=1, ic="AIC") 
ETHJPYdifflog_VAR 
##Null: ETH does not cause JPY 
causality(ETHJPYdifflog_VAR, cause = "ETHlogdiff")$Granger 
##Null: JPY does not cause ETH 
causality(ETHJPYdifflog_VAR, cause = "JPYlogdiff")$Granger 
###   EUR vs JPY  #### 
EURJPYdifflog=cbind(EURlogdiff, JPYlogdiff) 
EURJPYdifflog_VAR=VAR(EURJPYdifflog, type = "const", lag=1, ic="AIC") 
EURJPYdifflog_VAR 
##Null: EUR does not cause JPY 
causality(EURJPYdifflog_VAR, cause = "EURlogdiff")$Granger 
##Null: JPY does not cause EUR 






9.9.4 IRF Graphs 
                                                  ### BTC-ETH 
#Forecast from shocks with impulse response 
irf.BTCETH <-irf(BTCETHdifflog_VAR, impulse = "BTClogdiff",  
                        response = "ETHlogdiff", boot =TRUE, 
                        n.ahead=7,cumulative=TRUE,ci=0.95) 
#Plot impulse response function 
plot(irf.BTCETH, lwd=4) 
#Forecast from shocks with impulse response 
irf.ETHBTC <-irf(BTCETHdifflog_VAR, impulse = "ETHlogdiff",  
                            response = "BTClogdiff", boot =TRUE, 
                            n.ahead=7,cumulative=TRUE,ci=0.95) 
#Plot impulse response function 
plot(irf.ETHBTC, lwd=4) 
                                                      ### BTC-LTC 
#Forecast from shocks with impulse response 
irf.BTCLTC <-irf(BTCLTCdifflog_VAR, impulse = "BTClogdiff",  
                 response = "LTClogdiff", boot =TRUE, 
                 n.ahead=7,cumulative=TRUE,ci=0.95) 
#Plot impulse response function 
plot(irf.BTCLTC, lwd=4) 





irf.LTCBTC <-irf(BTCLTCdifflog_VAR, impulse = "LTClogdiff",  
                 response = "BTClogdiff", boot =TRUE, 
                 n.ahead=7,cumulative=TRUE,ci=0.95) 
#Plot impulse response function 
plot(irf.LTCBTC, lwd=4) 
                                                      ### LTC-ETH 
#Forecast from shocks with impulse response 
irf.LTCETH <-irf(ETHLTCdifflog_VAR, impulse = "LTClogdiff",  
                 response = "ETHlogdiff", boot =TRUE, 
                 n.ahead=7,cumulative=TRUE,ci=0.95) 
#Plot impulse response function 
plot(irf.LTCETH, lwd=4) 
#Forecast from shocks with impulse response 
irf.ETHLTC <-irf(ETHLTCdifflog_VAR, impulse = "ETHlogdiff",  
                 response = "LTClogdiff", boot =TRUE, 
                 n.ahead=7,cumulative=TRUE,ci=0.95) 
#Plot impulse response function 
plot(irf.ETHLTC, lwd=4) 
### BTC-EUR 
#Forecast from shocks with impulse response 
irf.BTCEUR <-irf(BTCEURdifflog_VAR, impulse = "BTClogdiff",  





                 n.ahead=7,cumulative=TRUE,ci=0.95) 
#Plot impulse response function 
plot(irf.BTCEUR, lwd=4) 
#Forecast from shocks with impulse response 
irf.EURBTC <-irf(BTCEURdifflog_VAR, impulse = "EURlogdiff",  
                 response = "BTClogdiff", boot =TRUE, 
                 n.ahead=7,cumulative=TRUE,ci=0.95) 
#Plot impulse response function 
plot(irf.EURBTC, lwd=4) 
### LTC-EUR 
#Forecast from shocks with impulse response 
irf.LTCEUR <-irf(LTCEURdifflog_VAR, impulse = "LTClogdiff",  
                 response = "EURlogdiff", boot =TRUE, 
                 n.ahead=7,cumulative=TRUE,ci=0.95) 
#Plot impulse response function 
plot(irf.LTCEUR, lwd=4) 
#Forecast from shocks with impulse response 
irf.EURLTC <-irf(LTCEURdifflog_VAR, impulse = "EURlogdiff",  
                 response = "LTClogdiff", boot =TRUE, 
                 n.ahead=7,cumulative=TRUE,ci=0.95) 







#Forecast from shocks with impulse response 
irf.ETHEUR <-irf(ETHEURdifflog_VAR, impulse = "ETHlogdiff",  
                 response = "EURlogdiff", boot =TRUE, 
                 n.ahead=7,cumulative=TRUE,ci=0.95) 
#Plot impulse response function 
plot(irf.ETHEUR, lwd=4) 
#Forecast from shocks with impulse response 
irf.EURETH <-irf(ETHEURdifflog_VAR, impulse = "EURlogdiff",  
                 response = "ETHlogdiff", boot =TRUE, 
                 n.ahead=7,cumulative=TRUE,ci=0.95) 
#Plot impulse response function 
plot(irf.EURETH, lwd=4) 
9.9.5 Polynomial Regression 
##Original Series 













##  Ether as a predictor of Bitcoin 
BTCtoETHcube <- lm(BTClog ~ ETHlog) 
summary(BTCtoETHcube) 
anova(BTCtoETHcube) 
BTCtoETHcube2 <- lm(BTClog ~ poly(ETHlog,2, raw=TRUE)) 
summary(BTCtoETHcube2) 
anova(BTCtoETHcube2) 
BTCtoETHcube3 <- lm(BTClog ~ poly(ETHlog,3, raw=TRUE)) 
summary(BTCtoETHcube3) 
anova(BTCtoETHcube3) 
##  Ether as a predictor of Litecoin 
LTCtoETHcubeLOG <- lm(LTClog ~ ETHlog) 
summary(LTCtoETHcubeLOG) 
anova(LTCtoETHcubeLOG) 
LTCtoETHcubeLOG2 <- lm(LTClog ~ poly(ETHlog,2, raw=TRUE)) 
summary(LTCtoETHcubeLOG2) 
anova(LTCtoETHcubeLOG2) 







##  Bitcoin as a predictor of Litecoin 
LTCtoBTCcubeLOG <- lm(LTClog ~ BTClog) 
summary(LTCtoBTCcubeLOG) 
anova(LTCtoBTCcubeLOG) 
LTCtoBTCcubeLOG2 <- lm(LTClog ~ poly(BTClog,2, raw=TRUE)) 
summary(LTCtoBTCcubeLOG2) 
anova(LTCtoBTCcubeLOG2) 
LTCtoBTCcubeLOG3 <- lm(LTClog ~ poly(BTClog,3, raw=TRUE)) 
summary(LTCtoBTCcubeLOG3) 
anova(LTCtoBTCcubeLOG3) 
###ETH vs BTC 
plot(BTClog, ETHlog) 
ETHtoBTCcube <- lm(ETHlog ~ BTClog) 
summary(ETHtoBTCcube) 
anova(ETHtoBTCcube) 
ETHtoBTCcube2 <- lm(ETHlog ~ poly(BTClog,2, raw=TRUE)) 
summary(ETHtoBTCcube2) 
anova(ETHtoBTCcube2) 
ETHtoBTCcube3 <- lm(ETHlog ~ poly(BTClog,3, raw=TRUE)) 
summary(ETHtoBTCcube3) 
anova(ETHtoBTCcube3) 






BTCtoLTCcubeLOG <- lm(BTClog ~ LTClog) 
summary(BTCtoLTCcubeLOG) 
anova(BTCtoLTCcubeLOG) 
BTCtoLTCcubeLOG2 <- lm(BTClog ~ poly(LTClog,2, raw=TRUE)) 
summary(BTCtoLTCcubeLOG2) 
anova(BTCtoLTCcubeLOG2) 
BTCtoLTCcubeLOG3 <- lm(BTClog ~ poly(LTClog,3, raw=TRUE)) 
summary(BTCtoLTCcubeLOG3) 
anova(BTCtoLTCcubeLOG3) 
###ETH vs LTC 
ETHtoLTCcubeLOG <- lm(ETHlog ~ LTClog) 
summary(ETHtoLTCcubeLOG) 
anova(ETHtoLTCcubeLOG) 
ETHtoLTCcubeLOG2 <- lm(ETHlog ~ poly(LTClog,2, raw=TRUE)) 
summary(ETHtoLTCcubeLOG2) 
anova(ETHtoLTCcubeLOG2) 








9.10 Description of Analysis Techniques Empoyed in Chapter 2. 
9.10.1 Stationarity and cointegration 
For each of the series, we tested their stationarity using KPSS (Kwiatkowski, Phillips, 
Schmidt, & Shin, 1992) and ADF (Dickey & Fuller, 1979) tests. The Kwiatkowski-Phil-
lips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests have opposite null 
and alternative hypotheses, thus forming an ideal pair for the stationarity versus unit root 
testing. Specifically, the KPSS tests are used for testing a null hypothesis that an observ-
able time series is stationary (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992), whereas the ADF test is applied 
to test the null hypothesis that a unit root is present in a time series (Dickey & Fuller, 
1979).  
A summary of the results of these tests is detailed in Table 2.2. For the prices of Bitcoin, 
Litecoin, and Ether we find both their original series and logarithmic series to be non-
stationary and to contain a unit root. Alternatively, we find the first difference series of 
Litecoin to be stationary. However, the same result is not found for the first difference 
series of Bitcoin or Ether. In fact, the results of these tests found the logarithmic differ-
ence series was the only transformation of all sets of data to be stationary. As detailed in 
Table 2.2 all three logarithmic difference series failed to reject the null hypothesis of 
stationarity in the KPSS test and rejected the null hypothesis of a unit root being present 
in the ADF test. 
9.10.2 Vector Autoregression  
The Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model is a model for two or more time series where 
each variable is modelled as a linear function of past values of all variables, plus disturb-
ances that have zero means given all past values of the observed variables (Wooldridge, 
2015). Vector Autoregression is a standard procedure for analysing causal relationships 





infer Granger Causality and impulse-response analysis. Impulse-response analysis is 
based on a vector moving average representation of VAR, showing the reaction of one 
variable to a unit shock in some other variable and how the effect vanishes over time 
(Enders, 2008; Hamilton, 1994). 
9.10.3 Granger Causality Results 
Based on the results from our VAR models, we were able to proceed to Granger Causality 
tests. This test is a key advantage of the VAR model as it follows the results of the model 
directly. Granger Causality is a statistical hypothesis test for determining whether one-
time series is useful in forecasting another (Granger, 1969). The Granger Causality tests 
express p-values for the VAR model, under the null hypothesis of no Granger Causality. 
If we achieve results that are statistically significant in rejecting the null hypothesis, then 
we can claim that there is a causality relationship between the variables tested 
(Wooldridge, 2015). The results of our Granger Causality tests are presented in Table 2.3 
and will be discussed in the findings section (Section 2.7). However, these results should 
be interpreted with caution as the term ‘causes’ in ‘Granger causes’ does not allow us to 
determine whether the variables are exogenous or endogenous (Wooldridge, 2015).  
9.10.4 Impulse Response Functions 
In addition, we calculated the impulse response functions of each variable to exogenous 
shocks on other variables, in the presence of correlated noise (Lütkepohl, 2005). The re-
sults of Granger Causality tests show whether or not a causal relationship exists between 
Bitcoin and the other altcoins. Impulse Response Functions represent how this effect per-
sists over time. If there is a reaction of one variable to an impulse in another variable we 





The results of these tests are illustrated in Figures 6.1 - 6.6. The charts show the response 
of a corresponding variable to a shock in the impulse variable. The impulse response 
function estimates the propagation of a shock of 1 standard deviation on a variable to the 
other variables (Garcia et al., 2014). The number of steps is displayed along the x-axis of 
each graph, in this case, we chose to analyse 10 steps, which represents 10 days as we are 
working with daily price data. The response of the corresponding variable to the given 
one-unit impulse change is displayed along the y-axis. The area between the dotted lines 
of each graph represents the 95% confidence interval. 
9.10.5 Polynomial Regression 
Polynomial regression is a type of regression analysis used in statistics to model the rela-
tionship between an independent variable and a dependent variable. Polynomials are 
widely used in situations where the response is curvilinear (Montgomery, Peck, & Vining, 
2012). Polynomial regression is advantageous over a standard linear regression in that it 
fits a non-linear relationship between the values of the independent and dependent varia-
bles. We estimate both quadratic and cubic polynomials on the logarithmic transformation 
of the original series of each data set in order to test our hypotheses by demonstrating that 
a polynomial regression of a higher order would be more predictive of the relationship 






9.11 Description on Analysis Techniques Employed in Chapter 6. 
A components-based estimation approach to structural equation modelling was taken to 
reflect the exploratory nature of theory building, specifically the partial least squares 
(PLS) method (Gefen & Straub, 2005; Gefen et al., 2000). Item loadings were first exam-
ined to determine convergent validity for the measures used. One item was dropped, after 
which loadings for all remaining items satisfied the criteria for a PLS model, i.e. the av-
erage loading for each construct is greater than .707 (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988; Gefen & 
Straub, 2005) and scores for the average variance extracted (AVE) each exceed .05 (Chin, 
1998) (see Table 6.2). Discriminant validity was also supported using the (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981) method, as the square root of AVE of each latent variable is greater than 
correlations among the latent variables, the results of this are displayed in Table 6.1. Re-
liability was supported as each construct satisfies the required threshold for composite 
reliability >.707 (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988). Lastly, a Harmon’s single factor test suggested 
common method variance was unproblematic at 39.6% (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).  
Once measures were validated, comparative tests were run to compare scores for con-
structs in the Creative Ancestry and control groups. Tests used the average scores for 
included indicators for each construct. Comparisons included standard two-tailed t-test 
assuming equal variances and non-parametric two-sided Mann-Whitney tests. The results 
are presented in Table 6.3.  
The results show mixed support for the utility of the system. Descriptively, the Creative 
Ancestry-enabled system scores more highly for each construct. Non-parametric tests 





However, t-tests do not demonstrate statistical significance at the .05 level for collabora-
tion or interactional justice, suggesting further exploration of the structural model is 
needed. 
PLS was used to analyse the structural model. Results are presented in Table 6.4 (inner 
model) and Table 6.5 (model with moderating variables)for a bootstrap test with 300 
samples. 
